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ABSTRACT 
INTERTHEORY: DISABILITY, ACCOMMODATION, AND THE WRITING OF 
COMPOSITION 
 
by 
 
Adam Pacton 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015 
Under the Supervision of Anne F. Wysocki 
 
 
Combining approaches from composition studies, legal studies, and disability studies, 
this project theorizes a new model of accommodation in composition (and beyond): 
“complex accommodation.” Complex accommodation frames disability as critical kairos; 
in other words, I argue that the encounter of disability and attendant necessity for 
accommodation creates a moment of practical and theoretical dissonance in composition 
that may reveal under-critiqued norms in individual classrooms, writing programs, and 
the field as a whole. This project provides the theoretical grounding and articulation of 
complex accommodation while also creating practical accommodational heuristics for 
instructors and writing programs.  
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Introduction  
The origins of this project are difficult to trace, and like any origin narrative of 
myself, it has become necessarily fabular and fictive even to me (Butler 39). That said, all 
fables worth remembering start with a good story. 
 While still in coursework as a Rhetoric and Composition PhD student, I 
participated in a writing workshop in which I was asked to develop a previous seminar 
paper into an elaborated, publishable article. I chose a paper written on Bakhtin and on 
Nancy Welch’s idea of sideshadowing and got to work.1 In short order, I was as restless 
as Bakhtin shows all texts and writers really are. The target journal, the peer- and 
professor-reviews, and the general structures of acceptability encoded in the field of 
Composition Studies were quietly squeezing the text at the same time I was trying to 
open it up to new possibilities. I felt that in both form and content the piece was merely 
another minor variation in a series of similar papers and articles. So, I turned to my 
teacher. 
 I expressed my concern and uneasiness for my work along with my confusion 
regarding the actual contours of Composition Studies, a sometimes protean field. In 
response, my professor issued me an invitation and a challenge. In general terms, she 
asked me to table the piece and address a number of related yet more fundamental 
                                                
1 In “One Student’s Many Voices: Reading, Writing, and Responding with Bakhtin” and 
“Sideshadowing Teacher Response,” Nancy Welch describes the possibilities of 
approaching student texts—and response to student texts—in a way that recognizes the 
inherent instabilities and uncertainties in such texts and capitalizes upon such 
indeterminacy by creating new opportunities for dialogue in texts: “In contrast with the 
much more common narrative device of foreshadowing, which fixes our attention on a 
predetermined future, sideshadowing redirects our attention to the present moment, its 
multiple conflicts, its multiple possibilities.” (376-77). 
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questions, questions which might help me to work out some of the frustrations and 
anxieties I was feeling. She asked: What are you doing when you teach composition, 
what’s at stake for students in the composition classroom, and what really is 
“Composition?” I was allowed and challenged to eschew formal requirements and instead 
to work through these questions in whatever ways I saw fit. I accepted and what followed 
was the beginning of a personal and professional process of destabilization. 
 Over the course of a few weeks, I hammered at my computer and at my sense of 
Composition Studies’ purposes, articulations, and interpellations. The resultant text 
reflected my sense of the conflicts within the field and within myself as a teacher and 
scholar of composition. In its genre-bending construction, it probed what the field 
permits, forbids, foregrounds, and elides. More importantly, it presented students, 
language, and the text itself as irreducibly complex and only partially accessible. With 
this realization—with this unstable, confusing, eclectic, and (I thought) beautiful text—I 
stood in front of the composition classes I was teaching that semester and felt like the 
doctor from Peter Shaffer’s Equus:  
In an ultimate sense I cannot know what I do in this place—yet I do ultimate 
things. Essentially I cannot know what I do—yet I do essential things. 
Irreversible, terminal things. I stand in the dark with a pick in my hand, striking at 
heads! I need—more desperately than my children need me—a way of seeing in 
the dark. (108-09) 
In one sense, invoking Dr. Dysart’s struggles with his methods and ends as a corollary of 
my own as a compositionist smacks of hyperbole, but in another sense the association 
rings true. If compositionists take seriously the imbrications of identity, language, and 
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rhetoric (as I think they do), then the process, product, and even play of composition 
becomes (as I say in my exploratory piece) “very fucking serious” (Pacton 77). My 
exploratory/experimental text and the process of composing it led me to a skeptical, 
conflicted place thrumming with dissonances. The text both describes such dissonances 
but also enacts them formally in the ways it plays with various multimodal elements and 
polyvocality. The reaction in workshop was, perhaps, unsurprising. 
 My peers approached my text in much the same way that I did: with confusion 
and some degree of discomfort. While they were undoubtedly generous readers, their 
comments and recommendations pulled the text centripetally towards something that 
more closely resembled an academic article in structure, form, and epistemological and 
rhetorical moves. While I discussed how our teacher had offered me an alternative textual 
invitation, our group still had difficulty moving outside of our frames of reference for 
how a “Composition text” ought to appear and function. Even so, I continued to 
experiment and see where the text could take me and the work of Composition Studies 
rather than focusing overmuch on aligning the piece with my notions of what the field 
expected as acceptable. When I brought the new text to my teacher, she praised the 
experimental effort, stretching, and flexing that the text afforded me, and she told me to 
take what I had learned in constructing the text and rewrite it as a conventional academic 
essay. Upon hearing this, I was conflicted. 
 I understood that we were participating in a writing workshop dedicated to 
crafting a text for academic publication, but I also knew that the text I composed was an 
organic whole. I believed that the proposed revision was a fundamental remediation and 
that such remediation would essentially change what was important about the piece. I was 
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conflicted insofar as I understood my teacher’s motivations and concern that such writing 
was heuristically valuable but might lack professional capital. So, I decided to see what 
scholars and writers in other contexts might think of what I had written—“Composing: 
An Ars Logica”—and I submitted the piece for publication at Writing on the Edge, a 
journal broadly dedicated to writing and the teaching of writing. The piece was accepted 
and was published as “imaginative nonfiction.” Although it was not published as an 
academic text, it still received a modicum of notice and even approval within the 
Composition Studies community, with Andrea Lunsford calling it “seriously delightful, 
demonstrating the need for an ‘ars logica’ while all the time providing the outline for 
one” (“Do You Read WOE?”). This left me wondering whether I had created a serious 
piece or just a “seriously delightful” curiosity to be discussed in multimodal composition 
courses. 
 Composition Studies has shown great tolerance for and acceptance of texts that 
push the boundaries of conventional academic forms. Richard Miller’s influential piece 
“The Nervous System”—which we read in the course of the writing workshop—
combines poetry, narrative, memoir, and more “academic” discourse. Even more 
famously, Kathleen Blake Yancey once admonished the field to rethink the shape of 
composition and academic texts, arguing that postmodernity and the proliferation of 
different types of writing call for evolving conceptions of writing, writers, and their 
attendant interrelationships (“Made”).  
 Even though the field seemed amenable to “non-standard” writing and the 
implications that such writing could entail—a blurring of the lines between academic and 
creative writing, a destabilization of Composition Studies’ articulations with various 
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epistemological stances, the situating of composition courses within schools and the 
academy as a whole—I wondered whether Composition Studies was an open door or a 
shut window. Although the field calls for more capacious understandings of the writer 
and his/her writing, there are still traces in the literature and within writing programs of 
an implicit subscription to a Cartesian subject, a subject whose mental processes—
including, paramountly, his or her choices—are transparent to him or herself. In other 
words, I was concerned that certain commitments in Composition Studies to a “well-
formed” text and its attendant “well-formed” composer (there is a mutually-constitutive 
dialectic between the two, after all) lead to critical tensions and perhaps intransigencies 
within the field.  
 The relationship between normed textuality and identity bothered me because of 
the ways certain sorts of linguistic performances might function as broader measures of 
competency. As a nontraditional student, I had long bucked against the idea that 
producing particular texts transparently indexed my ability in anything other than writing 
those particular, contextually-bounded texts. I had felt that any textual production, any 
linguistic act, was a snarled negotiation and that drawing conclusions about a writer’s 
identity and/or abilities based upon their writing could be an inverted species of ad 
hominem fallacy. At the time of the workshop, I had trouble disentangling these issues. 
Ars Logica made sense. It was not purely self-reflexive, it impacted audiences in clear 
ways, and it was accepted as valuable by notable voices in the community; however, it 
was not clear—even to me—how this piece indexed my identity, my skill, or even my 
voice. This confusion and its attendant anxiety about the interrelationships between my 
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voice, performance, and identity were intensified by the complexities surrounding these 
same interrelationships as enacted in my son’s experience of language and identity. 
 Shortly before I began the writing workshop, my oldest son was diagnosed as 
autistic (“severely autistic” to use the clinician’s precise term). At the time of diagnosis, 
he was almost 3 years old, and what words he had possessed before his second birthday 
had retreated into silence. According to the diagnostician and what I found in my own 
research, those words and any new ones were likely to remain in that silence. The 
seemingly-best-case scenario was that he would learn ostensive and instrumentalist 
communication such as pointing and hand-over-hand manipulation/indication, and such 
communication would be behavioral and not necessarily indicative of higher cognitive 
functioning. The seemingly-worst-case scenario was that he would withdraw completely 
without even the simulacrum of communication. In either case, the story went, his 
intentionality and rhetoricality would be limited if not completely absent given his 
particular neurological makeup. This understanding of autism, communicative disorders, 
and disability (as I will be arguing) is reductionist, normative, and shows a particular 
medicalized understanding of disability; this understanding of autism, communicative 
disorders, and disability is also echoed in a number of quarters in Composition Studies, as 
I hope to show in the coming pages. 
 As most any person with regular contact with autistic people will tell you, these 
people are rhetorical, intentional, and communicative. Their modes of communication 
might not closely match “normal” or “typical” types of communication, but 
communication nonetheless occurs in various ways.  In Composition Studies, however, 
some scholars have approached disability—mental and psychosocial disability, in 
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particular—as my son’s diagnostician did: as deficiency and lack. These scholars 
seemingly locate rhetorical deficiency in the individual, and they identify inability with 
that individual’s ignorance, sloppiness, willfulness, or native incapacity. In a sense, the 
localization of rhetoric and communicative responsibility/success in the individual rhetor 
is a core element of Current-Traditional rhetoric, which in assuming stable objective 
scales of valuation for stable objective texts attempts to construct a limpid transitivity 
from writer to text to audience: 
 
The transitivity is bi-directional in the sense that the creation and reception of a text flows 
from the writer, and the breakdown of the text and/or its reception flows back to the 
writer. In short, following Current-Traditional rhetoric, “problems” associated with a text 
are traceable to the writer’s lack of ability in execution and are not attributable to 
problems or complications in other quarters. As Berlin puts it, “The emphasis in this 
rhetoric is on adapting what has been discovered outside the rhetorical enterprise to the 
minds of the hearers. The study of rhetoric thus focuses on developing skill in 
arrangement and style” (770). Following post-structuralism, social-constructionism, and 
the broader imbrications and associations of postmodern theories with Composition 
Studies, this model became deeply problematic: the Cartesian subject ceased to resemble 
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an exploded diagram and, instead, simply exploded: big-A “Authors” died and plural, 
protean authors took their place; texts became polysemous and underdetermined; selves 
became multiple, performative, and social; the rhetorical situation and the relationships 
between its elements became much, much more complex. If this was the state of the field, 
I wondered why some compositionists still subscribed—in whole or in part—to the 
ideologies associated with Current Traditional Rhetoric; specifically, why did some 
compositionists still locate “disability” associated with writing within a static writer and 
his or her texts rather than within the discourses and relationships constructing writer, 
text, context, and audience?  
 My work on Ars Logica and my research into my son’s linguistic and rhetorical 
abilities led me to begin researching how compositionists approached the relationships 
among cognitive and psycho-social disabilities and the construction/reception of texts. In 
some cases, I was delighted by what I saw, particularly with reference to autism spectrum 
disorders (ASD) and their rhetoricity. Paul Heilker and Melanie Yergeau, for example, 
write about autism as “a rhetoric,” a way of “being in the world through language, 
through invention, structure, and style” (487). This framing makes visible and 
destabilizes normed rhetorics associated with more positivistic or Current Traditional 
approaches to communication. In such a way, what might a priori be cast as deficiency 
may instead be presented as difference. As Yergeau puts it, “Coming to autism 
rhetorically recasts items such as ‘difficulty smiling’—from pitiful disease symptom into 
autistic discourse convention, from a neurological screwup into an autistic confluence of 
structure and style” (489). This more theoretical characterization of autism as a rhetoric 
(in the way Heilker and Yergeau mean) is also echoed in pedagogical treatments of ASD 
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like those represented in Gerstle and Walsh’s collection, Autism Spectrum Disorders in 
the College Composition Classroom: Making Writing Instruction More Accessible for All 
Students. While the chapters in the book present ways to productively accommodate ASD 
in the composition classroom, they do so with the understanding that such 
accommodation can make composition more accessible for all students (as the title of the 
book implies). While I found this collection, Heilker and Yergeau’s rhetoricizing of 
ASD, and other works on the intersections between disability and Composition Studies 
heartening, I was also troubled by what I found in some composition scholarship and in 
my institutional experiences with accommodation.   
 In her article, “Neurodiversity,” Anne Jurecic characterizes ASD in terms of 
rhetorical limitations rather than potentials. In her article, Jurecic relates her diagnosis of 
“Gregory” (a student) as having Asperger’s Syndrome (a form of “high-functioning” 
autism). Jurecic’s “diagnosis” is problematic and troubling as “Gregory” had not 
previously been diagnosed as having Asperger’s Syndrome and “…as far as I know, he 
remains undiagnosed and is perhaps still unaware of his Asperger’s” (428). In other 
words, Jurecic performed the diagnosis. Leaving aside the ethical and colonial issues 
associated with arm-chair diagnosis, Jurecic’s article is ultimately more worrisome for 
her conclusions regarding the rhetorical potentials of writers on the autism spectrum, 
particularly that “for the student with Asperger’s, a pedagogical practice focused on 
rhetorical strategies and shifting audiences may have little chance of succeeding” (433). 
Asperger’s, in other words, precludes full rhetoricity because of purportedly inherent 
deficits in interpersonal communication. To her credit, Jurecic does go on to discuss how 
individualizing Gregory’s instruction allowed her to find negotiative approaches to 
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writing and rhetoric instruction and that Gregory was able to finish the semester 
“performing solidly in the middle of the class” (435). Jurecic ends her article, ultimately, 
calling for renewed attention to what medical, scientific, and psychological experts have 
to say about difference and disability with the hope of finding a “middle ground between 
a constructionist rejection of scientific positivism and the extreme of biological 
determinism” (439). She believes that learning about “innate” neurological differences 
that autistic individuals have can help us “expand our sense of the depth and reach of 
difference—not so that we can exclude, but so that we can teach” (439). This seems, at 
first blush, like a positive approach to the differences that autistic students bring to the 
composition classroom, but a number of scholars strongly reacted against Jurecic’s 
article. 
 In “Two Comments on ‘Neurodiversity,’” Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson, Jay 
Dolmage, and Paul Heilker critically respond to Jurecic’s article. Although the authors 
are pleased to see Jurecic arguing for an individualized approach to working with 
students on the autism spectrum, they argue that her position strongly aligns with the 
“normate stance” which leaves the normate (the unmarked norm) under-criticized along 
with the “monolithic” academic text that autistic writers are seemingly unable to produce 
(314). The authors argue that Jurecic’s article takes part in a discourse of disability 
medicalization (particularly the medicalization of autism) that obscures the socially-
constructed nature of disability (315-16). Most pointedly, the authors frame Jurecic’s 
search for diagnosis as reflective of her abelist position: 
A teacher, faced with a student who doesn’t quite “fit” assumptions about 
“normality” and doesn’t thrive on “teaching-as-usual” practices, seeks to explain 
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or diagnose the student’s “deficiency” or “deviation” rather than or before 
reflecting on and perhaps revising his or her own assumptions and teaching 
practices. (316) 
A critical, informed, and more ethical approach, the authors argue, should not rely on 
medicalizations that reinforce a narrow and hegemonic understanding of “the norm”; 
instead, the concept of neurodiversity should help to challenge and disrupt normalization 
(317-18). In responding to these authors, Jurecic defends the use of medical approaches 
to help understand ASD, arguing that such approaches can be useful to compositionists if 
“handled with sensitivity and intelligence” (324); however, she takes no issue with her 
own “diagnosis” of Gregory, even praising the “valuable information” that such a label 
gave her about Gregory and how to best teach him (324).  
Jurecic’s silence on her construction of Gregory’s diagnosis concerned me insofar 
as such labels and labeling can quickly, quietly, and insidiously shape the horizons of 
possibility in interactions and evaluations as they tend to implicate a consequent 
epistemological and ideological approach (approaching autism as a medical concern 
rather than a social one, as Jurecic’s critics point out). More telling and troubling, though, 
is that Jurecic is not a clinician, and so her diagnosis carries with it an epistemological 
and ideological approach that she does not adequately understand and must, of necessity, 
merely approach in an asymmetrically authoritative manner: the extension, possibilities, 
and limitations of “autism” and “autistic writers” is taken on faith and, perhaps, it is a bad 
faith understanding of disability, as disability studies scholars would argue.  
 While I found Jurecic’s approach to autism disquieting in the ways it approached 
autism and writerly ability, I was happy to find that many scholars—scholars like 
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Lewiecki-Wilson, Dolmage, Heilker and others—approached autism and disability more 
complexly, drawing from post-modern constructions of identity, textuality, and even 
disability. But scholarship is only one indicator of the state of the art. I began to look not 
just to theory and pedagogy, but also to administration to try and understand the 
relationships between composition and disability, and I came to realize that many 
instructors I knew—myself included—often relied uncritically on institutional channels 
to dictate how to work with disabled students.  
 Many compositionists—indeed, many college instructors in various fields of 
study—rely on accessibility or accommodation statements to frame how they will work 
with disabled students. An accommodation statement is a university-mandated syllabus 
addendum that addresses how an instructor is willing to provide accommodations in his 
or her class in association with a campus accommodation or accessibility service. While 
these statements often provide invaluable means for making classrooms more accessible 
to some disabled students, they can also discursively construct “disability” in ways that 
can bureaucratize accommodation, as the following memo from the Provost and Vice 
Chancellor at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee shows: 
In the spirit of providing equal access to students with disabilities and in 
compliance with state and federal laws, the University is required to provide 
accommodations to students with documented disabilities. It is expected that a 
statement be placed on your syllabus informing students to contact you to arrange 
needed accommodations. Students are to provide a copy of their Verified 
Individual Services and Accommodations (VISA) to you to indicate the 
accommodations they may need in your class. If a student requests 
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accommodations, but does not have a VISA, please direct him/her to the Student 
Accessibility Center (SAC.) (Britz) 
The memo above positions accommodation as a requirement to be fulfilled (“in 
compliance with,” “the University is required to,” “documented,” “it is expected that,” 
“students are to provide”) rather than as a mechanism to create new classroom 
possibilities and affordances. Perhaps more interesting, though, is the fact that the 
machinery of accommodation is approached as uniform across the university. Of course, 
if a student were to go the accessibility center, he or she would undoubtedly receive 
accommodations designed for his or her particular classes, but this locates 
accommodation outside of the curriculum; accommodation becomes, like the 
accessibility statement in syllabi, an addendum. Furthermore, at least in the above 
example, students need to present a “Verified Individual Services and Accommodations,” 
or “VISA,” to receive an accommodation. The verification of disabilities is fraught from 
not only theoretical standpoints2 but also economic ones: economically disadvantaged 
students who cannot afford third-party diagnoses cannot usually receive disability 
accommodations. What do administrative accommodation practices like those above 
signify for Composition Studies? 
A number of compositionists have written on the problems of accessibility 
statements and the ways such statements might position disability (see Wood and 
Madden), but I wondered and continue to wonder what it means in broader terms for 
Composition Studies that disabled students need to be accommodated at all in 
                                                
2 This includes, but is not limited, to the fact that the ill-chosen “V.I.S.A.” acronym 
constructs a disabled student as an outsider or resident alien, thus reinscribing the 
medicalized “us vs. them” dynamic between the disabled and the non-disabled. 
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composition classrooms and within the theories that underwrite those classrooms. If 
accommodation needs to occur in a composition classroom, then there must be 
normalizations and stabilities within that classroom; in other words, if someone’s 
particular way of being-in-the world necessitates adaptation and/or accommodation in the 
composition classroom, then there must be some set of normalized practices or ideologies 
that favor other groups of students’ ways of being in the world. Depending upon one’s 
theoretical perspective, these normalizations themselves may create the disabilities in 
their construction of a norm or set of norms.3 But where do these normalizations—
whether pedagogical, theoretical, or administrative—come from? Are they endemic to 
composition? How do we identify them? What do we do when (if) we uncover them? In 
Composition Studies who accommodates whom/what, and what are the implications of 
this relationship? 
 The above questions generated by my increasing personal and professional 
research in the intersections of Disability Studies and Composition Studies dovetailed 
with the questions generated by my experience in my writing workshop. This dissertation 
springs from the confluence of these questions. It is an extended inquiry into 
accommodation in Composition Studies, inquiry that I argue leads back to the heuristic 
questions my teacher posed for me to help channel my confusion: what are you doing 
when you teach composition, what’s at stake for students in the composition classroom, 
and what really is “Composition?” In the course of this project I try to address these 
questions in a reasoned and detailed fashion, but as becomes clear in the final chapters, 
                                                
3 This perspective can be identified with the “social model” of disability, which I explore 
at length in Chapter 2. 
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there are no authoritative or easy answers. Or, to put it simultaneously more cryptically 
and more accurately: there is no “Answer”; there are only “answers.”  
By considering accommodation from legal perspectives and through a Disability 
Studies lens, I argue that current approaches to accommodation in composition can be 
simplistic, limiting, and reliant upon other fields’ and agencies’ constructions of identity 
and disability. This limited approach frames accommodation within a rhetoric of 
requirement. By “rhetoric of requirement,” I refer to a discursive approach that centers 
accommodation as a process essentially concerned with the fulfillment of institutional 
requirements that insure minimally-mandated “fit” between a disabled individual and the 
environment wherein his or her disabilities become salient. In short, a rhetoric of 
requirement constructs disability as something that must be fit into an extant system, 
according to prescribed procedures, and with minimal impact to extant conditions within 
the system. Following a rhetoric of requirement, one might ask “What must I do with a 
disabled individual?” or “How am I obligated to fit this disabled person into this 
classroom, workplace, or public environment?” In contrast to a rhetoric of requirement, I 
forward the idea that accommodation can instead be approached through a “rhetoric of 
affordance.” A “rhetoric of affordance” constructs disability as a critical encounter 
wherein “fit” might be explored and reconfigured: I argue that the encounter of disability 
indicates normalization and privileging within systems which gives rise to disability, and 
such indication affords possibilities to critique normalization and privileging within the 
system wherein disability is encountered. Such critique can lead to deeper, more nuanced 
understanding of disablement within particular milieus, and it can also lead to a more 
robust understanding of the milieus themselves. This can, in turn, create possibilities to 
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better fit institutions to individuals and not the other way around and, in so doing, disrupt 
the very nature of the “disability.” Following a rhetoric of affordance, one might ask 
“What does this disability reveal about the conditions that lead to its emergence?” or 
“What opportunities for critique and transformation does the emergence of this disability 
create?” 
Within this project, I concretize a rhetoric of affordance by developing a notion of 
“complex accommodation,” an approach that locates disability at the intersections of 
embodied difference in particular classrooms, constructions of disability and the field of 
Composition Studies, and programmatic histories/theories/institutional commitments. 
Complex accommodation recognizes the complexity in these interrelationships and 
approaches the encounter of disability as kairos: it is a moment of normative unmasking 
wherein instructors can begin to explore and possibly transform the unmarked 
pedagogical, theoretical, environmental, and administrative practices that disable certain 
students and normalize or even privilege others. Such an approach, I argue, may result in 
more ethical and theoretically-sound treatments of disability in the composition 
classroom, but it also creates a critically-reflective stance which productively foregrounds 
how “composition” and the doing of composition is situated. By working through a set of 
simple heuristics, composition instructors can enact a complex dialectic that helps them 
to better understand these relationships, the ways in which they shape a composition 
classroom, and the ways in which the relationships may be adjusted to better 
accommodate all students. 
 This dissertation is divided into five additive chapters. Chapter 1 traces the 
legislative history of accommodation in higher education from Section 504 of the 
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Rehabilitation Act of 1973 through the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments of 
2008. I show how academic programs are only required to accommodate students with 
disabilities when such accommodation does not present an undue operational or 
ideological burden to those programs. Whether such a burden exists is tied to each 
program’s ability to articulate and undergo a “deliberative procedure” (Guckenberger v. 
Boston) wherein the program can show whether or not a proposed accommodation is 
reasonable given the requirements of that program for a particular course (and/or program 
of study). I argue that the laws on accommodation and those that frame the deliberative 
procedure “test” (Wynne v. Tufts) create a legal impetus for writing programs to consider 
how “essential” their practices and procedures are within their particular programs and 
larger institutions. However, I argue that this impetus conceals a danger: framing 
disability in composition solely in legal terms neglects the ethical and theoretical 
dimensions of accommodation, and I take up such aspects in Chapter 2. 
 Chapter 2 moves beyond legal approaches to disability and instead utilizes the 
theoretical apparatus of Disability Studies to complicate what it means to have a 
disability and, by extension, what it means to accommodate a disability. Drawing on 
these complications, I argue that a nuanced approach to disability recognizes both the 
embodied and socially-constructed aspects of disability. I forward the idea that rhetorics 
of requirement—such as legalistic approaches—can elide the socially-constructed nature 
of disability and miss the critical opportunities for systemic theoretical and practical 
revision that “complex accommodation” can afford. 
Chapter 3 builds upon the work of Chapters 1 and 2 by fleshing out “complex 
accommodation” as it might occur within a Composition Studies framework. I show how 
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compositionists face a minimum of legal compulsion when it comes to accommodation, 
but I argue that complex accommodation invites compositionists to engage in a special 
sort of recursive and reflective ethical, pedagogical, theoretical, and administrative 
deliberative procedure and that such a procedure can shift accommodation from a rhetoric 
of requirement to a rhetoric of affordance. In other words, I argue that complex 
accommodation can help compositionists fundamentally and productively think through 
their work not just with disabled students but with all students. To this end, Chapter 3 
includes heuristics to help instructors work through complex accommodation in their 
individual classrooms, writing programs, and larger institutions.  
Chapter 4 concretizes the work of Chapter 3 by providing and elaborating two 
cases of complex accommodation. In one case, I describe how complexly 
accommodating a student who was having severe seizures in class led to a new set of 
classroom accommodations, programmatic revisions of attendance policies, and an 
uncovering of commitments to physical presence within composition studies. In another 
case, I show how complex accommodation can work prior to particular encounters of 
disability, arguing that such thought experiments can reveal fault lines within individual 
classrooms or programs. Using the student-teacher conference as my starting point, I 
trace the situatedness of the conference in my own pedagogy and in the identity of my 
writing program, and I trouble the continuance of the practice as a result of theoretical 
and practical inconsistencies in the goals of conferencing. Ultimately, I present a 
conflicted position wherein my own theorizations of the conference might entail its 
abandonment, but its programmatic position requires its continuation in my classroom. 
Of critical importance, I argue, is the fact that this is not a failure of complex 
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accommodation but is instead a foregrounding of how possibilities of individual 
accommodations are constructed along multiple vectors: an individual student’s 
embodied disability, an instructor’s particular pedagogy, an instructor’s theoretical 
commitments, a writing program’s requirements, and the larger institution’s 
requirements. Complex accommodation uncovers how the limits and affordances of 
accommodations can track and work with and through such vectors. 
Chapter 5 addresses the potential objections, pitfalls, and areas for further inquiry 
with regards to complex accommodation in Composition Studies. In particular, I argue 
that there are three main objections that might be associated with complex 
accommodation: fears that complex accommodation might lower standards, concerns that 
the ways in which it models disability might obscure what a disability actually is, and 
worries that complex accommodation might not be equally feasible across institutions. 
While I argue that these sorts of objections can be productively answered, Chapter 5 
issues a call for further inquiry insofar as the current project is largely critical and 
theoretical. While complex accommodation is intuitively appealing and potentially 
transformative for all stakeholders, it remains a mere abstraction until it is put into 
practice at different colleges and universities. Ethnographic research is needed to see how 
instructors (and programs) might implement such an approach, how students might 
respond to it, and how the field as a whole might react to it.  
I end the project with the same questions that started it, but this time they are an 
invitation to other compositionists: What are you doing when you teach composition, 
what’s at stake for students in the composition classroom, and what really is 
“Composition?” I don’t pretend to have answered the questions in the course of this 
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project, and indeed, I think I raise more questions than I answer. However, I think I show 
why these questions—especially in the context of working with students with 
disabilities—are worth asking.
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Chapter 1: The Americans with Disabilities Act, “Reasonable Accommodation,” 
and Legislated Essentialism  
Introduction 
From 2011-12, 6.4 million children received special education services in public K-12 
schools, with a full 13 percent of the total number of children in public schools receiving 
disability services (“Children and Youth with Disabilities”). For post-secondary 
educators, this figure may or may not be startling; however, the fact that 11 percent of 
undergraduate students and 7 percent of post baccalaureate students report having a 
disability (“Number and Percentage”) should give any educator pause.4  
The passage of legislation affecting students with disabilities in primary, 
secondary and post-secondary contexts has helped students navigate K-12 schools more 
successfully, resulting in higher enrollments in post-secondary institutions. This increase 
has begun to draw the attention of educators, administrators, and scholars: literature on 
the accommodation of disabilities has begun to proliferate, and Disability Studies 
programs are moving beyond specialized certifications to become full-fledged 
undergraduate and graduate programs (Taylor). Some scholars have even speculated that 
we find ourselves in the midst of a paradigm shift from postmodernism to 
“dismodernism,” the theoretical position that the only commonality shared among people 
is difference and interdependence (Davis 311). Against this backdrop, scholars and 
teachers of Composition Studies find themselves in a position where they must not only 
acknowledge the disabled students in their classrooms, but they must also confront 
                                                
4 These figures are based on self-reported disability. Given that many students choose not 
to report their disability (or “pass”), these figures are likely higher. 
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disability and working with students with disabilities as fundamental material conditions 
of the teaching and doing of composition. 
Within Composition Studies, a number of prominent scholars have already 
focused on disability and how it comes to bear on the practice of, and thinking about, 
composition. As a broad indicator, the Conference on College Composition now has a 
Committee on Disability Issues devoted to making the annual conference more 
accessible, promoting inclusive practices, and researching disabilities issues as they come 
to bear on the teaching and doing of writing (“Committee on Disability Issues”). Some 
scholars explore the intersections of Composition Studies and disability issues by parsing 
the rhetoric of disability and representations of disability and disabled persons (Dolmage; 
Heilker and Yergeau). Others use discourse analysis to trouble how disabled identities 
function within the milieus related to Composition Studies (Kerschbaum, “Avoiding”). 
Still others try to create and compile pedagogical approaches to working with particular 
disabilities within the composition classroom (Gerstle and Walsh). Some of these 
disability-oriented compositionists have even begun to gain broad attention and 
recognition within the field, such as when Margaret Price’s book Mad at School: 
Rhetorics of Mental Disability and Academic Life was selected as a winner of the 
Conference on College Composition and Communication’s Outstanding Book Award in 
2013 (“CCCC Outstanding Book Award”) and hailed by some as a book that “will 
radically transform the terrain of academic life for the better, for everyone” (Kerschbaum, 
“Rev. of Mad”). There are indications, however, that such disciplinary shifts may be 
missing critical opportunities to fundamentally rethink the relationships among disability, 
identity, composition pedagogy, and composition theory. 
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The slow shift towards a focus on disability within the discipline is laudable and 
exciting, particularly because the act of accommodation might create new pedagogical, 
theoretical, and ideological possibilities for Composition Studies and for the ways in 
which compositionists approach disability and disabled students. In the pages that follow, 
I argue that a careful theorization of accommodation might disrupt what it means to teach 
or “do” composition, but before compositionists can really inquire into how they might 
best accommodate students with disabilities in the composition classroom, teachers of 
composition must ask what ramifications the concept—not merely the activity—of 
accommodation produces for Composition Studies.  
This project focuses on what it means to “accommodate” a student within a 
composition course and what such accommodation signifies for the broader field of 
Composition Studies. This is not to say that the current project is a descriptive state of the 
art in terms of accommodation or even a prescriptive approach to the teaching of 
composition, though there are elements of both here. This inquiry does not begin by 
asking how a composition class can “fit” a disability or disabilities into its workings or 
how Composition Studies’ theories can make sense of disability. Instead, I begin by 
parsing accommodation and disability on legal and conceptual levels, exploring how 
“disability” and “accommodation” may be troubled and destabilized before turning to 
how Composition Studies works with—and might work with—disability. In such a 
manner, I will show that reasoned critiques of the mechanisms of accommodation and the 
models of disability lead to certain kinds of critique of Composition Studies and that such 
critiques result in an approach to Composition Studies wherein accommodation both 
allows and calls for a rethinking of the theoretical and practical contours of the field. 
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Accordingly, I begin this critique not within the context of Composition Studies, per se, 
but with the broader legislation that pertains to accommodation.   
I begin with legislation on accommodation because disability and the 
accommodation thereof are usually approached legalistically; in other words, various 
institutions and their individual agents tend to approach the accommodation of disability 
through legal requirement and alignment. So, this project initially frames the 
accommodation of disability not as an ethical need for compositionists to consider but as 
a pressing legal requirement. There are, of course, ethical and disciplinary imperatives to 
consider in relation to accommodating students in the composition classroom5, and 
inquiry into such imperatives can help the field orient itself within social and institutional 
networks and relations of power.6 Starting this project’s inquiry instead from the legal-
requirement standpoint results in two critical consequences. First, such a starting point 
mirrors many extant approaches to accommodation (What are we required to do? For 
whom are we required to do it?), but it also destabilizes the legal-appeal approach by 
tracing how the spirit of the laws are not followed in their execution, which calls into 
question the justness of mere prima facie appeals to the law. Second, carefully tracking 
accommodation legislation results in a very particular type of inquiry that leads to a 
                                                
5 One might even argue that CCCC’s affirmation of the “Students’ Right to Their Own 
Language” (SRTOL) contains such imperatives within it (at least for those students 
whose disabilities lead to “nonstandard” textual productions): “We affirm the students' 
right to their own patterns and varieties of language—the dialects of their nurture or 
whatever dialects in which they find their own identity and style…We affirm strongly 
that teachers must have the experiences and training that will enable them to respect 
diversity and uphold the right of students to their own language” (“Student’s Rights”). 
6 For example, the ways in which composition classrooms are accessible or inaccessible 
for students with disabilities may position Composition Studies as a gate-keeping or 
norming field even as it seemingly welcomes and praises diversity and individuality  
(LeCourt 26-28). 
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consequence of paramount concern for compositionists: writing programs may be 
required to engage in “deliberative procedures” to determine what is essential or 
fundamental to the teaching and doing of composition within their own programs. 
Eventually I will show that such a deliberative procedure can reinscribe a rhetoric of 
requirement when it comes to disability, or it can create a rhetoric of affordance that 
might help compositionists move beyond thinking of disability in terms of the legal 
requirements of accommodation en route to creating a more engaging and productive 
composition classroom for all students.  
This chapter begins with background on disability legislation and how it 
articulates accommodation practices as they relate to post-secondary education.7 The 
evolution of this legislation, I argue, has resulted in potentially stronger requirements for 
accommodation, including the possible necessity for universities and programs to 
articulate what the essential or fundamental aspects of composition are and what would 
constitute an “undue burden” in a composition course. 
 
A Brief Sketch of Recent Accommodation Legislation8 
In one sense, a legislative history of disability accommodation in the United States begins 
with the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States. The text reads: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
                                                
7 Legislation that does not directly affect post-secondary education will not be addressed 
in this chapter (e.g., The Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA)). 
8 A full legislative history of accommodation, or even accommodation as it relates to 
higher education is unnecessary for the present project. Central legislation—especially 
that legislation that seems to have guided judicial decisions—will be reviewed in brief 
instead. 
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person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” (Amend. XIV, Sec. 1).9 In other 
words, one might argue that the Fourteenth Amendment protects persons with disabilities 
from discrimination by laws or the social structures underwritten by discriminatory laws. 
However, for the purposes of brevity and specificity, a legislative history of disability 
accommodation as it comes to bear on educational accommodation should start with 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“§504” from this point forward). 
 A number of portions of §504 relate to the accommodation of disabilities in 
educational contexts. The “Promulgation of rules and regulations,” states in part: 
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined 
in section 705 (20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be 
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or 
by the United States Postal Service. (“Section 504”) 
In classifying a relevant “program or activity,” §504 only applies to institutions that 
receive federal funding; §504 does not apply to private universities or colleges that do not 
receive federal funds (though that group is vanishingly small). In addition to this 
limitation, §504 also has a number of qualifiers attached which have had significant 
judicial consequences for disabled individuals seeking accommodations; in particular, 
subsection (c) of §794 (“Significant structural alterations by small providers”) holds that 
                                                
9 Thought the 14th Amendment does not apply to the federal government, certain types of 
discrimination perpetrated by the federal government can violate the 5th Amendment’s 
due process clause  (“Equal Protection”).  
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“Small providers are not required by subsection (a) of this section to make significant 
structural alterations to their existing facilities for the purpose of assuring program 
accessibility, if alternative means of providing the services are available.” Providing 
alternative pathways to accessibility instead of accommodations within extant ones is 
echoed in other parts of  §504. For example, §794a(1) (“Remedies and attorney fees”) 
allows courts to “take into account the reasonableness of the cost of any necessary work 
place accommodation, and the availability of alternatives therefor or other appropriate 
relief in order to achieve an equitable and appropriate remedy.” The “reasonableness” 
condition and the “availability of alternatives” mirror the language used in subsection (c) 
of §794, and they throw into relief how disability discrimination and suits brought 
regarding it can be framed as a function of the defendants’ and courts’ own sense of 
“reasonableness” rather than the plaintiff’s own sense of injury or discrimination, a fact 
borne out by case law relating to §504. 
 In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, a hearing-impaired student brought 
suit against Southeastern Community College, alleging the college discriminated against 
her because of her hearing impairment. According to an audiologist at Duke University 
Medical Center, even with the assistance of a hearing aid, Davis would only be able to 
hear gross environmental sounds while working in medical contexts and would depend 
on lip-reading for interpersonal communication. Southeastern Community College 
consulted Mary McRee, the executive Director of the North Carolina Board of Nursing, 
and McRee recommended that Davis be denied admission into the nursing program, 
arguing that her hearing condition would make it “impossible for respondent [sic] to 
participate safely in the normal clinical training program, and those modifications that 
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would be necessary to enable safe participation would prevent her from realizing the 
benefits of the program” (401-02). The Supreme Court found that advances in assistive 
technology might one day allow individuals like Davis to meet the requirements for 
particular programs like Southeastern’s nursing program and that, “such advances also 
may enable attainment of these goals without imposing undue financial and 
administrative burdens upon a State. Thus, situations may arise where a refusal to modify 
an existing program might become unreasonable and discriminatory” (412-13). However, 
the Court found that it was “undisputed that respondent could not participate in 
Southeastern's nursing program unless the standards were substantially lowered. §504 
imposes no requirement upon an educational institution to lower or to effect substantial 
modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped person” (413). The Court went 
on to argue: 
Nothing in the language or history of §504 reflects an intention to limit the 
freedom of an educational institution to require reasonable physical qualifications 
for admission to a clinical training program. Nor has there been any showing in 
this case that any action short of a substantial change in Southeastern's program 
would render unreasonable the qualifications it imposed. (414) 
Three elements deserve particular note in the Court’s decision and reasoning: reference to 
substantially lowering program standards, to the “unreasonableness” of the program’s 
qualifications, and to the “undue financial and administrative burdens.” On the face of it, 
these conditions of discrimination determination seem equitable by virtue of their 
negotiative nature; in other words, if a program can make the argument that these 
conditions (reasonableness, maintaining program standards, avoiding undue burden) are 
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being met and the court defers to such contextualized argument, then such deliberation 
ought to serve as a valid discrimination inquiry. However, such reasoning ignores 
important systemic discriminatory potentials. 
 If a program is accused of discrimination, and that program is called upon to show 
how accommodation in a particular instance would be unreasonable and/or burdensome, 
then the standards for determining reasonableness and burden rest within the disciplinary 
agency that stands accused of discrimination. By “disciplinary agency,” I refer not to 
either the “discipline” of nursing or of jurisprudence but instead deploy the term in a 
broader, Foucauldean sense to capture the workings of the nursing program/field and the 
Supreme Court as overlapping and mutually constitutive technologies of power. As 
Foucault says, 
 ‘Discipline’ may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it 
is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, compromising a whole set of 
instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a ‘physics’ 
or ‘anatomy’ of power, a technology. (Discipline and Punish 215) 
In the present case, one might argue that the discipline (construed here to indicate the 
relations of power constituted by the interaction of the nursing program and the Supreme 
Court) interpellates Davis through its own anatomy of power and makes her a “docile 
body” to be regularized by the discipline (fit into the discipline’s regularizations and its 
“anatomy of power”).10 If Davis cannot be slotted into the discipline, then such 
incapacity resides in her body rather than in the normalized discipline, and discrimination 
                                                
10 In his chapter, “Docile Bodies,” Foucault traces how disciplines place individuals 
within anatomies of power that regularize the ways such disciplines structure space, time, 
activity, and other ways of moving and being in the world for the individuals who exist 
within a discipline’s gaze.  
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ceases to be discrimination as her body becomes “unreasonable” by virtue of the 
normalizing power of the discipline. In other words, if disability resides in the body then 
it is the body that is unreasonable and intractable, and “discrimination” becomes 
incoherent: the discipline cannot discriminate because to do so would be to denaturalize 
its own power relations and admit of other ways of moving, doing, and being within the 
discipline. “Discrimination” becomes instead an evaluative judgment and course of 
action in favor of the “reasonable” institution’s sense of its own classifications and 
requirements; discrimination thus becomes impossible as a person ceases to be “disabled” 
(where an agency or context is dis-abling the person) and instead becomes simply 
incapable or unqualified.  
The tension between locating disability in individual bodies rather than in social 
relations will be explored in depth in Chapter 2, but for now it is worth noting that §504 
and cases like Southeastern Community College v. Davis made determinations of 
disability problematic as they relied upon disciplinary legitimation, and such legitimation 
could easily deny protected-class membership according to institutional logics. The laws 
created a situation where disability could be argued away and incapacity could be 
inscribed on a body. In short, a person becomes “naturally” unqualified, and 
discriminating against such a person becomes acceptable insofar as it is not “solely by 
reason of his or her disability” (“Section 504”): it is discrimination by reason of 
“reasonableness” or “undue hardship.” While some would come to hail the subsequent 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as a piece of revolutionary anti-discrimination 
legislation—and in some ways it was—the same accommodation issues that flowed from 
§504 remained in the ADA, with subsequent court decisions more strongly locating the 
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power of disability determination (and, by extension, interpellation) in disciplinary 
agencies. 
The ADA was landmark legislation. It had (and has in its amended form) far-
reaching implications for workplace discrimination, private and public accessibility, and 
the very definition of disability itself. Much broader in scope than §504, the ADA seemed 
to offer more meaningful and effective protections to individuals with disabilities. 
Contrary to the original intentions behind the ADA, however, the Act became an engine 
of more systematic and permissible discrimination, with judicial decisions restricting 
class membership and, by extension, class protection for individuals who would 
commonsensically be considered “disabled” (Hensel 641). 
 Within the context of accommodation (especially post-secondary 
accommodation), the crucial elements of the ADA include the definitions of “disability” 
(Sec. 12102), the Title III definitions of  “public accommodation” (Sec. 12181), and the 
definitions of “discrimination” (Sec. 12182). The general definition of “disability” reads 
as follows:  
The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual (i) a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such 
individual; (ii) a record of such an impairment; or (iii) being regarded as having 
such an impairment.” (Sec. 12102) 
A number of the terms in this definition—“substantially limits,” “major life activities,” 
“record of such an impairment,” “being regarded as having”—are ambiguous, and 
subsequent case law circled around these ambiguities. Before turning to case law, 
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however, it’s first necessary to turn to other central elements in the ADA as they come to 
bear on education. 
 Title III contains definitions and provisions that directly affect education and 
accommodations in education. First, Section 12181 classifies a number of private 
enterprises/organizations as “public accommodations,” including “a nursery, elementary, 
secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school, or other place of education.” 
The inclusion of these private institutions extends discrimination protections for 
individuals with disabilities to both public institutions that receive federal funding (§504  
& Title II) and to private educational institutions that may or may not receive federal 
funding.  This seems like a straightforward extension of protections, and the “General 
rule” of the “Prohibition of discrimination by public accommodations” likewise seems 
unambiguous:  
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full 
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, 
leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. (Sec. 12182) 
In short, then, these “public accommodations” must not discriminate against individuals 
with disabilities on the basis of those disabilities. However, Title III’s byzantine 
qualifications of “discrimination” make it difficult to determine if public 
accommodations have actually discriminated against an individual. 
 Title III includes a number of discrimination categories under its “General 
prohibition” including, “Activities,” “Integrated Settings,” “Opportunity to Participate,” 
“Administrative Methods,” and “Association.” “Association” prohibits discrimination 
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based on one’s association with a disabled individual. “Administrative Methods” 
prohibits the use of “standards or criteria or methods of administration” that discriminate 
or perpetuate the discrimination of persons on the basis of a disability. “Opportunity to 
Participate” and “Integrated Settings” essentially prohibit the sequestering of individuals 
with disabilities in separate programs and calls for the “most integrated setting 
appropriate to the needs of the individual.” The “Activities” section contains the 
prohibitions that, together, can be associated with the “leveling the playing field” 
metaphor that abounds in discussions on accommodation.  
 The “Activities” section is divided into four subsections: “Denial of 
participation,” “Participation in unequal benefit,” “Separate benefit,” and “Individual or 
class of individuals.” “Denial of participation” defines an action as discriminatory when 
an individual (or group of individuals) is denied participation in or benefit from a public 
accommodation—the commonsense understanding of “discrimination.” “Participation in 
unequal benefit,” on the other hand, addresses the idea of an unfair advantage:  
It shall be discriminatory to afford an individual or class of individuals, on the 
basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through 
contractual, licensing, or other arrangements with the opportunity to participate in 
or benefit from a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation 
that is not equal to that afforded to other individuals. (Sec. 12182) 
The “Separate benefit” section dovetails with “unequal benefit” in its prohibition against 
separate services, goods, accommodation, etc. unless such arrangements are necessary to 
provide a person or group with equally effective/beneficial/etc. goods, services, etc. 
Taken together, these various “Activities” work towards equality between individuals 
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with disabilities and those without disabilities, with provisions meant to ensure that 
neither class of individuals receives undue benefits. It’s interesting to note this discourse 
on unfair advantage present in legislation meant to protect a historically-discriminated-
against class. In other words, the “leveling the playing field” metaphor is not 
unidirectional, and there may be some anxiety in the ADA centering on over-
accommodation or unfairness to the non-disabled. The further specifications of 
“discrimination” in the “Specific prohibitions” section lend credence to this through 
explicit considerations of competing interests and how these interests can shape (and 
even preempt) accommodation. 
 The “Specific prohibitions” section of Section 12182 operationalizes 
discrimination and—as will come to be shown—is perhaps the most critical portion of 
the ADA as it comes to be interpreted/enforced in particular judicial decisions. Due to the 
importance of these definitions and due to their structural parallels, I offer them in full. 
Under “Specific prohibitions,” “Discrimination,” the ADA includes the following types 
of discrimination in the context of public accommodations: 
(i) the imposition or application of eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to 
screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with 
disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations, unless such criteria can be shown to 
be necessary for the provision of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations being offered; 
(ii) a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or 
procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, 
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facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with 
disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications 
would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations; 
(iii) a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual 
with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated 
differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and 
services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, 
or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden; 
(iv) a failure to remove architectural barriers, and communication barriers that are 
structural in nature, in existing facilities, and transportation barriers in existing 
vehicles and rail passenger cars used by an establishment for transporting 
individuals (not including barriers that can only be removed through the 
retrofitting of vehicles or rail passenger cars by the installation of a hydraulic or 
other lift), where such removal is readily achievable; and 
(v) where an entity can demonstrate that the removal of a barrier under clause (iv) 
is not readily achievable, a failure to make such goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations available through alternative methods 
if such methods are readily achievable. (Sec. 12182) 
In the broadest strokes possible, these definitions prohibit public accommodations from 
using differential selection criteria for individuals with disabilities or leaving 
facilities/programs inaccessible (i.e., refusing to make accommodations in structures, 
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programs, or both) unless such criteria or accessibility omissions are necessary according 
to the public accommodation. Turning to the central terms of these definitions will help 
elucidate how this actually works. 
 In each of the definitions, there is a caveat that traces how a particular act of 
discrimination becomes non-discriminatory given certain conditions of internal (to the 
public accommodation) necessity. So, following definition (i), a public accommodation 
which uses eligibility criteria that select and eliminate individuals based on a disability is 
not discriminatory if that accommodation can “show” that such selection/elimination is 
necessary for the continued operation of the accommodation. This is clearly problematic 
as it elides the fact that discrimination is often built into the very structure of systems and 
agencies and, thus, such discrimination can be self-legitimizing by the logic of those 
systems and agencies (“necessity” can become fluid and relative). Interestingly, this 
structural issue is foregrounded in (ii) insofar as it requires accommodations unless such 
accommodations “fundamentally alter” the nature of a public accommodation. So, 
following (i) and (ii), a public accommodation may deny access and/or accommodation 
provided such denial is necessary to the continuation of that public accommodation’s 
identity as the public accommodation conceives of it (i.e., the accommodation must 
“show” or “demonstrate” that this is the case). This issue of altering the identity of the 
public accommodation also appears in (iii) and echoes the language of (ii) 
(“fundamentally alter the nature of”), but (iii), (iv), and (v) also move beyond issues of 
identification and focus on viability. 
 Just as the “specific prohibitions” tie necessity and identity to nondiscrimination 
as presented by a public accommodation, they also link viability and difficulty to 
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discrimination. In other words, the “specific prohibitions” make discrimination a function 
of expedience. According to (iii), a public accommodation need not “takes steps” to 
ensure equal access in the absence of “auxiliary aids and services” if it would cause an 
“undue burden” or “fundamentally alter” the nature of the public accommodation. Just as 
in (i) and (ii), the public accommodation must somehow “demonstrate” that taking 
additional steps to ensure equal access would cause an undue burden for the public 
accommodation and such demonstration is, presumably, a function of the logic of the 
public accommodation. Definitions (iv) and (v) move beyond viability (“undue burden”) 
and link discrimination with expedience or plenitude. 
According to definitions (iv) and (v), public accommodations must remove 
architectural barriers to access and/or offer alternative goods, services, etc. in cases where 
such actions are “readily achievable,” which echoes the language of §504’s “availability 
of alternatives.” To sum these definitions and their consequences in plain language: a 
public accommodation is required to make their goods, services, etc. accessible to 
individuals with disabilities if such action is consistent with the identity of the public 
accommodation and if such accommodation is not onerous to the public accommodation 
according to the public accommodation’s own reasoning. One might go further and argue 
that the “specific prohibitions” ultimately only require public accommodations to take 
actions that they would otherwise have no reason—by their own processes of 
reasoning—not to take.  
 The “specific prohibitions” locate a public accommodation’s discriminatory 
practices in its inability to rationalize those practices; i.e., practices only become 
discriminatory if the public accommodation is unable to rationalize them. Such 
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rationalization is a function of the internal logic of a particular public accommodation, 
and if courts give deference to such logics, it seems likely that discrimination (as it is 
pretheoretically or commonsensically understood) would proliferate rather than diminish 
as a result of the ADA, and one might conclude that discriminating agencies would still 
retain their rights, privileges, and abilities to self-legitimate while individuals with 
disabilities might be further marginalized and discriminated against.  I believe that case 
law seems to bear this out, but before turning to post-ADA case law, it’s first necessary to 
look at a number of pre-ADA cases that impacted post-ADA procedures and decisions. 
 Before the passage of the ADA, Pushkin v. The Regents of the University of 
Colorado set a precedent regarding a public accommodation’s due deliberation and 
ability to justify exclusion. Pushkin filed suit against the Regents of the University of 
Colorado, claiming that he had been discriminated against in his denial to be admitted to 
a psychiatric residency program. Although Pushkin had multiple sclerosis, his work 
history and the testimony of experts showed that the disability did not affect his work 
when some basic accommodations were made, and previous residents in the program had 
received accommodations for disability, including an individual with multiple sclerosis. 
The court found that Pushkin had been subject to discrimination following §504  (his 
record and abilities demonstrated that he was an “otherwise qualified individual”) 
because an interview committee denied Pushkin admission based solely on a subjective 
agreement that his disability—by its a priori nature—would preclude success in a 
residency program. While the court recognized the value (and even necessity) of 
subjective judgments in determining a candidate’s ability to participate in a program of 
study, the court found that such subjective judgments need shared criteria: 
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In the instant case, however, there is no established criteria upon which subjective 
assessment can be based. From the testimony I glean that there is some sort of 
inchoate criteria which the interviewers believe they share, but it certainly has not 
been formulated or articulated. (Pushkin v. Regents) 
The court found that Pushkin had been discriminated against solely on the basis of his 
disability and ruled against the defendant. However, it is important to note that the court 
found in favor of Pushkin because of a failure in the defendant’s deliberative procedures: 
In truth, I am most favorably impressed by the effort and dedication which the 
defendants demonstrate. I am not even critical of the psychiatric resident selection 
process as it is generally applied… Nevertheless, in this instance, I am convinced 
that the established processes failed. Testimony establishes that Dr. Pushkin is 
indeed qualified by defendants' standards. I believe that defendants failed to reach 
this conclusion because they did not apply their established standards. (Pushkin v. 
Regents) 
In short, the court deferred to the logic of the institution in selecting candidates to admit, 
and discrimination occurred with Pushkin because of an explicit failure of that logic 
within the institution. In other words, the case frames discrimination rigidly by sticking to 
the “otherwise qualified” criterion in §504. If the defendant had been able to justify a 
denial of admission through evenly-applied criteria, then the court seems to affirm that 
Pushkin v. Regents would have had a different outcome. A consistent “deliberative 
procedure” took center stage in a number of court decisions after the ADA, especially as 
such procedures related to alterations in the essence or programs of public 
Pacton 40 
accommodations. Before turning to that, though, it is worthwhile to look at a formative 
case that occurred almost at the same time as the ADA was being passed. 
 Although Wynne v. Tufts was tried under §504, it had far-reaching consequences 
for post-ADA cases. In brief, Wynne had previously failed a number of medical school 
courses, and after retaking these courses with the assistance of a number of 
supplementary aids provided by Tufts, Wynne was still unable to pass biochemistry and 
was dismissed from the program. Wynne brought suit against Tufts, arguing that Tufts’ 
refusal to allow him to take exams in formats other than multiple-choice (a condition, 
Wynne argued, was necessary to his success given certain learning disabilities) precluded 
his success and thus was discriminatory based on his “otherwise qualified” nature (he 
succeeded in other non-multiple choice assessments). The First Circuit Court of Appeals 
found in favor of the defendant because Tufts argued that dispensing with multiple-
choice tests would “require substantial program alterations, result in lowering academic 
standards, and devalue Tufts' end product—highly trained physicians carrying the prized 
credential of a Tufts degree” (Wynne v. Tufts). It is notable that the court recognized that 
another medical school offered oral versions of multiple choice tests for dyslexic students 
but argued that such evidence does not point to a “right” or “wrong” programmatic 
decision; instead, the court affirmed the relevant program’s deliberative procedure and 
findings:  
The point is that Tufts, after undertaking a diligent assessment of the available 
options, felt itself obliged to make “a professional, academic judgment that [a] 
reasonable accommodation [was] simply not available’…Phrased another way, 
Tufts decided, rationally if not inevitably, that no further accommodation could be 
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made without imposing an undue (and injurious) hardship on the academic 
program. (Wynne v. Tufts).  
In ruling in this fashion, the court implicitly—and in another place, explicitly—upheld 
the “reasonableness” of an accommodation as a result of the internal logic of the 
institution: “Reasonableness is not a constant. To the contrary, what is reasonable in a 
particular situation may not be reasonable in a different situation—even if the situational 
differences are relatively slight” (Wynne v. Tufts). The court also explicitly created a 
“test” for deciding whether an academic institution “adequately explored the availability 
of reasonable accommodations”: 
If the institution submits undisputed facts demonstrating that the relevant officials 
within the institution considered alternative means, their feasibility, cost and 
effect on the academic program, and came to a rationally justifiable conclusion 
that the available alternatives would result either in lowering academic standards 
or requiring substantial program alteration, the court could rule as a matter of law 
that the institution had met its duty of seeking reasonable accommodation. 
This “test” at first seems merely to formalize the definitions of “discrimination” found in 
the “Specific prohibitions” of the ADA. However, the “Specific prohibitions” remain 
agnostic as to who judges whether the public accommodation is compliant. For example, 
the third prohibition states that discrimination occurs when a public accommodation fails 
to provide equitable services or is exclusionary unless that public accommodation can 
“demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter…”; but the ADA does not 
indicate how this “demonstration” works, who judges its adequacy, and so forth. The 
other critical terms—“readily achievable” and “undue burden”—are likewise 
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underdetermined as far as who makes the final determination. Wynne’s formalized test 
thus created precedent for future cases wherein the “reasonableness” of an 
accommodation as a function of its lowering of standards or requiring substantial 
programmatic change rested firmly with the public accommodation (academic 
institution).  
 A number of court decisions after Wynne v. Tufts (and after the passage of the 
ADA) followed similar reasoning as the Wynne court with some even citing the Wynne 
“test” as a precedential procedure to be followed in determining whether an academic 
institution demonstrated due diligence in seeking to accommodate a student. In 
Guckenberger v. Boston University, for example, the court directly cited both the “test” 
from Wynne v. Tufts and the First Circuit Court’s affirmation that the “point is not 
whether a [university] is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in making program-related decisions. Such 
absolutes rarely apply in the context of subjective decision making, particularly in a 
scholastic setting” (Wynne v. Tufts qtd. in Guckenberger v. Boston University). In brief, 
Guckenberger v. Boston University was a class-action lawsuit brought by a group of 
learning-disabled students against Boston University because of Boston University’s 
refusal to allow course substitutions for its liberal arts foreign language requirement. In 
the course of the case, the court found that Boston University had not undergone a 
“deliberative procedure” to determine whether or how the foreign language requirement 
was essential to liberal arts programs at Boston University (how a substitution would 
“fundamentally alter” the program), and it ordered the university to conduct such an 
inquiry. After Boston University completed the inquiry and submitted its findings, the 
court ruled in favor of the university. 
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 The court’s decision was based on Boston University’s testimony that the 
proposed course substitution would “fundamentally alter the nature” of the liberal arts 
education at Boston University and that reasonable accommodations had otherwise been 
made. While there was some dissent on the committee who prepared the report, the 
committee as a whole found that “[n]o content course taught in English can substitute 
fully for the insider access to other cultures—with its attendant invitation to 
thoroughgoing critical self-awareness—that is the hallmark of foreign language study” 
(qtd. in Guckenberger v. Boston University). Boston University offered a number of 
accommodations including spelling accommodations, student tutors, and others. In 
determining whether the refusal to substitute courses was reasonable, the court was clear 
in its belief that academic institutions—provided they enact a “deliberative process”—
should be shown great deference in the validity of the process and resultant decisions. 
Citing Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, the court affirmed that:  
In the unique context of academic curricular decision-making, the courts may not 
override a faculty's professional judgment “unless it is such a substantial 
departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or 
committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.” 
(Guckenberger v. Boston University quoting Regents of the University of 
Michigan v. Ewing) 
In Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, the Supreme Court repeatedly 
underscored the importance of academic freedom, even going so far as to affirm the 
Court’s “responsibility to safeguard their [educational institutions’] academic freedom, ‘a 
special concern of the First Amendment’” (quoting from Keyishian v. Board of Regents). 
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The court in Guckenberger v. Boston University seemed to embrace this general 
perspective, even in the face of the plaintiff’s attack on Boston University’s deliberative 
procedure. 
 Following the language of Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, the 
plaintiffs argued that the refusal to allow the requested course substitutions was “a 
substantial departure from accepted academic norms” (Guckenberger v. Boston 
University quoting Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing) insofar as most 
colleges and universities either lacked a foreign language requirement or allowed course 
substitutions. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument, asserting the following: 
The evidence that BU is only among a handful of schools of higher education in 
its decision to deny course substitutions in language requirements is relevant to an 
evaluation of its decision to deny a reasonable accommodation. However, a court 
should not determine that an academic decision is a “substantial departure from 
accepted academic norms” simply by conducting a head-count of other 
universities. This approach is particularly inappropriate in the protean area of a 
liberal arts education. The liberal arts curriculum cannot be fit into a cookie cutter 
mold, unlike the medical school curriculum in Wynne, where no one disputed that 
mastery of biochemistry was necessary. (Guckenberger v. Boston University) 
Accordingly, the court argued, the precedent set by Wynne shows that what is at stake is 
“whether BU's decision is ‘rationally justifiable’ rather than the only possible conclusion 
it could have reached or other universities have reached.” In other words, if Boston 
University, in a deliberative procedure of its own design, can justify—according to its 
own values and theories of confirmation—the refusal to accommodate on the basis that 
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there would be an “undue burden” or that such accommodation would “fundamentally 
alter the nature of the program,” then there is no discrimination in the court’s eyes. This 
case thus further located the authority of the deliberative procedure and its ruling in the 
local university’s context, even going so far—in its rejection of the plaintiff’s argument 
based on Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing—as to equate common practices 
at analogous institutions as mere “head count” evidence. 
 Guckenberger v. Boston University and Wynne v. Tufts created troubling 
precedent for postsecondary students with disabilities. In the broadest sense, the “test” 
from Wynne v. Tufts and the court’s affirmation of the necessity of academic freedom 
(broadly construed) created a very particular discursive horizon wherein an institution 
need only legitimate its own practices—and this is the crucial part—according to its own 
standards of reasonableness and rationality and not even the standards of reasonableness 
and rationality (or common practices) of analogous institutions and programs.11 The end 
result: “reasonable accommodation” becomes a function of disciplinary discourses 
enacted in local contexts, and if accommodations are provided, they are ipso facto 
“reasonable accommodations” provided there was due deliberation by the relevant 
individuals; if accommodations are not provided, the university or college is ipso facto 
justified provided there was a deliberation by the relevant individuals and available 
accommodations posed either an undue burden (as defined by the college or university) 
or such accommodations would fundamentally alter the nature of the relevant program 
(as determined by the relevant individuals). In such a climate, one might begin to wonder 
                                                
11 In addition to Guckenberger v. Boston University, see Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. 
Case Western Reserve University for an example of how cross-institutional precedent 
does not trump (or even strongly influence) individual institutional inquiry. 
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“what is a disability?” and some courts, in debating reasonable accommodation, debated 
this very question12 in addition to closely scrutinizing the “otherwise qualified” clause of 
the ADA. What occurred in this milieu was directly contrary to the intent of the ADA: 
the ADA and related court cases provided postsecondary institutions with legally-
justified means of disciplinarily-couched discrimination. While amendments to the ADA 
correct for some of this, many essential features of the ADA as it comes to bear on 
postsecondary education remain intact.  
 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 2008 (ADAAA) was signed into law in 
September of 2008 by President George W. Bush. Arguably, the primary purpose of the 
ADAAA was to reverse a judicial trend which narrowed the definition of “disability” 
and, in so doing, discriminated against individuals who would be commonsensically 
considered disabled (Hensel 641-42). According to the ADAAA: 
…in enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Congress 
intended that the Act “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities” and provide 
broad coverage… While Congress expected that the definition of disability under 
the ADA would be interpreted consistently with how courts had applied the 
definition of a handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that 
expectation has not been fulfilled. 
In order to reverse or correct for this trend, one of the explicit purposes of the ADAAA is 
to “to carry out the ADA’s objectives of providing ‘a clear and comprehensive national 
                                                
12 See Price v. National Board of Medical Examiners and Bartlett v. New York State 
Board of Law Examiners for two examples of how disability was defined relative to 
general populations or more discrete populations.  
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mandate for the elimination of discrimination’ and ‘clear, strong, consistent, enforceable 
standards addressing discrimination’ by reinstating a broad scope of protection to be 
available under the ADA.” The ADAAA affirms that: “it is the intent of Congress that the 
primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities 
covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations, and to convey that the 
question of whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should not 
demand extensive analysis.” Such clarifications do, indeed, seem to mandate a broader 
protective stance towards individuals with disabilities and towards the protected class as a 
whole. Additionally, there exists at least the potential for improved working conditions 
and greater legal recourse for disabled individuals across various sectors. It is not, 
however, so clear how this legislation will affect students with disabilities as they seek 
accommodations in post-secondary institutions. 
   Although the ADAAA is a powerful piece of antidiscrimination legislation, it 
remains unclear how much protection it offers postsecondary students in the face of 
disciplinary control/reasonableness. None of the crucial sections (“crucial” for the 
purposes of this chapter) of the ADA were revised by the amendments—there were no 
alterations of the “specific prohibitions” for public accommodations (i.e., there was no 
revision of the “undue burden,” “fundamental alteration,” or “readily achievable” 
clauses). Likewise, although the ADAAA calls out previous employment discrimination 
cases and its intent to reject their decisions as precedential,13 it omits mention of central 
decisions in postsecondary cases (for example, whether the “test” from Wynne v. Tufts 
                                                
13 For example: Sutton v. United Air Lines; School Board of Nassau County v. Arline; and 
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.  
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should be rejected or even altered). In a new addition under “Subchapter IV—
Miscellaneous Provisions,” the ADAAA explicitly reaffirms the following: 
Nothing in this chapter alters the provision of section 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), 
specifying that reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures shall 
be required, unless an entity can demonstrate that making such modifications in 
policies, practices, or procedures, including academic requirements in 
postsecondary education, would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations involved.  
On the face of it, this provision merely contextualizes the “fundamental alteration” 
specific prohibition for Subchapter IV; however, the addition of this clause combined 
with the fact that the “specific prohibitions” were not revised indicates an (at least tacit) 
approval of the specific prohibitions and the resultant/related judicial decisions (Wynne v. 
Tufts, Guckenberger v. Boston University, etc.). A Report of the House Committee on 
Education and Labor underscores this by maintaining that the ADAAA does not change 
the “fundamental alteration” prohibitions and that, for example, “a university would not 
be expected to eliminate academic requirements essential to the instruction being pursued 
by a student, although it may be required to make modifications in order to enable 
students with disabilities to meet those academic requirements” (Miller 11). Thus, there 
appears to be a tension in accommodation legislation as it relates to postsecondary 
institutions. 
 On one hand, the ADAAA is clearly an attempt to rectify the failings of the ADA 
and resultant decisions based upon it. On the other hand, it’s not at all clear how courts 
will weigh individual students’ needs for accommodation against competing interests, 
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values, and disciplinarity in higher education (Hensel 684). Returning to the particular 
case of Composition Studies, however, it seems reasonable to argue that compositionists 
and the programs, departments, and universities in which they are housed may be called 
upon—perhaps soon—to articulate what is essential or fundamental to a course of study 
in composition and how one might accommodate a disabled person in a composition 
course.  
 
Composition Studies, Disability, and Reasonable Accommodation 
As composition is one of the only (quasi-) universally-required college requirements14, it 
is not unreasonable (or improbable) that students with disabilities may at some point 
bring suit against a writing program for failing to reasonably accommodate a disability. 
One can easily imagine a student seeking a course substitution, an alternate project 
format, or even attendance considerations. One can also easily imagine that student being 
denied because the “fundamental” or essential nature of the class or program would be 
altered, or because such accommodations would create an “undue burden” for the 
department or program. Of course, this begs the question: what is “fundamental” or 
essential to the teaching and doing of composition? 
 Inquiring into the fundamental or essential nature of composition is fraught. 
Maintaining that there is an essence—that there are definable characteristics, 
methodologies, or theories that obtain across contexts/schools—is fiercely debated by 
scholars in the field. In the context of the present project, however, one might argue that 
this question is—in part—a non-starter; after all, a number of court decisions tie the 
                                                
14 Moghtader, Cotch, and Hague’s 2001 survey indicates that percentages of schools with 
a curricular writing requirement range from 90-100% (by type of school) (457). 
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question of what is fundamental to a course of study to local contexts such as a college, 
department, or program. Put another way, in any given discrimination case, the defending 
writing program or department would likely need to show only that a deliberative 
procedure occurred within that program or department and that as a result of said 
deliberative procedure, the disabling practice or policy was found to be essential to the 
program of study. Citing policies or practices from other schools would be irrelevant per 
Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Case Western Reserve University and Guckenberger v. 
Boston University. One might rejoin, however, that such precedent may be called into 
question given the ADAAA’s purpose in “reinstating a broad scope of protection.” In any 
event, no simple answer tells us what the fundamental nature of composition might be. 
This question—and how its answers might interact with relevant law—are dealt with at 
length in Chapter 3, but before addressing that question, there is perhaps an even more 
practical question that compositionists may need to address: what is a “disability” for 
Composition Studies? 
 The ADA, ADAAA, and related legislation debate at length what counts as a 
“disability”; in fact, one of the primary purposes of the ADAAA is to reject “courts’ 
narrow approach to eligibility under the statute and restore Congress’ original intent to 
provide broad legal protection from disability discrimination in society” (Hensel 697). 
Interrogating the minutia of these qualifications as they relate to Composition Studies is 
not the purpose of this project and, in fact, such exploration can obscure broader 
considerations. For example, most colleges and universities require that a student possess 
disability documentation to grant that student accommodation. While the definitions of 
“disability” may vary according to different criteria, this standard of external 
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authorization and authentication frames disability—theoretically—as residing within 
particular hegemonic power relations. In other words, extant channels of authorization 
locate disability in the body of the disabled individual rather than in networks of power 
relations, and the location of the authorizing agent remains unmarked and apolitical. 
Focusing overmuch on the distinctions, qualifications, and classifications such networks 
employ can miss the forest from the trees and leave fundamental, underwriting theoretical 
models intact. In short, then, the important question for compositionists becomes what 
model of disability do (and/or should) compositionists embrace, and what consequences 
derive from such subscription? This question is explored at length in Chapters 2 and 3. In 
addition to the questions of “essence,” and “disability,” there is a third interconnecting 
question that affects the answers to these other questions: what does it mean for 
Composition Studies to even consider what an “accommodation” might be? 
 In an abstract sense, the need for accommodation implicates an asymmetrical 
relationship (construed as broadly as possible to include a relationship among agents, 
among agents and environments, among agents and ideas, and so forth) wherein one 
party does not in some sense match up or “fit” with another. For example, there is an 
asymmetrical relationship between a person who uses a wheelchair and a building that 
lacks ramps and/or elevators. Accommodation, in this example, would mean that one 
party—or both—would require some sort of alteration to effect congruity in the 
relationship: the person using the wheelchair would need some device or tool to 
circumvent the inaccessible aspects of the environment, or some responsible party would 
need to alter the building’s architecture via ramps, lifts, or some other modification to 
make it more accessible. With this in mind, what does it mean for composition to 
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accommodate someone with a disability? What is the nature of the asymmetry? Where 
does the fit occur/need to occur? What are the implications? These are not idle questions. 
If composition—what it does, what it teaches, how it is operationalized in the 
classroom—is inaccessible, if accommodations need to be made for certain students, this 
has implications for composition’s technologies. By “technologies,” I of course refer to 
such things as the production of writing, curricula, and classroom materials, but I also use 
the term to indicate how composition both creates technologies of power and 
epistemology and exists itself within particular networks of power as a potentially-
hegemonic technology.  
 As critical, philosophical, and even scientific theories have shown us, there is no 
“view from nowhere” (Nagel). Any perspective will seek to legitimate itself through its 
own relative logics, and any descriptions will be bound by taxonomies which articulate 
with such logics. Accordingly, beginning an inquiry into accommodation as it occurs or 
may occur within Composition Studies from a Composition Studies perspective might be 
doomed to employing a metatheory derived from the theories and taxonomies of 
Composition Studies itself. At best, this might influence possible inquiry. At worst, this 
might make certain sorts of inquiry impossible. Legal considerations—as this first 
chapter has shown—provide a particular kind of impetus and set of considerations for an 
exploration of accommodation within Composition Studies. But this exploration—from 
legal and Composition Studies perspectives—is imbricated with Disability Studies and 
the models of disability that Disability Studies’ theories provide. These models, in turn, 
can reframe understandings of how disability is situated within the law and within 
Composition Studies.
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Chapter 2: Cripping Complexity: Medical, Social, and Complex Models of 
Disability 
Introduction 
As Chapter 1 shows, legislation and legal precedent can complicate—and have 
complicated— “disability,” its accounting, its accommodations, its borders, its class 
membership. However, legal analyses of disability only provide one historico-
cultural/theoretical lens through which to explore “disability” and related issues. As I 
argue below, beginning and ending with such a singular perspective leaves “disability” 
undertheorized and oversimplified. Additionally, as Chapter 1 argues, some legislation 
and case law functions disciplinarily and epistemologically, legitimizing particular 
apparatuses of classification, elision, omission, and so forth. While exploring such legal 
treatments of disability provides a valuable perspective for Composition Studies, it 
remains insufficient as a theoretical engine. A more nuanced approach to disability can 
both uncover the theoretical assumptions and baggage built into legal approaches to 
disability and simultaneously create a more recognizable theoretical bridge with 
Composition Studies. By “theoretical bridge,” I simply mean that one area of inquiry and 
its attendant theorizations may form an intermediary or transitive linkage between 
seemingly disparate areas of inquiry. Disability Studies can be framed as such a 
theoretical bridge between legislation on disability/accommodation and Composition 
Studies.15 
 “Disability Studies” refers to a broad interdisciplinary field of study drawing 
scholars from history, philosophy, literature, sociology, and Composition Studies, just to 
                                                
15 Of course, this by no means equates the mission or even intention of Disability Studies. 
This relationship is merely heuristic. 
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name a few. It began to coalesce as a field in the 1990s, according to James Wilson, 
“amid the interest in identity issues growing out of postmodern inquiries into 
subjectivity” (60). According to the Society for Disability Studies,16 “Disability Studies 
recognizes that disability is a key aspect of human experience, and that the study of 
disability has important political, social, and economic implications for society as a 
whole, including both disabled and nondisabled people” (“Mission and History”). As it is 
a “key aspect of human experience,” many Disability Studies scholars work at troubling 
the extension of “disability,” uncovering how disability is constructed and represented in 
various media, and exploring how disability can limn unmarked political categories and 
their valorizations of abelism. According to Simi Linton, a prominent voice in Disability 
Studies,  
It has been particularly important to bring to light language that reinforces the 
dominant culture’s view of disability. A useful step in that process has been the 
construction of the terms abelist and abelism, which can be used to organize ideas 
about the centering and domination of the nondisabled experience and point of 
view. (224) 
The sort of critical work Linton references lays no claim to neutrality. Like Critical 
Discourse Analysis—an analytic method employed by a number of Disability Studies 
scholars (Kerschbaum, “Avoiding”; Price)—Disability Studies often embraces an activist 
                                                
16 The Society for Disability Studies, or “SDS,” is a non-profit professional organization 
of scholars, researchers, activists, and artists that “promotes the study of disability in 
social, cultural, and political contexts…Through research, artistic production, teaching 
and activism, the Society for Disability Studies seeks to augment understanding of 
disability in all cultures and historical periods, to promote greater awareness of the 
experiences of disabled people, and to advocate for social change” (“Mission and 
History”). The organization hosts yearly conferences and is responsible for the peer-
reviewed journal, Disability Studies Quarterly.  
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role, working for equality and access for all. Clearly, this description indicates a rather 
expansive and often heterogeneous grouping of scholars and activists. However, this does 
not indicate an utter lack of cohesion; indeed, it is possible to point clearly at what 
Disability Studies is not: “It is not medicine, rehabilitation, special education, physical or 
occupational therapy, and professions oriented toward the cure, prevention, or treatment 
of disabilities” (“What is Disability Studies”). In other words, Disability Studies does not 
embrace “medicalized” approaches to disability; in fact, much of the work of Disability 
Studies scholars aims directly at disrupting the medicalization of disability in culture and 
politics.  
 Many scholars in Disability Studies locate a broad constellation of approaches to 
disability within the “medical” and “social” models of disability and their 
interrelationships. Understanding each of these theoretical models, their limitations, and 
the potential expansion afforded by troubling the binary sheds important light on the 
theories undergirding Composition Studies’ approaches to disability. Further, close 
scrutiny of these models uncovers the need for a more complex notion of disability and 
accommodation than what currently obtains in Composition Studies. 
 
The Medical Model of Disability  
The “medical model of disability” (or, more simply, the “medical model”) is an approach 
to disability that explicitly or implicitly defines disability as “a deficiency that restricts 
one’s ability to perform normal life activities” (Donoghue 204). Please note two elements 
in this definition: disability is “deficiency” and it is defined relative to the “normal.” The 
deviance—the deficiency—results from damage, deformity, and/or disease to a normal 
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body, and such deviance should be “cured” to bring—as much as is possible—the deviant 
body into alignment with the healthy norm, a perspective that aligns with medical 
approaches to disease (Llewellyn and Hogan 158). This model is not merely associated 
with medicine; instead, it refers to a broader, clinical approach to disability that 
approaches deviation etiologically, with an aim towards therapeutic intervention (159). 
Accordingly, the fields of medicine and psychology/psychiatry—and their approaches to 
disability—are generally both included when scholars refer to the medical model. Such 
approaches, with their focus on deficiency and deviance, fundamentally depend upon 
constructions of a “norm.” 
 The “norm” did not develop into the concept with which it is most commonly 
associated until the 19th century. Even so, there is ample evidence that persons with 
disabilities were normatively judged throughout history on the basis of their differences. 
These individuals tended to be categorized as belonging to a deviant group with respect 
to either an ideal or at least common prescriptive category, and such categorization 
sometimes carried moral and/or political consequences. Plato, for example, associated 
disability with an imbalance in the proper harmony of the person and even recommended 
euthanasia for disabled persons (Kiefer). Aristotle likewise recommended euthanasia for 
disabled individuals (Kiefer), identifying them as morally flawed and ranking among 
barbarians and non-citizens (“Making Disability Visible” 153). However, the response to 
disabled persons and their relation to some sort of human baseline tended to become  
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more uneven in the course of Western history.17 
 Western representations and treatments of disabled persons have varied greatly 
since the ancient Greeks. For example, while early Christians framed disability as a path 
to grace (Munyi), others were more ambivalent. Augustine, in his musings on the 
“monstrous races,” seems to grant individuals with disabilities a modicum of 
commonality with non-disabled individuals as a result of shared lineage. However, this 
affiliation seems to apply only to physical impairments: 
…so all the races which are reported to have diverged in bodily appearance from 
the usual course which nature generally or almost universally preserves, if they 
are embraced in that definition of man as rational and mortal animals, 
unquestionably, trace their pedigree to that one first father of all. (118) 
Augustine leaves the relationship to those with mental disabilities ambiguous at best (“if 
they are embraced in that definition of man as rational…” [italics added]), while later 
Christian figures such as Calvin and Luther accused some disabled persons of possession 
and sought to cleanse such individuals through painful exorcisms (Munyi). Of course, 
this is only a tiny sliver of Western attitudes, and it is by no means a detailed 
representation of the historical development of the normal v. disabled binary. That said, it 
does begin to point at an important discursive othering of the disabled by the nondisabled 
in Western ideologies: the disabled were not only set apart in public discourses but their 
                                                
17 It should be clear that the historical background offered here is cursory. The reasons for 
this are twofold. First, deep historical analysis is not absolutely integral to the present 
project, though it is informative. Second, as Chomba Wa Munyi argues, disability history 
is still a developing field of inquiry, with only sparse scholarship available. Protracted 
research into disability history, particularly non-Western disability history and cross 
cultural disability history, will undoubtedly provide even greater insight into the socio-
historical formation of disabilities and norms. 
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discourse was considered alien if it was not negated. Foucault describes this 
phenomenon: 
From the depths of the Middle Ages, a man was mad if his speech could not be 
said to form part of the common discourse of men. His words were considered nul 
[sic] and void, without truth or significance, worthless as evidence, inadmissible 
in the authentification of acts or contracts, incapable even of bringing about 
transubstantiation…And yet, in contrast to all others, his words were credited 
with strange powers, of revealing some hidden truth, of predicting the future, of 
revealing, in all their naivete [sic], what the wise were unable to perceive…At all 
events, whether excluded or secretly invested with reason, the madman’s speech 
did not strictly exist…Whatever a madman said, it was taken for mere noise; he 
was credited with words only in a symbolic sense, in the theatre, in which he 
stepped forward, unarmed and reconciled, playing his role: that of masked truth. 
(“The Discourse on Language” 217)  
In Foucault’s characterization, then, the madman—s/he with a mental disability—
becomes othered either through dehumanization or through mystification (as a “divine 
idiot”). In such a way, s/he lies outside of the common mass of humanity; s/he is an 
outlier from some center. This center and its resultant outliers—this norm-deviant 
relationship—became formalized in the nineteenth century with the interrelated rise of 
statistics and eugenics. 
 In his essay, “Constructing Normalcy,” Lennard Davis argues that normalcy and 
“the norm” as we understand them today developed in the nineteenth century as a result 
of both the work of statisticians and eugenicists. Davis argues that prior to the nineteenth 
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century, many societies and cultures believed in a human ideal, and this ideal was an 
ideal precisely because it did not occur in the world (at least, the non-mythological 
world); all people were non-ideal in one way or another. With the advent of more fine-
grained systems of classification (including statistics), people could be grouped according 
to their similarity to a majority or deviance therefrom. However, in plotting people along 
a bell curve, the majority of people should lump in the center—the norm—with outliers 
(including the “disabled” and the “superlative”) grouping to either side of the curve (4-7). 
While this mode of representation created the norm through its relation to deviance, 
eugenicists like Francis Galton developed the means to further specify differences along 
the overall curve in normative ways. 
 Central to eugenic thinking in the nineteenth century was belief in the 
perfectibility—or at least possible continual improvement—of humanity. As Davis points 
out, this creates a catch-22 with regard to the bell curve. For almost any given trait, one 
outlying area of the bell-curve represents superlative examples (highly-intelligent, tall, 
etc.) while the other outlying area of the curve represents the deficient. The bell curve by 
itself does not evaluatively distinguish between either set of outliers, and they are made 
similar by their deviance from the norm. Dalton “solved” this conundrum by dividing the 
bell curve into ranked quartiles. In such a way, the norm becomes the imperative, and one 
set of outliers becomes “ideal” while the other becomes “deviant” or “deficient.” As 
Davis puts it:  
This statistical ideal is unlike the classical ideal. The new ideal of ranked order is 
powered by the imperative of the norm, and then is supplemented by the notion of 
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progress, human perfectibility, and the elimination of deviance, to create a 
dominating, hegemonic vision of what the human body should be. (8-9) 
In his chapter, Davis shows that this norming extended beyond the physical to include the 
psychological, resulting in a “eugenics of the mind,” “creating the concepts of normal 
sexuality, normal function, and then contrasting them with the perverse, abnormal, 
pathological, and even criminal” (11-12). Ultimately Davis shows that the creation of 
“the norm” is socio-historical and tied to a middle-class, industrialized, Enlightened 
belief in progress and perfectibility. Davis sees one task of Disability Studies as “the 
attempt, then, to reverse the hegemony of the normal and to institute alternative ways of 
thinking about the abnormal” (17). Following Davis, then, one may reapproach “normal” 
as an instrument of dominant, hegemonic forces: a legitimizing, centripetal concept18 that 
unmarks or obscures its own historico-political nature.  
A number of recent scholars have tried to disrupt the pseudo-transparency of the 
“norm.” For example, Garland-Thomson coined “normate” to mark the political nature of 
“normal.”19 Similarly, Scott Lunsford argues that using “dis/ability” marks “ability” and 
                                                
18 I am using “centripetal” in a Bakhtinian fashion here to refer to an ideologically-
saturated language’s tendency towards semantic and political consolidation, what Bakhtin 
calls “verbal-ideological centralization and unification” (“The Dialogic Imagination” 
272). 
19 “This neologism names the veiled subject position of cultural self, the figure outlined 
by the array of deviant others whose marked bodies shore up the normate’s boundaries. 
The term normate usefully designates the social figure through which people can 
represent themselves as definite human beings. Normate, then, is the constructed identity 
of those who, by way of the bodily configurations and cultural capital they assume, can 
step into a position of authority and wield the power it grants them” (Extraordinary 
Bodies 8). 
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opens both “ability” and “disability” to critique.20 Many Disability Studies scholars have 
worked—and continue to work—at marking both “normal” and “ability” as these terms 
ground the medical model and its continued “tyranny of the norm.”  
With the above historical context in mind, returning to definitions of the medical 
model can be quite telling. As indicated earlier, we can understand the medical model’s 
medicalization as an approach to disability that defines “disability” as “a deficiency that 
restricts one’s ability to perform normal life activities” (Donoghue 204). In this 
definition, “normal” is twice referenced. First, it refers—at least implicitly (via 
“deficiency”)—to an embodied, ranked deviation.21 Second, it refers to life activities that 
are somehow “normal.” The definition thus centers normal configurations—physical or 
psychological—and normal ways of acting or moving through the world. While this 
second, activity-based normalization seems to indicate a socially-constructed normality, 
behavior still connects inextricably with the individual as flowing outward from the 
individual rather than as a networked emergence. In other words, the individual becomes 
an embodied, functionalist locus of normalities: the system (individual) is either normal 
or deficient, and its outputs are either normal or deficient (with one normality or 
                                                
20 “I use the form dis/abilities to emphasize the importance of its inclusion as an issue of 
difference which we approach as critically as we do race, class, and gender: just as we 
cannot discuss race without arguing how ‘whiteness’—at least in this country—performs 
hegemonic control over other racial identities, we cannot ignore how ‘ability’ realizes its 
constituent disability” (330). 
21 One could read “deficiency” as coextensive with the restriction of “one’s ability to 
perform normal life activities,” but the addition of “that” in the definition may indicate 
difference. 
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abnormality often implying the other).22 This embodiment, perhaps, and its clinicalization 
of the norm defines the medical model. 
 The most salient, inimical, and entrenched aspect of the medical model may lie in 
its localization of disabilities within particular human bodies. For many people, 
seemingly pretheoretical understandings of disability associate particular disabilities with 
particular people and their embodied deficiency or deviance. That this seems 
pretheoretical or commonsensical indicates the unmarked norm of the autonomous, 
unified self that sustains over time and in ways definable beyond (or prior to) networked 
relations (much like the myth of the autonomous writer). In any case, the medical model 
quantifies disability/deviance, marks its borders, and develops the instruments through 
which classification (diagnosis) can be effected. Medical (and psychological) 
practitioners encapsulate the disabled person in the “medical gaze” and, in the process, 
turn “person” into “patient.” Unpacking this process clarifies how such medicalization 
operates. 
 When individuals are medically/psychologically diagnosed, they enter into the 
disciplinary machinery of the medical and/or psychological fields; they become subject to 
the medical gaze. Phrased another way, the medical gaze interpellates the subject as 
patient and identifies the patient with the disability. Linton describes the ideological 
implications of such enpatienting: 
The homonymic patient/patient, is, I think, not coincidental or irrelevant. The 
noun patient is a role designation that is always relational. A patient is understood 
                                                
22 For example, a deviant behavior implies a deviant system while a deviant system 
implies that a given behavior may be normal only be accident rather than design or 
natural consequent. 
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to belong to a doctor or other health care professional, or more generally to an 
institution…The adjective patient moves beyond the noun’s neutral designation to 
describe a person who is capable of ‘bearing or enduring pain, difficulty, 
provocation, or annoyance with calmness’ as well as ‘tolerant … persevering … 
constant … not hasty’ (American Heritage Dictionary 1992). The ‘good’ patient 
is one who does not challenge the authority of the practitioner or institution and 
who complies with the regimen set out by the expert, in other words a patient. 
(234) 
The clinician—as expert or authority in the identification of disease or disorder—is s/he 
who names the subject as “X” or “Y” (where “X” or “Y” refer to a disability), and should 
the subject reject such naming or diagnosis, that subject becomes impatient; that is, s/he 
becomes hasty, intolerant, and perhaps even anxious, which are all potential indicators of 
further pathology (and further legitimation of the medical gaze). This process shackles 
disabled individuals who may depend on auxiliary services and care provided through 
clinical channels: if an individual rejects or repudiates part of a clinician’s assessment 
and/or treatment, s/he may become ineligible for other treatments or services that s/he 
may need. In such a context, disabled persons have often found little recourse beyond 
subjecting themselves to the medical model’s clinical and ideological apparatuses and, in 
so doing, have sometimes found themselves unwilling patients.  
 While the medical model and the self-legitimizing technologies associated with it 
still hold sway in many quarters, its hegemonic power has increasingly been troubled. In 
particular, at the end of the Twentieth Century and the beginning of the Twenty-First, the 
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social model began to systematically challenge the medical model and the 
theories/perspectives underwriting it. 
 
The Social Model of Disability 
Mike Oliver first referred to the “social model of disability” in 1983 (“The Social Model 
of Disability” 267), and it has since become the dominant Disability Studies approach in 
the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom (Davidson 136). In contrast to the 
medical model’s location of disability in individual deficient bodies, the social model 
recognizes the constructed, hegemonic nature of disability. Proponents of this model 
maintain that understanding the socially-constructed nature of disability leads to 
understanding that disability is difference—deviation from the norm—that is identified as 
deficiency in order to buttress the norm and delineate its boundaries. 
 Social model theorists argue that physical architectures and hegemonic ideologies 
both construct and legitimize the physical and psychological configurations of either the 
norm or its superlative variants. For example, nothing inherently makes stairs the only—
or best—way of moving from one level to another in a public space. However, that stairs 
have been normalized makes the inability to traverse them seem deficient even though a 
“normal” person might have difficulty navigating stairs in any number of circumstances. 
Similarly, there is nothing natural in the requirement that individuals be able to sit still for 
long periods of time in order to be educated. However, considerations of efficiency in 
many educational institutions normalize and naturalize the ability to sit through long 
lectures and activities, and the inability (or unwillingness) to do so becomes individual 
deficiency. In order to legitimate the superiority of the “norm” and its preferred practices 
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and ideologies, it is not enough to admit the coexistence of difference in abilities insofar 
as such an admission carries ethical consequences that may be at odds with normative 
preference. Instead, the norm (and its physical and social articulations) must become a 
descriptive and prescriptive category if it is to continually consolidate and legitimate its 
power. As Donoghue argues,  
The more desirable arrangement to the non-disabled majority is one that 
maintains the superiority of people with ‘normal’ abilities. As a result, the 
disabled are typically described as dysfunctional and are often perceived to be 
incapable of understanding the world in the same way that ‘normal’ people do. 
(205) 
To critique the norm, in other words, is to risk admitting one’s own inability to 
understand the norm; difference in body, mind, and even opinion becomes deficiency. 
The equation of difference with deficiency has been especially prevalent and often 
intransigent in discourses on mental disabilities.  
 According to a social model perspective, mental disabilities tend to be cognitive 
or psychosocial variations of, or departures from, the norm. This has visibly been the case 
in the autism community, where many self-advocates have passionately argued that so-
called autistic deficits are alternative, valued behavioral and cognitive ways of being in 
the world. For example, in the preface to Aquamarine Blue 5: Personal Stories of College 
Students with Autism, Dawn Prince-Hughes argues for the inherent value of autists’ 
writing and writers:   
It is true that the word choices and sentence structures of autistic writers often 
make it difficult to follow their thought processes. I believe that this is because 
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most people are used to following one ‘logical’ train of thought to what amounts 
to foregone conclusions. Autism spectrum people do not think this way. Rather, 
we constantly see divergent possibilities (and at a staggeringly fast pace) and our 
word selection and sentence structures often reflect this. Also, we tend to 
punctuate our thinking processes rather than the actual sentences we write. (xii) 
While similar perspectives on disabled behaviors or expressions can be valuably counter-
hegemonic, they can also be risky insofar as they keep the locus of value within extant 
socio-political power relations. For example, even in Prince-Hughes’ valuation of autistic 
writers, she falls back on the terms and comparisons that underwrite the medical model: 
she distinguishes “autistic writers” and their abilities from “most people” and implies that 
a ranked-quartile bell curve is operative, with autistic people possibly residing in the 
superlative quartile rather than the below-normal.23 This “us” vs. “them” perspective both 
elides the broad heterogeneity across writers (and people, in general), but it also subtly 
reaffirms the myth of the supercrip.  
 The “supercrip” figure seemingly valorizes the accomplishments and personhood 
of disabled persons and may lead some to believe it is a counterhegemonic construct; 
however, the supercrip figure actually reinscribes medical model ideology. In brief, a 
“supercrip” is an individual with a disability who has “overcome” his or her disability 
through the achievement of something remarkable either for disabled people, “normal” 
people, or both. The supercrip is praised by “normal” people not only for his/her 
                                                
23 I.e., implicit in the “foregone conclusion” description of “normal writing” is a 
tautological criticism of “normal writing” and writers. While Prince-Hughes may be 
right, such a comparison potentially trades on an evaluative scale that places autistic 
writing in the superlative quartile by virtue of its implicit space for the unexpected. 
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seemingly super-human abilities (for a disabled person), but also for his/her cheerful 
disposition in the face of a burdensome existence: 
Supercrip is the Good Cripple taken to dizzying, perhaps nauseating heights, and 
chances are, if you've had any exposure to media depictions of disability at all, 
you have been exposed to this trope. Supercrip has been, in his and her various 
iterations, sunny, kind, overachieving, possesses a "can-do" attitude, and does 
AMAZING! and INSPIRING! things and can thus "overcome" his or her 
disability…Supercrip's main function is to serve as inspiring to the majority while 
reinforcing the things that make this majority feel awesome about itself. In short: 
Supercrip provides a way for non-disabled folks to be "inspired" by persons with 
disabilities without actually questioning—or making changes to—how persons 
with disabilities are treated in society. (annaham). 
Wrapped up in the superlative nature of the supercrip, then, is an expectation that the 
supercrip will overcome his or her disability in both functional and emotional terms. The 
figure of the supercrip carries paternalistic and colonial freight: accomplishments are 
praiseworthy for a disabled person and because they are accomplishments that the 
normate values as constitutive of the normate or the superlative version of the normate. 
Perhaps worse is that the normate’s endorsement of the supercrip potentially endangers 
non-supercrips.  
As Linton points out, the supercrip and his/her overcoming narrative indicts “the 
other members of the group from which the individual has supposedly moved beyond” 
(228): these other “disabled” individuals, by implication, are not “as brave, strong, or 
extraordinary as the person who has overcome that designation” (228). The disabled 
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person who is not superlative by the norm’s standards becomes especially disabled, lazy, 
or willful in light of supercrip narratives. Worse, if such a person refuses to be grateful to 
society and clinicians, they may provoke indignant responses (Marks 621). Approaching 
supercrip narratives from a social model perspective reveals that such narratives are not 
ultimately about valuing disabled persons but are instead about reinforcing the medical 
model of disability: the supercrip reasserts the values of the norm and the values of 
abelism.  
In general, the social model provides a useful analytical lens for understanding 
how disability is socially constructed and how it functions within networks of power, but 
there are significant limitations to the model. In order to move beyond a general—and 
perhaps overly abstract—social constructionist approach to disability, it’s necessary to 
look more closely at the shortcomings of the social model. 
While the social model has provided a much-needed theoretical corrective to the 
medical model, it has its problems. In the broadest sense, the social model has limited 
theoretical and practical utility because it can simplify and essentialize disability as a 
unitary category. In other words, a potential, implicit slippery slope in the social model 
can lead to a reductio ad absurdum within the concept of disability itself. 
 If the social model frames disability as a physical or psychological configuration 
that deviates from a hegemonic norm, then “disability” becomes conceptually ambiguous. 
For example, given that the median household income in the United States is 
approximately $50,000 (Noss 3), and given that access to higher education and social 
mobility is generally predicated upon financial stability, does it make sense—following 
the social model—to argue that lower-income people are disabled? While it might be a 
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stretch to make such a claim, it is not a far jump to conflate the social model with other 
models of political oppression and elide conditions that one might intuitively associate 
with disability (Shakespeare, “Developed Countries’ Responses” 130). Even when this 
collapse does not occur, the social model still has a tendency to approach disability as a 
homogenous category.  
 “Disability”—no matter how one might approach it—is a heterogeneous concept. 
From a medical model perspective, this is clearly the case as the myriads of diagnostic 
possibilities attest. The social model, in framing disability as a normate-driven oppression 
of difference, tends to lump all disabilities together, collapsing mental and physical 
disabilities (and the various forms of each) together into the broad category of 
“disability.” This is problematic, of course, as even at the sociocultural level, a person 
who has, for example, lung cancer is regarded very differently from a person who has 
autism. However, there is also a finer-grained homogenization that occurs through the 
social model. In short, the social model tends to ignore the intersectional nature of 
disability and the fact that “unlike other forms of marginalization, disability always 
intersects with race, class, sexuality, and gender” (Krefting 110). Put another way, one is 
never simply a “disabled person,” a “person with schizophrenia,” or a “person with 
chronic fatigue syndrome”; rather, a person might be an affluent-trans-Latino/a with 
multiple sclerosis. While there may be some utility in thinking about how these different 
categories function within social milieus, any understanding gained will be limited and 
will likely not reflect the intersectional nature of these categories (let alone their fluidity). 
Accordingly, intersectionality makes the move from larger identity-category positioning 
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to individual positioning extremely problematic for the social model, but not nearly as 
problematic as the social model’s explicit or implicit omission of impairment. 
 Some social model theorists may avoid accounting for impairment or may attempt 
to subsume impairment under the social understanding of disability by claiming that 
impairment too is socially-constructed. “Impairment” is the deviant (from the norm) 
characteristic that leads to disability. For example, a person with paraplegia has an 
impairment in functioning in his/her lower extremities, and that person is disabled by a 
building which only uses stairs as access points (and the normalizing ideologies that 
underwrite such construction choices). The social model risks—in a way—disabling 
these individuals further by erasing impairments that can have significant (and sometimes 
negative) impacts on peoples’ lives (Mulvany 583; Terzi 150). As Tom Shakespeare puts 
it: 
The social model so strongly disowns individual and medical approaches, that it 
risks implying that impairment is not a problem…For individuals with static 
impairments, which do not degenerate or cause medical complications, it may be 
possible to regard disability as entirely socially created. For those who have 
degenerative conditions which may cause premature death, or any condition 
which involves pain and discomfort, it is harder to ignore the negative aspects of 
impairment. (“The Social Model of Disability” 269-70) 
Simply put, many people with impairments require medical interventions to maintain 
quality of life and even continuance of life (270); accordingly, approaches to impairment 
and disability need to recognize the often-necessary medical aspects of living with a 
disability while simultaneously critiquing the medical imbrication of impairment and 
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disability (Mulvany 593-94). This limitation does not mean that the social model is not 
useful or even necessary24; however, it does mean that the social model qua reductive, 
everything-is-socially-constructed model needs to evolve to account for the medical 
dimensions of impairment—it needs to become more productively complex.  
 Both the medical model and the social model obscure the complexity of being 
disabled. The medical model fails to recognize its own limited, constructed, and 
hegemonic apparatuses—it is blind to its own gaze—but the social model fails to 
recognize that it too focuses a limiting gaze upon the individual. In the case of the social 
model, the gaze slides off the individual and instead apprehends a broad social blur. 
Under either model, the individual is continually retreating, becoming a placeholder, and 
fading into coextension with his or her own disability. This assertion is doubtlessly 
contentious, and some explanation is in order. 
 The claim that the medical model can essentialize disability and identify the 
individual with his or her disability is fairly unproblematic, but the social model of 
disability can perform analogous essentialization and identification. When one speaks of 
social configurations disabling a person and creating his or her disability, it is by virtue of 
a configurational difference that is tied to a social or environmental structure. For 
example, people who have certain sensory disorders or sensitivities may be disabled by 
the use of fluorescent lights. They become disabled by their relation to this architectural 
feature and its naturalization in many institutional settings, and an analysis of their 
                                                
24 Oliver argues that the social model needs to be reformulated or replaced with 
something that allows for powerful social critique (and resultant action), or political 
pressures may force disabled persons to eventually succumb to pressures of accepting 
medicalized models of disability to ensure continued medical interventions for their 
impairments (1026). 
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disablement centers on this difference. Foregrounding this difference both elides the 
experience of the impairment—in this case, potential sensory dissonance, anxiety, or any 
number of resultant physiological and/or cognitive responses—and also collapses the 
identity of the individual into a single point: the disability. What is the individual’s 
gender identification, and how does that identification color social expectations of 
responses to sensory disorders or resultant/comorbid conditions like panic attacks? What 
of the individual’s culture? How might different cultures—and the experience of 
occupying a position or class affiliation within a particular culture—affect the experience 
of being disabled? The social model does not imply such questions (at least not usually 
and not in such an interrelated way), and so its likening to the medical model makes more 
sense: each model condenses and compresses the individual’s relation to a disability. The 
models may come at it from different directions, and may create identification in different 
ways, but they both nonetheless miss the intersectionality of identities. 
One way in which the social model might move away from the medical model 
while retaining its critical social power is through closer attention to the intersectionality 
of identities and/or identity categories. Intersectional analyses, some scholars have 
shown, can more concretely show how disability is socially-constructed than some social 
model approaches. For example, Mark Sherry has argued that when depression is 
recontextualized within particular cultures, its social construction qua disability may be 
foregrounded in concrete ways. Drawing from T.D. O’Nell’s study of depression in a 
Flathead Indian community, Sherry argues that a medical model approach to depression 
elides depression’s cultural situatedness and that such decontextualization obscures not 
just the location of depression—within a body, cultural matrix, and so forth—but also its 
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broader extension. According to O’Nell’s study, between 70% and 80% of the Flathead 
Indians in a particular community reported experiencing depression (102). Such figures 
approached through a medical model lens might indicate an epidemic. However, as 
Sherry describes, these figures cannot be interpreted without understanding how 
depression functions within the Flathead Indians’ culture: 
The incidence of depression was not generally connected to accounts of illness. 
Instead, a sense of suffering was regarded as a marker of maturity and Indian 
identity. For many people living on the Flathead Reservation, depression is the 
natural and esteemed condition of ‘real Indians,’ those who have used their 
sadness as a source of compassionate responsibility for others…O’Nell interprets 
the loneliness and depression as part of the political process of individual and 
collective demoralization and ‘remoralization’ of the Flathead Indian people. 
(102)  
As Sherry goes on to argue, such an analysis is impossible from a medical model 
perspective: “depression” would be approached as ahistorical, apolitical, and generally 
decontextualized (102). Of course, a broad and/or overly-abstract social model might 
yield the same results by collapsing the Flathead Indians into a general social category 
and placing the larger category in relation to broader social structures and groups (i.e., a 
social model might zoom out to larger milieus and miss the local social role of 
“depression” for the Flathead Indians). In short, it is not enough to say that a particular 
disability is created by social conditions, for such an affirmation borders on uselessness 
in its generality; instead, disability must be locally-contextualized within physical, 
cultural, and intersecting environments.  
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 Intersectional analyses also help us see that the social model may run the risk of 
self-naturalization. Chris Bell, for example, argues that Disability Studies (and the social 
model by implication) should be referred to as “White Disability Studies” because of its 
unmarked “White” nature: 
I contend that it is disingenuous to keep up the pretense that the field is an 
inclusive one when it is not. On that score, I would like to concede the failure of 
Disability Studies to engage issues of race and ethnicity in a substantive capacity, 
thereby entrenching whiteness as its constitutive underpinning…In 
contradistinction to Disability Studies, White Disability Studies recognizes its 
tendency to whitewash disability history, ontology and phenomenology. (374) 
Bell’s contention does not seem far off-base; indeed, a number of other scholars have 
argued that Disability Studies needs to actively reorient its models and methods of 
inquiry as more explicitly intersectional. Robert McRuer has written about the critical 
benefits of a “queer/disability studies” which could  
continuously invoke…the inadequate resolutions that compulsory able-bodiedness 
offer us. And in contrast to an able-bodied culture that holds out the promise of a 
substantive (but paradoxically always elusive) ideal, a queer/disabled perspective 
would resist delimiting the kinds of bodies and abilities that are acceptable or that 
will bring about change. (389)  
Other writers outside the academy have written at length about how sexuality, gender, 
and class can intersect with disability and how such intersections and accounts of them 
are not only illuminating but also necessary in understanding disability and moving 
beyond an academic, overly-abstract “White Disability Studies.”  
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An increasing number of writers offer narratives of their own disabilities which 
foreground the fundamental intersectionality of disability with other identity categories 
and how this intersectionality cannot be exhausted by social models alone. Amy 
Wilensky’s book, Passing for Normal: A Memoir of Compulsion, recounts how 
Wilensky’s experiences with Tourette Syndrome, obsessive compulsive disorder, and 
trying to “pass”—to give the appearance of being nondisabled— permeated every aspect 
of her life. Nancy Mairs’ famous and moving essay about living with multiple sclerosis, 
“On Being a Cripple,” even more explicitly tracks how her disability intersects with her 
identities as teacher, daughter, wife. Mairs rejects the easy categorization and 
compartmentalization that so often attends disability, declaring, “What I hate is not me 
but a disease. I am not a disease. And a disease is not—at least not single-handedly—
going to determine who I am, though at first it seemed it was going to.” In his book, Exile 
and Pride: Disability, Queerness, and Liberation, Eli Clare explores the complicated 
intersectionality of disability and other contested identity categories, not only showing 
that these categories are mutually-constitutive and transformative, but also showing that 
such intersectionality can transform and reframe context as well. Scholarly critiques and 
popular accounts of intersectionality like the above are undoubtedly useful in marking 
disability (and Disability Studies) and contextualizing/complicating disability categories, 
but categorization still obscures the complex, embodied, and—quite simply—lived 
experience of having a disability. 
 While intersectional approaches to disability can begin to complicate the 
essentializing/decontextualizing aspects of the medical and social models, these 
approaches still have limited utility and applicability. In the most general sense, thinking 
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in terms of identity categories, even intersecting and interpenetrating ones, still risks a 
collapse of the individual into such categories; in other words, a “person” becomes the 
locus of intersecting, contextualized identity categories that—hypothetically—could be 
externally parsed and placed in relation to one another (a dubious proposition).25 
Relatedly, there is an implicit assumption in categorical approaches to identity that the 
various operative identity categories can be teased apart, weighted, and/or tracked within 
a particular context either by external agencies (such as a critic describing how a 
particular environment disables a particular person or a discourse analyst tracking how a 
particular category is performed or attended to in context) or by an individual person. In 
short, utilizing categories is a sometimes-useful heuristic for critiquing social 
configurations, but even when categorical approaches become more nuanced through 
intersectional analyses, they still miss the complexity of living with a disability: 
categorical (and more broadly, medical and social) approaches to disability lack an 
affective, phenomenological element. There is a problem of access. 
Access to both other minds and to one’s own mind has been a perennial problem 
in Western Philosophy since Descartes built his cathedral of consciousness upon his 
cornerstone cogito. Some recent philosophers and scientists have even gone so far to 
assert the fundamental unknowability of consciousness because of brain structures.26 In 
terms of our own minds, Judith Butler has argued that we always remain opaque to 
ourselves: 
                                                
25 I say “hypothetically” here to indicate the lack of a logical absurdity in the idea, not to 
indicate any practicable possibility. 
26 Colin McGinn, for example, argues that our brains are wired in certain ways that 
preclude our ability to grasp or think through certain things. For McGinn, human brains 
are “cognitively closed” with respect to consciousness—it’s just something we can’t fully 
understand.  
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If I try to give an account of myself, if I try to make myself recognizable and 
understandable, then I might begin with a narrative account of my life. But this 
narrative will be disoriented by what is not mine, or not mine alone. And I will, to 
some degree, have to make myself substitutable in order to make myself 
recognizable. The narrative authority of the ‘I’ must give way to the perspective 
and temporality of a set of norms that contests the singularity of my story… my 
narrative begins in media res, when many things have already taken place to make 
me and my story possible in language. I am always recuperating, reconstructing, 
and I am left to fictionalize and fabulate origins I cannot know. (37-39) 
What Butler is getting at above is a relationship between one’s identity for oneself and 
one’s identity for others. One’s identity—as a broad, delimitable concept or unit—
functions socially and has a history not totally accessible to the individual. But one’s 
access to one’s identity is also circumscribed by the tendency towards coherent 
narrativization of one’s life and/or sense of “I” (64). Because of such closure or 
inaccessibility, some scholars have advocated an approach to disability (and identity 
more broadly) that relies upon emergence and performance, arguing that such an 
approach bridges the personal experience of disability with the social construction of it. 
 In “Avoiding the Difference Fixation: Identity Categories, Markers of Difference, 
and the Teaching of Writing,” Stephanie Kerschbaum approaches identity—and, more 
specifically, differences therein—as something dynamic that emerges in interactions. 
Kerschbaum argues that many writing scholars try to get at more complicated and 
nuanced approaches to identity through ever-more precise categorical taxonomies of 
roles/intersections of roles that writers may play or complications of extant categories of 
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identity (619-20). Unfortunately, these approaches can ignore aspects of an individual 
that may not be evident in a particular interaction or performance but that may 
nonetheless affect that interaction or performance (like internal states, affective 
dimensions, etc.); in addition, such approaches tend to fix or reify categories (619-20). 
Kerschbaum offers a solution by arguing that identity should be approached not as a 
series or even confluence of stable categories but instead as “dynamic, relational, and 
emergent” (623). This emergent approach to identity and difference follows (in spirit if 
not in letter) discourse-analytic approaches to identity as emergent-in-interaction, but it 
also captures the access issues raised above: 
To presume to know me is to close off interactional possibilities rather than to 
hold them open…Indeed, this uniqueness is such that people are never even 
coincident with themselves: I am always yet-to-be, I am always coming to know 
who I am. I cannot know every aspect of even my own identity and self…it is 
only through interaction with others that people are able to apprehend themselves. 
This awareness, subsequently, shapes their consciousness of the markers to which 
others are orienting and how they take on meaning. (626-27) 
This continual “coming-to-be” in interaction occurs through the deployment of—and 
attending to—markers of difference, which, in turn, points to the rhetoricality of 
identity/identity performance (626-28) and also underscores the importance of context 
(and how it is attended to/interacted with) to identity (634-35). This finer-grained 
approach to identity seems to destabilize the fixation of identity categories that can 
happen with medical or social approaches to disability, but it is still fraught, particularly 
in the case of invisible disabilities. 
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 Individuals with “invisible disabilities” challenge models of identity that equate 
identity with its emergence/performance. According to the Invisible Disabilities 
Association, the term “invisible disabilities” refers to “symptoms such 
as debilitating pain, fatigue, dizziness, cognitive dysfunctions, brain injuries, learning 
differences and mental health disorders, as well as hearing and vision impairments” 
(“What Is an Invisible Disability”). Many of these disabilities may not emerge in 
interaction, or they may not emerge in such a way that they are observable by other 
individuals in a particular context. They may even be interpreted as something else 
entirely. Within a composition classroom, for example, chronic fatigue may be parsed as 
laziness or as the result of undergraduate shenanigans. Similarly, seeming disengagement 
during a teacher-student conference—roving eyes, the inability to follow the thread of the 
teacher’s words, continual shifting in the seat—may be read as disengagement or 
boredom rather than, say, a sensory processing disorder. In either case (and myriads of 
similar examples) the emergence of performed identities is made problematic by both the 
potential nature of particular disabilities and by the asymmetric power relations between 
the student and teacher (i.e., the teacher’s interpretive response to such interactions can 
have concrete evaluative consequences for the student that are not mirrored by the 
student’s available interpretive reactions). Pushing harder on this issue of participation 
and emergence reveals more fundamental problems for those individuals who cannot 
communicate in contextually-normed ways. 
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Individuals with certain cognitive and/or communicative disabilities27 are at risk 
for essentialization and colonization within interactions. As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, Foucault has argued that, historically, the speech of the “madman” (a person 
with a cognitive or, possibly, communicative disorder) has had special, symbolic 
signifying properties but, technically, such speech does not signify (“The Discourse on 
Language” 217). In contexts where one is known to have a cognitive disability, or one 
“outs” him or herself as having such a disability, there is a very real chance that merely 
attending to features of the interaction will lead to an appraisal of discursive 
inaccessibility. In an often-quoted passage, Catherine Prendergast eloquently describes 
this danger: “To be disabled mentally is to be disabled rhetorically…That the mentally ill 
are treated as devoid of rhetoric would seem to me to be an obvious point: If people think 
you’re crazy, they don’t listen to you”(57). In other words, as a person with a cognitive or 
communicative disorder emerges through discursive interactions, s/he may be categorized 
as non-functional or deficient by his or her apparent inability to attend to interactions in 
contextually-appropriate ways. This is often the case with non-verbal autistic individuals. 
Some scholars in a variety of fields have found ways to obviate such presumptions: some 
have pointed out how microfeatures of discourse provide evidence of some rhetorical 
understanding (Kremer-Sadlik),28 while others have offered ways to presume rhetoricity 
                                                
27 The seeming conflation of cognitive and communicative disorder here is intentional. I 
write with Autism Spectrum Disorders in mind, and the agnosticism re: cognitive vs. 
communicative disorder resists diagnostic essentialization of ASDs as primarily cognitive 
disorders. 
28 Tamar Kremer-Sadlik, in “How Children with Autism and Asperger Syndrome 
Respond to Questions: A ‘Naturalistic’ Theory of Mind Task,” tracks how children with 
Asperger’s Syndrome approach “adjacency pairs” and finds that—at least in a local, 
familial context—children with Asperger Syndrome are able to “read” social situations 
appropriately (195).  
  81 
and differential discourse conventions (Heilker and Yergeau 489-90). Even emergent 
models that presume competency and rhetoricity can still miss the embodied, lived 
dimensions of disability. Accordingly, a theoretically-nuanced approach to disability 
must somehow account for how context and interactions in context define a disability for 
both the disabled person and for other people attending to that disability in context, but 
such an approach must also take into consideration the disabled person’s experience of 
such interactions and how this experience in turn affects the construction of that disability 
in context.  
 
Complicating Embodiment, Complexifying Accommodation, and Making a Conundrum 
of Composition 
In his book, Disability Theory, Tobin Siebers uses “complex embodiment” to describe the 
relationship between the social construction of disability and the lived, phenomenological 
reality of living with a disability. As Siebers describes it, complex embodiment, 
“theorizes the body and its representations as mutually transformative. Social 
representations obviously affect the experience of the body…but the body possesses the 
ability to determine its social representation as well” (25-26). Siebers believes that social 
construction only tells part of the story and that there are elements of experience that are 
irreducible to abstract categories or instances of representation (such as the affective of 
phenomenological dimensions of having a disability). Accordingly, much of Siebers’ 
book is dedicated to destabilizing the vague nature of the term “socially constructed,” and 
his “complex embodiment” points to the need for further elaborations and specifications 
of disability models. 
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 Extending the complexity in “complex embodiment” can redirect theories of 
disability into more nuanced and productive directions, particularly in terms of how 
environments construct disability and how individuals interact with such constructions 
and the representations they create. Some analyses of built environments will begin and 
end by merely picking out general features or relations that “construct” the normate and 
disable the different. While this sort of analysis is undoubtedly helpful in marking the 
unmarked norm, it seems as if it oversimplifies the environment’s role in constructing the 
disability. As Siebers contends: 
What if we were to embrace the metaphor implied by social construction, if we 
required that the ‘construction’ in social construction be understood as a 
building…and that its blueprint be made available? Not only would this 
requirement stipulate that we elaborate claims about social construction in 
concrete terms, it would insist that we locate the construction in time and place as 
a form of complex embodiment. (32) 
Siebers is calling for a more detailed use of the term “social construction,” maintaining 
that whenever we use this concept with relation to disability we need to “map as many 
details about the construction as possible and to track its political, epistemological, and 
real effects in the world of human beings” (32-33). Among these “real effects,” we must 
track both the apparent or emergent effects but also—as much as is possible—the 
individually-experienced effects. To accomplish this means a potentially radical 
reconfiguration of “accommodation.” 
As it is pretheoretically understood, “ accommodation” implies a “fitting in” to an 
extant structure: one is accommodated to or within something else. The law underscores 
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this with its fundamental alteration clauses; i.e., a “reasonable accommodation” is one 
that does not result in or necessitate fundamental alterations of goods, services, etc. 
(ADAAA Sec. 12182). This model of accommodation implies a unidirectional, 
asymmetrical relationship wherein the disabled person should not seriously affect the 
broader ecology: there is either space for the person-to-be-accommodated, in which the 
person fits into an extant location, or there is no space and the person is not fit (in either 
case, the accommodating locus remains fundamentally unchanged). Following Siebers 
and focusing on what accommodations do or can do may both uncover and promote a 
more complex and transformative model of accommodation based in a more complex 
model of disability. But before concretizing, it’s first necessary to abstract a bit further. 
 If an accommodation must be made for an individual, then this means that there is 
an element or framework within a given ecology29 that is dissonant, inimical, or 
inaccessible to the individual. When such an individual experiences this disjunction, 
unmarked aspects of the ecology become marked and available for scrutiny and critique. 
As Siebers points out: 
When a disabled body enters any construction, social or physical, a 
deconstruction occurs, a deconstruction that reveals the lines of force, the 
blueprint, of the social rendering of the building as surely as its physical 
rendering. Constructions are built with certain social bodies in mind, and when a 
different body appears, the lack of fit reveals the ideology of ability controlling 
the space. (124) 
                                                
29 I am using the term “ecology” here because it allows for greater flexibility in terms of 
treating physical, environmental, and ideological/social aspects of an environment. It also 
underscores the interrelationships between these elements, interrelationships that will be 
explicated and explained in further depth throughout this project. 
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So, the lack of fit upon which accommodation is predicated highlights those areas taken 
for granted and/or normed within the ecology. These areas then become available for  
critique and even theorization.30 In one pragmatic respect, this is built into the legal  
requirements of reasonable accommodation: “unreasonable accommodations” foreground 
what those in power understand as essential or fundamental to an ecology and frame the 
conditions of diminishing returns (“undue burden”) or disequilibrium within that ecology. 
Of course, even a granted (and therefore “reasonable”) accommodation could result in 
rethinking and retheorizing.  
 Denying an accommodation clarifies certain theoretical commitments and 
exercises or establishes certain relationships of power within a particular ecology, but 
granting an accommodation may also result in concrete changes to the broader ecology. 
To put it simply, an accommodation is not a slotting or a fitting; it is transforming. The 
individuals involved, the rules that govern their interactions, and the context wherein all 
of this occurs are reconstituted. Of course, this description borders on useless given its 
generality, so greater specification is necessary to understand the nuances of this process 
and how exactly such a dialectic may operate. 
                                                
30 While a number of practices in composition courses will be critiqued with this dialectic 
in mind in later chapters, it’s worth mentioning a concrete example here to explicate this 
point. Regular classroom attendance is thought to be critical to the learning of 
“composition.” Beyond adherence to college or university guidelines, one might argue 
that this belief is underwritten by Composition Studies’ subscription to processural 
models of both writing and writing pedagogy. Within a given writing program, then, a 
disabled student’s need for additional absences—due to treatments or temporary 
increases in severity of certain conditions—could meet with a blank administrative 
response, or they could serve as an opportunity to discover where the particular writing 
program derived the policy from, with either direction (university policy vs. processural 
commitment) revealing theoretical and/or bureaucratic consequences that could further be 
queried with the essential criterion (“is this practice essential to composition?”). 
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 To continue to move forward towards a robust theorization of accommodation, I 
must locate my discussion within a more particular context. Towards this end, in the 
chapters that follow, I theorize a model of accommodation that complicates extant 
models of disability and the relationship of the disabled individual to the composition 
classroom. I use “local” and “local context” to refer at times to particular composition 
classrooms and at times to the writing programs that house them. As will be shown, it is 
not really possible to fully disentangle these contexts from one another, and there is 
sometimes slippage between the two. 
Following the destabilization of identity categories and disability that occurs in 
this chapter, a robust theorization of accommodation must account for the emergent, 
rhetorical, and complex aspects of identity while simultaneously recognizing that many 
people, legal institutions, and Composition Studies itself may continue to approach 
identity and disability in a priori, categorical ways. In Chapter 3, I show how theorizing 
accommodation within Composition Studies results in an intertheorization: what is being 
accommodated must be theorized as it moves into the accommodating context—just as 
that context must be theorized in light of that-which-is-to-be accommodated—if the 
relationship between the two may be understood. I show that such intertheorization 
within the context of college composition reveals a sometimes-legalistic and medical 
theorization of disability within Composition Studies. This theorization, I argue, is 
dissonant with other commitments in the field, and a complex model of disability and 
accommodation theorized within a compositional context sheds light not only on 
disability/disabilities, but also on composition itself, implying transformative approaches 
to working with all student writers. 
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Chapter 3: Complicating Composition: First-Year Writing and Complex 
Accommodation  
Introduction 
As the name implies, “complex accommodation” is complex. This chapter tracks 
this complexity within a Composition Studies context, and I argue that complex 
accommodation helps Composition Studies avoid a rhetoric of requirement in relation to 
disability and instead embrace a rhetoric of affordance. Complex accommodation in 
composition can lead to pedagogical, theoretical, and administrative inquiries and 
critiques which may, in turn, lead to fundamental transformations of composition for the 
betterment of all students. Additionally, I argue that the “complexity” in “complex 
accommodation” need not preclude widespread adoption of this form of accommodation; 
instead, easy-to-follow heuristics can help individual instructors and writing programs 
work through particular accommodations, including the implications of such 
accommodations within classrooms and within writing programs. To best understand 
how complex accommodation might be fully articulated within Composition Studies, 
though, it’s first necessary to clarify which model of disability the field tends to accept. 
 
Composition and Models of Disability 
While some composition scholars embrace complex approaches to disability (see esp. 
Heilker and Yergeau), the larger field seems to subscribe to a broadly social model of 
disability. For example, “A Policy on Disability in CCCC” not only indicates the 
CCCC’s commitment to access and the inclusion of individuals with disabilities, but it 
also recognizes the overlap between Composition Studies and Disability Studies, and it 
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underscores a social-model understanding of disability. The position statement affirms, in 
part, that 
CCCC acknowledges the important contributions disability studies makes to 
composition and rhetoric, to the promotion of access, to literacy studies, and to 
theories of difference, especially in its critique of “norms” and “normalcy.” The 
questions posed by disability studies ask us to rethink language, the body, the 
environment, identity, culture, power, and the nature of knowledge itself, enabling 
a meaningful engagement at multiple levels: bodily, personal, social, cultural, and 
political. 
The above could be read as a general statement of Disability Studies’ importance as a 
field of inquiry, and the CCCC’s position statement goes on to underscore the advantages 
of centering Disability Studies approaches in composition. The statement even goes so 
far as to affirm that “disability studies enhances learning and teaching in college 
composition…Disability studies as it intersects with composition, rhetoric, and literacy 
studies has enlarged knowledge in our field.” In short, the CCCC statement positions the 
work of Disability Studies as complementary to, and even partially-constitutive of, 
Composition Studies (“enlarged knowledge in the field”). The position statement is 
somewhat less direct regarding its alignment with the social model, but such alignment is 
present: 
We acknowledge the right of full inclusion for all members of society. Full 
inclusion for people with disabilities means moving beyond narrow conceptions 
of disability as a flaw, deficit, or a trait to be accommodated. At best, 
governmental legislation outlines minimum standards of accommodation for 
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people with disabilities; full inclusion, however, requires going beyond the 
minimum standards. Educators should ensure that alternatives for those with 
disabilities are built into physical and intellectual spaces, rather than "added on" 
in ways that segregate and stigmatize those with disabilities. 
The above distances the CCCC from the medical model (“moving beyond narrow 
conceptions of disability as flaw, deficit, or a trait to be accommodated”), and the 
statement’s recognition that disability requires transformation rather than fitting is 
consistent with social model understandings of the ways in which physical and 
intellectual spaces construct individuals. Additionally, the overall tenor of the position 
statement more closely approaches a rhetoric of affordance rather than one of 
requirement (“going beyond the minimum standards).” It’s not clear, however, whether 
such a position statement is meant to be generally descriptive or prescriptive.  
 According to “The Process by which CCCC Position Statements are Created,” 
CCCC position statements are institutionally or organizationally descriptive. In other 
words, “Characteristically, a position statement is a short summary of what is currently 
known about an issue and the organizational beliefs about that issue.” These statements 
are crafted by CCCC Executive Committee-appointed taskforces that research “a 
proposed issue, drafts and revises a position statement, and presents the revised position 
statement to the Executive Committee for its approval in order to represent the 
organization at large.” While the statements may “include implied suggestions for putting 
recommendations to practice,” they are largely descriptive of the CCCC’s knowledge and 
perspective on given issues; the statements do not function as field guidelines or 
standards. With this in mind, appealing to “A Policy on Disability in CCCC” in order to 
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suss out the field’s operative model of disability may be misguided. In fact, trying to suss 
out the field’s overall operative model of disability may overlook some fundamental 
characteristics of the field. 
 The model of disability a compositionist subscribes to will be a function of any 
number of features. While an individual instructor might be guided by the CCCC position 
statements, his or her alignment (in terms of disability models) will more likely be a 
result of his or her education, background, and—most immediately—current institutional 
conditions. The writing programs and departments in which compositionists find 
themselves can often determine the model of disability which one subscribes to. This is 
not to say that instructors uncritically accept their writing programs’ explicit 
constructions of disability (though this might occur); however, the writing program and 
its institutional articulations can create conditions of intelligibility with respect to 
disability. For example, at my current institution, the “social model of disability” was 
largely unknown (or, at least, not discussed) within the writing program except by a small 
handful of individual instructors who work at the intersections of Disability Studies and 
Composition Studies. Teacher-training, professional development, and writing program 
curriculum did not address the social model or social constructionist approximations of 
the social model. Until the social model was recently presented at a professional 
development forum on disability and disability issues (the first of its kind in the writing 
program), the social model was conceptually unavailable for many of the compositionists 
in the writing program. Disability was constructed, instead, through other available 
institutional channels.  
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 In the absence of a more foregrounded and nuanced description of disability, my 
writing program approached disability through other available institutional avenues; in 
the present case, these channels consisted of referral to the Student Accessibility Center 
and the bureaucratic machinery and attendant medicalization sometimes associated with 
it (see 12-14 in the “Introduction”). This is not to say that in the absence of explicit 
cultural alignment (i.e., a writing program’s cultural alignment) with the social model, the 
default model for compositionists or even writing programs will be the medical model; 
rather, my particular writing program and the individuals which constitute it had access to 
an uneven conceptual horizon: some instructors understood and worked in light of the 
social model of disability, while others did not have access to the social model qua 
concept and were thus left to other extant (within the program and institution) approaches 
to disability. My experience at other institutions bears out this unevenness. Some 
programs I have visited have thoroughgoing social (if not complex) approaches to 
disability, while many others approach disability in the ways my program used to. The 
point here is this: talking about model alignment at the field level elides the fact that 
writing programs across the country are often heterogeneous in their practices, structures, 
and theories; and within given programs, individual instructors will often show great 
variance in practices, administration, and theories as well. This variance has salient 
consequences for model alignment or acceptance, and it also more firmly locates 
potential deliberative procedures within individual writing programs. 
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The WPA OS and “Head Count Evidence” 
As Guckenberger v. Boston University established, the reasonableness of an 
accommodation is a function of a situated deliberative procedure, and appeals to other 
institutions’ practices are unlikely to affect rulings (see Chapter 1, 41-44). Given this 
precedent and given the fact that writing programs can exhibit great variance across 
institutions, there doesn’t seem to be much danger that a plaintiff suing for 
accommodations in a writing program would be able to appeal to other programs; such an 
approach would likely constitute “head count evidence” and be “particularly 
inappropriate in the protean area of a liberal arts education” (Guckenberger v. Boston 
University). Though writing programs seem to be somewhat insulated with respect to 
accommodation requirements through legal precedent and programmatic heterogeneity, I 
wonder if there are any fundamental or essential components to composition curricula, 
because while precedent is against “head count evidence,” Guckenberger v. Boston is 
agnostic as to whether or not a “substantial departure from accepted academic norms” 
might reasonably be appealed to in some circumstances (even within the “protean area of 
a liberal arts education”).  
 In trying to suss out some sort of field-level essential or fundamental curricular 
requirements, it is hard to pin down commonalities that may exist between programs with 
any degree of specificity. As the Wynne and Guckenberger courts pointed out, there are 
indisputable requirements in a medical education like demonstrating proficiency in 
biochemistry, but it’s not as clear whether there are similar field-wide verities regarding 
composition curricula. Writing programs can differ radically on how writing is to be 
assessed, on what constitutes an appropriate pedagogical approach, and even on the 
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proper content of a composition class.31 Drawing from another core field-level position 
statement—the “Writing Program Administrators Outcomes Statement for First Year 
Composition” (WPA OS)—shows that perhaps this variance is itself fundamental and 
endemic to Composition Studies. 
 Unlike the CCCC position statements, the WPA OS may be framed as a central, 
field-wide document that both describes and prescribes first-year composition. The WPA 
OS describes 
…attempts to both represent and regularize writing programs’ priorities for first-
year composition… To this end it is not merely a compilation or summary of what 
currently takes place. Rather, this Statement articulates what composition teachers 
nationwide have learned from practice, research, and theory. It intentionally 
defines only “outcomes,” or types of results, and not “standards,” or precise levels 
of achievement. The setting of standards to measure students’ achievement of 
these Outcomes has deliberately been left to local writing programs and their 
institutions. (para. 1) 
There are a number of notable features here. First, the WPA OS clearly affirms some sort 
of core to composition. This is present (tacitly, at least) in the belief in some body of 
knowledge that “composition teachers nationwide have learned from practice, research, 
and theory,” which implies particular outcomes that may be prescribed across the field. 
Second, although these outcomes are cross-contextual, assessment of their achievement 
                                                
31 A few authors have even argued that there is no actual “content” beyond an under-
articulated self-referentiality in composition as it is currently formulated (Russell), with 
some scholars calling for a transformation of composition into a more clearly content-
driven course (Downs and Wardle).  
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should be local and developed in both composition and in students’ subsequent 
disciplinary curricula.  
 The structure of the WPA OS indicates a cross-curricular linkage within particular 
institutions, a linking up that may occur in any variety of locally-determined ways. The 
outcomes are divided into four broad categories: Rhetorical Knowledge; Critical 
Thinking, Reading, and Composing; Processes; and, Knowledge of Conventions. Under 
each heading, there is a brief description of what that category refers to.32 Under these 
descriptions, there are a number of outcomes headed by “By the end of first-year 
composition, students should” (italics in original), followed by another set of outcomes 
headed by “Faculty in all programs and departments can build on this preparation by 
helping students learn.” So, for example, the outcomes for “Rhetorical Knowledge” read: 
By the end of first-year composition, students should 
• Learn and use key rhetorical concepts through analyzing and composing a 
variety of texts 
• Gain experience reading and composing in several genres to understand 
how genre conventions shape and are shaped by readers’ and writers’ 
practices and purposes 
• Develop facility in responding to a variety of situations and contexts 
calling for purposeful shifts in voice, tone, level of formality, design, 
medium, and/or structure 
                                                
32 For example, under “Processes,” the WPA OS reads: “Writers use multiple strategies, 
composing processes, to conceptualize, develop, and finalize projects. Composing 
processes are seldom linear: a writer may research a topic before drafting, then conduct 
additional research while revising or after consulting a colleague. Composing processes 
are also flexible: successful writers can adapt their composing processes to different 
contexts and occasions.” 
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• Understand and use a variety of technologies to address a range of 
audiences 
• Match the capacities of different environments (e.g., print and electronic) 
to varying rhetorical situations 
Faculty in all programs and departments can build on this preparation by helping 
students learn 
• The expectations of readers in their fields 
• The main features of genres in their fields 
• The main purposes of composing in their fields 
In this example, please note that the FYC outcomes are underspecified: they can be 
achieved in a variety of ways. This has two consequences. First, these outcomes show 
that writing programs can realize particular outcomes in quite different ways. For 
example, in “Gain experience reading and composing in several genres to understand 
how genre conventions shape and are shaped by readers’ and writers’ practices and 
purposes,” genres can refer broadly to fiction, nonfiction, poetry, and drama. “Genres” 
could also refer to science writing, business writing, or writing for advertising. Perhaps 
“genres” could refer to visual texts, audio texts, and multimedia texts. Whatever the case, 
it seems that there is a great degree of flexibility built into how these outcomes might be 
operationalized.  
 The second consequence of the underspecification is that there is an implicit and 
explicit implication that later work will capitalize on or flesh out the earlier, general work 
of composition in concrete and particular instances. In fact, one might make the case that 
these outcomes are structured in such a way in order to facilitate transfer from 
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composition to other disciplines. This seems to be confirmed by the way the second set of 
subgoals in each section focuses on the ways in which faculty in other fields or 
disciplines can “build on this preparation.”33 Leaving aside the issue of transfer though, 
the broader underspecification of the WPA OS signifies a recognition that composition 
and its essential curricular elements/approaches are hashed out within local programs.  
 Curricular underspecification and local determination in composition might make 
it quite difficult for a plaintiff to show s/he had been discriminated against on the basis of 
his or her disability. If the essential or fundamental aspects of composition curricula are 
dependent upon local programs’ own sense of what is essential or fundamental to 
composition instruction, then appealing to a program’s “substantial departure from 
accepted academic norms” would likely not sway a court as those academic norms 
include local instantiations and determinations of what exactly is essential to a course of 
study in composition at a particular institution. Of course, a program would likely still be 
held to the standard of the “deliberative procedure,” but as previous case law seems to 
demonstrate, this requirement may be easily fulfilled. So, what is composition required to 
do? What must writing programs do with regard to disability?  
 
A Rhetoric of Requirement vs. A Rhetoric of Affordance 
In a very real sense, it seems that writing programs must be able to justify their own 
practices by their own lights when confronted with cases of disability via a deliberative 
                                                
33 Perkins and Salomon might argue that the ways the WPA OS works with outcomes are 
predicated on “backward-reaching high-road transfer”: in their work in other disciplinary 
contexts, students should be able to consciously abstract from their particular contexts 
and reach backwards to their earlier experience in composition for insight on how to 
negotiate particular situations or problems (26). 
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procedure. As compositionists in general focus professionally on curricula, pedagogy, 
and argument, it seems likely that most programs would be able to justify most practices 
rather handily if faced with the deliberative procedure requirement. But this raises a 
crucial question: are writing programs structured according to rhetorics of requirement or 
rhetorics of affordance? In one sense, such a question is unanswerable given the 
programmatic heterogeneity discussed in the previous section. However, I believe that a 
rhetoric of affordance is more in line with many compositionists’ sense of themselves and 
their work, as “A Policy on Disability in CCCC” seems to indicate. Ultimately, though, 
casting writing programs’ approaches in terms of a rhetoric of requirement vs. a rhetoric 
of affordance may be overly-reductive. 
 Each writing program (and the writing instructors working within them) must 
negotiate coexisting and often conflicting rhetorics of requirement and affordance. 
Composition itself is usually a requirement for most students, and given its resultant 
enrollments, it is often subject to programmatic assessment and close institutional 
scrutiny. These institutional requirements may trickle down into programmatic 
requirements that may, in turn, trickle down into pedagogical and administrative 
requirements. Against this backdrop of requirement, though, every writing instructor I 
have met approaches their work in terms of dilating possibilities: What can we do for our 
students? What possibilities exist within a student draft? What possibilities does this or 
that pedagogical practice create? What new and exciting boundaries can my lesson, my 
course, my program push against and even cross for the enrichment of students, 
instructors, program, institution, and society? These questions and the rhetoric of 
affordance that underwrites them must square with the contextual requirements to which 
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writing programs and instructors find themselves subject to, but these requirements too 
can become affordances in the ways they create horizons of possibility, as I hope to 
show. The accommodation of disability, when handled complexly, can help to bridge the 
requirements and affordances not just in the area of disability accommodation but in 
composition in general. Before turning more directly to complex accommodation as a 
bridge between affordance and requirement, it will first be helpful to look at two extant 
models of accommodation, how they line up with rhetorics of requirement and 
affordance, and why these models are insufficient. 
 
Ad Hoc Accommodation and Universal Design 
Many approaches to accommodation take two broad directions: ad hoc accommodation 
or accommodation via Universal Design. These approaches are simplified here for the 
purposes of capturing them in broad strokes. In reality, these approaches can be 
interrelated and not cleanly separable, though sometimes they do occur in isolation. To be 
clear, what follows is not a dismissal of either form of accommodation; rather, I hope to 
show that either approach is by itself generally insufficient for a robust, situated, complex 
model of accommodation in Composition Studies. 
 By “ad hoc accommodation,” I refer to an accommodation of fit wherein an 
environment (broadly construed to include intellectual environments) is altered in the 
moment to fit a particular student’s configuration. I use the term “ad hoc” to indicate that 
this type of accommodation often occurs when a particular case of disability is 
encountered in a particular instance, but I also use this term to indicate that such 
accommodation does not immediately imply or result in systemic change. So, for 
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example, an office worker with photophobia or photo-oculodynia34 may need to work in 
an office where s/he can avoid harsh fluorescent lights and control ambient light 
exposure. In this case, the environment may not be substantially altered (the worker may 
simply be moved into a private office), and the use of fluorescent lights as the default 
office lighting may go uninterrogated. Similarly, a student who is hard of hearing may 
request and receive a note-taker for his or her classes. In such a case, the student is helped 
to better fit within the extant environment, but the oral components of his or her classes 
go uninterrogated (i.e., the necessity for such elements to be within the course). In either 
case, there is an implicit alignment with medical model approaches to disability: the 
disability—the lack of fit—is asymmetric, and it is the deviant body and its articulations 
that must be transformed rather than the environment (the disabled individual must fit in 
the environment, not the other way around).  
 Ad hoc accommodations are necessary and often salutary. When a lack of fit is 
discovered between an environment and an individual, it often occurs in medias res (such 
as in the midst of a school semester), and some sort of immediate accommodation is 
necessary so that the environment may be more accessible for the individual. The 
necessity for accommodation indicates an environmental privileging (usually of an 
unmarked “norm”) and should, ideally, result in a redesign that better includes non-
privileged configurations. However, such redesign is not always an option for various 
reasons, and so ad hoc accommodations can provide useful bootstrapped solutions, even 
if ad hoc accommodations have a number of limitations.  
                                                
34 Digre and Brennan define photophobia as “a sensory state in which light causes 
discomfort in the eye or head; it may also cause an avoidance reaction without overt 
pain,” and photo-oculodynia as “light-induced eye pain from a normally non-painful 
source (e.g. ambient lighting)” (n.p.). 
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 As I discuss above, the fact that accommodations become necessary indicates 
particular configurational privileging. Focusing on ad hoc accommodations without 
inquiring into the various ways environments privilege certain configurations can obscure 
other disabling aspects of the environment and miss how a disabling practice, policy, or 
structure is underwritten by monolithic conceptions of normality and/or ability. In 
addition, ad hoc accommodational approaches might presuppose the visibility of 
disability (where “visibility” means one can observe a disability directly or through 
administrative reporting such as the VISA at my own institution). As I indicated earlier in 
the Introduction (13-14), becoming visible in the sense of receiving a medical diagnosis 
can be problematized by a number of factors including the cost of diagnosis and fear of 
stigma. This does not mean that individuals so unmarked do not have disabilities, and it 
certainly does not mean that these individuals should be precluded from 
accommodations. However, given the ways in which university accommodation services 
are often structured, these individuals may have limited options in terms of ad hoc 
accommodations.35 Such issues can be mitigated in cases where redesign is possible. 
 In those instances where redesign is possible or necessary, universal design may 
be the preferred accommodational approach. It is worth noting a few important variants 
of the term “universal design” here. Ron Mace—who is thought to have begun 
popularizing the term—argued that Universal Design is “not a new science, a style, or 
                                                
35 AHEAD, the Association on Higher Education and Disability, has promulgated a 
conceptual framework for working with disability documentation: “Supporting 
Accommodation Requests: Guidance on Documentation Practices—April 2012.” While 
AHEAD recognizes that colleges and universities may “request a reasonable level of 
documentation” of disability, the organization also argues that “No legislation or 
regulations require that documentation be requested or obtained in order to demonstrate 
entitlement to legal protections because of disability … entities can require 
documentation though they are not obligated to do so.” 
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unique in any way. It requires only an awareness of need and market and a commonsense 
approach to making everything we design and produce usable by everyone to the greatest 
extent possible” (“History of Universal Design”). Of course, universal design is 
conceptually predicated upon the idea that environments have not been produced to be 
“usable by everyone to the greatest extent possible”; rather, they have been produced to 
be usable by persons with normalized configurations. The Assistive Technology Act of 
1998 appears to recognize this when it defines “universal design” as: 
a concept or philosophy for designing and delivering products and services that 
are usable by people with the widest possible range of functional capabilities, 
which include products and services that are directly usable (without requiring 
assistive technologies) and products and devices that are made usable with 
assistive technologies.  
 This specification throws into light the variance in capabilities that universal design 
approaches need to account for, and this variance is made even more explicit in the 
Higher Education Opportunity Act’s definition of “Universal Design for learning”: 
The term ‘universal design for learning’ means a scientifically-valid framework 
for guiding educational practice that (A) provides flexibility in the ways 
information is presented, in the ways students respond or demonstrate knowledge 
and skills, and in the ways students are engaged; and (B) reduces barriers in 
instruction, provides appropriate accommodations, supports, and challenges, and 
maintains high achievement expectations for all students, including students with 
disabilities and students who are limited English proficient. 
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At first blush, this formulation of universal design for learning (or UDL) is attractive: it 
recommends flexible and multimodal (in the broad sense of the term) pedagogy and 
assessment, it calls for necessary accommodations, and it upholds standards within an 
accommodational framework. These are, indeed, salutary and laudable goals, but they are 
more complicated than they initially appear. 
 In the most general sense, UDL (and universal design in general) will always be 
associated with particular socio-historical conceptions of “universality.” If a “disability” 
socially supervenes upon an impairment or non-normate individual configuration, then it 
is only recognizable and accountable (via design) if it can become visible within a 
particular milieu. To use the example above, if photophobia or photo-oculodynia is not 
recognized as a disability or a relevant variance of the norm within a given milieu, then it 
cannot figure into conceptions of “universality” in terms of design, so a “universally 
designed” space might not account for lighting in inclusive ways. Similarly, in terms of 
UDL, one can imagine cases where standards and standardization become conflated, and 
“high achievement expectations” themselves disable individuals and create a particular 
sort of universality. For example, in many composition classes, “class participation” is 
seemingly inextricably linked with achievement insofar as such participation is often 
imbricated with process approaches to writing (such as participating in writing 
workshops, class discussions, and so forth). However, “class participation” can be 
normalized as “oral participation,” and the demands for oral performance may disable 
individuals with anxiety and/or communication disorders. In either case, socio-historical 
understandings of disability are going to frame what counts as “universal.” In the case of 
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UDL, this universality will also be complicated by the ways in which achievement 
articulates with ability and disability.  
 Universal Design and UDL are, of course, not panaceas. This is written into the 
legal definition of UDL in the ways in which UDL “reduces barriers” rather than 
eliminating them. That said, note that UDL also specifies that accommodations, supports, 
and challenges be “appropriate.” Note too that there may be an ambivalence regarding 
how such accommodations impact standards of achievement (“maintains high 
achievement expectations for all students, including students with disabilities and 
students who are limited English proficient”).36 What, precisely, does this mean? My 
impulse is to assume that practitioners determine the appropriateness of accommodations 
and the ways in which such accommodations impact achievement. While the Higher 
Education Opportunity Act specifies that UDL take place within a “scientifically-valid 
framework for guiding educational practice,” such a framework presumably resides 
within a discipline’s articulation of a “scientifically-valid framework,” which is then 
operationalized at programmatic levels. If this is the case, we find ourselves back in the 
familiar deliberative procedure quandary, and UDL’s utility becomes a bit more 
questionable. 
 The above criticisms of UD, UDL, and ad hoc accommodations are not meant as 
dismissals of these varieties of accommodation. As I say earlier, each of these approaches 
to accommodation is valuable and necessary. In the above, I mean to merely foreground 
the underspecification of these approaches to accommodation. This underspecification 
                                                
36 The relationship between English proficiency and disability is certainly an interesting 
one, and some thoroughgoing social model theorists might make a case for limited 
English proficiency being a disability within some contexts in America. While interesting 
and requiring attention, such inquiry is beyond the immediate scope of this project. 
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gives UD and UDL some valuable conceptual flexibility, but this flexibility can lead to 
vagueness and potential difficulties in the operationalization of accommodation, 
especially in composition, where programs can show so much variance across contexts. 
Accordingly, I forward a model of accommodation that incorporates the best of ad hoc 
accommodations and UDL while foregrounding their underspecification in 
programmatically-valuable ways. 
 
Kairos, Stasis, and Complex Accommodation in Composition 
The work of this project has been building up to this point. In working through the 
legislation on accommodation and various approaches to accommodation, it should be 
clear that writing programs have quite a bit of latitude in terms of how and whether a 
disability can or should be accommodated in the composition classroom. Additionally, 
through exploring the various models of disability in Disability Studies’ literature, it has 
been shown that disability may be regarded as a complex, emergent interplay between 
individual configurations (including impairments) and the social-construction of those 
configurations as disabilities. The types of accommodations described above are at best 
limited, and at worst they are bureaucratic mechanisms which reinscribe disciplined and 
medicalized normalizations. Such is often the fate of idealized disability accommodation: 
instantiation and operationalization can militate against creating equitable, fair, and 
transformative relations for all stakeholders. Perhaps, then, such underspecified and 
idealized approaches to accommodation are not the answer. Perhaps the answer lies in 
something more specific, complex, but ultimately clear. 
 Enter “complex accommodation.” 
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 Complex accommodation, as I conceive of it, recognizes the myriad imbrications 
of disability, disciplinarity, and institutionality and works to confront and capitalize upon 
the Gordian knot that ensues. I see the encounter of disability as a kairic moment of 
disruption. The encounter—whether through a direct apprehension of disability or an 
indirect attending to hypothetical cases or conceptual categories37—reveals a lack of fit 
between the environment and a person’s individual configuration. On one hand, this 
realization can initiate a formal, reflexive, stasiastic response: the disability calls for an 
accommodation, and this implicates the relatively fixed legal and administrative 
procedures in place within an institution for an accommodative solution.38 Alternatively, 
the encounter can lead to a kairic response, one that opens up practical, theoretical, and 
ethical possibilities through the encounter’s situatedness and through the initiation of 
complex accommodation.  
 Kairos has a long and complex conceptual history. Though many scholars take it 
up beginning with the Pre-Socratic philosophers (especially Gorgias), some have traced it 
all the way back to Homer’s Illiad (Sipiora 2). Some definitions of kairos include 
“propriety,” “due measure,” “decorum,” “proportion,” and “wise moderation” (Sipiora 1), 
and these have sometimes historically been collapsed into “the principle of right timing 
and the principle of proper measure” (Kinneavy 60). However, these simple synonymic 
substitutions and historic shorthands do not really capture the nuances of the term. Kairos 
                                                
37 Treating hypothetical cases of disability and moving through complex accommodation 
is problematized by the fact that it potentially objectifies, decontextualizes, and 
medicalizes disability. However, the processes of inquiry that complex accommodation 
suggests may be employed in such cases with some utility provided the limitations of 
such thought experiments and such inquiry are duly noted and foregrounded.  
38 See Michael Carter’s “Stasis and Kairos: Principles of Social Construction in Classical 
Rhetoric” for a thorough description of stasis and stasiastic inquiry/procedure. 
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is essentially tied to time, but it is a special sort of time that differs from chronos, or time 
as we conventionally conceive of it: 
In chronos we have the fundamental conception of time as measure, the quantity 
of duration, the length of periodicity, the age of an object or artifact…By contrast, 
the term kairos points to a qualitative character of time, to the special position an 
event or action occupies in a series, to a season when something appropriately 
happens that cannot happen just at “any time,” but only at that time, to a time that 
marks an opportunity which may not recur. (Smith 47) 
So, there is a situatedness and an immediacy tied to kairos, but this situatedness and 
immediacy is itself more complicated than might initially appear.  
 Some scholars may link the notion of kairos and kairic time merely to the actions 
and orientations of rhetors and auditors, but others have pointed out how for some 
ancients, kairos had an ontological dimension as well. For Pythagoreans, kairos was a 
fundamental harmonizing force in the universe that, in its resolution of conflicts, became 
generative and was even responsible for the construction of the universe (Carter 101-02). 
In “Time and Qualitative Time,” John Smith wants to move understandings of kairos 
beyond the merely human sphere so that such emphasis “not be allowed to overshadow 
the ontological dimension of kairos as manifest in various orders of happening, such as 
constellations of historical events, natural processes, and developments which have their 
own temporal frames and opportune times quite apart from human action, especially the 
action of this or that individual” (48). Smith succinctly pulls together the ontological and 
rhetorical definitional strains of kairos in the following passage: 
  106 
Turning now to the features of kairos time, it is important to note three distinct 
but related concepts. There is, first, the idea of the ‘right time’ for something to 
happen in contrast to ‘any time,’ a sense that is captured nicely in the word 
‘timing’…Second, kairos means a time of tension and conflict, a time of crisis 
implying that the course of events poses a problem that calls for a decision at that 
time, which is to say that no generalized solution or response supposedly valid at 
any or every time will suffice. Third, kairos means that the problem or crisis has 
brought with it a time of opportunity (kairos is translated by the Latin 
opportunitas) for accomplishing some purpose which could not be carried out at 
some other time. Implicit in all three meanings embraced by kairos is the concept 
of an individual time having a critical ordinal position set apart from its 
predecessors and successors. (52) 
Central to Smith’s above elaboration is the idea that kairos cannot be taught as a principle 
or procedure (“no generalized solution or response supposedly valid at any or every time 
will suffice”), which complicates how a rhetor might negotiate a kairic moment.39 This is 
only problematic, however, if one assumes the arrival at logos as the end or telos of a 
kairic moment and rhetorical exchange between rhetor and auditor.  
Pre-Socratic approaches to kairos seem relativistic: in any given situation an 
auditor will have antithetical positions and perspectives to choose from. Kairos will guide 
the rhetor in choosing which antithesis is most probable, and the rhetor will, in turn, help 
guide the auditor. In a relativistic universe, this relationship imparts an ethical dimension 
to kairic inquiry/exchange: “It was not simply saying what the audience wanted to hear, 
                                                
39 As Benedikt (226-29), Sipiora (6), Poulakos (90), and others point out, any sort of 
theory of kairos would elide the situatedness and immediacy of a kairic moment. 
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as the connotations of sophistry suggest, but it was facing squarely the tragic notion that 
all logos is ‘deception’ and acting on the basis of what at the crucial time seemed to be 
the truest logos” (Carter 106). In other words, since all positions have some claim to truth 
or validity in a relativistic universe (102), it is the rhetor’s responsibility to understand 
the kairic aspect of a rhetorical situation to the best of his/her ability and help guide the 
auditor to the position which seems most likely in that given situation, hence the ethical 
aspect of kairos (105-06). Of course, the auditor does not play a passive role in a kairic 
exchange as he or she might in seemingly logocentric exchanges/inquiries; instead, the 
auditor’s likely response to the rhetor helps determine whether a moment actually is or 
becomes kairic. As Benedikt puts it: 
Evaluations of timing also require evaluating the kairic sense of the readiness of 
others who form part of the situational context. As Gorgias explained, one cannot 
evaluate the kairic fit of an action to a particular moment without considering the 
response of others. Taking others into consideration can lead to the conclusion 
that one is taking action at a ‘bad time.’ The other person might be preoccupied or 
unreceptive. (231) 
In short, the “right timing” of the kairic moment must encompass the potential or actual 
orientation of the auditor to the rhetor’s choice of competing logoi: the attunement of the 
rhetor and auditor to the kairic moment is a component in the moment qua kairos. This is 
not to fall back on the perspective wherein kairos lacks an ontological element 
independent of human interactions; rather, I mean to underscore that within discourse, the 
kairic moment may require both rhetor and auditor to attend to the moment qua kairic in 
order for it to actually be kairic in the richer sense of kairos described above. Drawing on 
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this deeper, nuanced, essentially complex understanding of kairos can help capture what I 
mean by complex accommodation. 
 I have already mentioned how accommodation can be approached in terms of 
rhetorics of requirement or rhetorics of affordance, and the above discussion of kairos 
can enrich what I mean, especially in regards to “rhetorics of affordance.” Following 
Smith’s elaboration of kairos, one can see how accommodation might be transformed 
into a kairic moment. As accommodation indicates a lack of fit, it is the “right time” to 
initiate inquiry into the lack of fit. The encounter also tracks with Smith’s 
characterization of kairos as situated crisis, requiring immediate and situated attention (ad 
hoc accommodation). Finally, the encounter provides an opportunity that otherwise might 
not be possible at other times: an opportunity to explore where the crisis actually comes 
from. Thinking about the encounter of the disability as kairos can thus allow/propel a 
teacher to ask the following questions: 
• Why and how does this specific context disable this particular student? 
• How can I immediately and reasonably ameliorate the situation or reconfigure the 
context to make it more accessible or equitable for the student? 
• Where does the disability come from?40  
These questions are not the end-point of complex accommodation as I conceive of it; they 
are the beginning. The initial kairic moment—the moment of the encounter—itself may 
create another kairic moment through the process of complex accommodation. This is not 
to imply that kairoi succeed one another as the moments of chronos time do, nor is it 
                                                
40 To be clear, by “disability,” I mean the system of relations—environmental, 
ideological, etc.—which disadvantage a person’s bodily and mental configurations in 
favor of a set of privileged configurations.  
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meant to be taken as a claim for systematized or proceduralized kairos; instead, as I will 
come to show, complex accommodation begins with a kairic moment that may lead to 
further kairic moments, but it may also lead to closures rather than openings.  
 The above bulleted questions can be taken as the beginning steps of complex 
accommodation. When an instructor encounters the lack of fit between the immediate 
environment and a student’s particular configuration, his or her first step should be to 
assess how the environment is disabling the student, and then s/he should seek to 
immediately reasonably accommodate that student. I’m purposefully employing the 
“reasonable” language here to indicate that the instructor should work with the student 
and the available accommodative channels at his or her institution at the point of 
encounter to equitably meet the student’s needs. Partially, this is based on how I am 
conceiving of the kairic nature of the encounter, but it is also a function of instructors’ 
legal obligations and temporal constraints (students with disabilities will need 
accommodations in the moment).41 Additionally, the inquiry pointed to in the third 
question may require significant time to unfold. Accordingly, as I indicate above, ad hoc 
accommodation is still very much a part of complex accommodation, but it occurs at the 
beginning of the complex accommodation process. To be clear: I am not advocating a 
mere reliance on administrative, ad hoc approaches to accommodation. Rather, these first 
steps should employ the instructor’s extant available resources including (but not 
necessarily limited to) the accommodating agencies at the institution and the instructor’s 
own sense of “reasonable accommodation” based upon his/her experience in the writing 
                                                
41 “In the ethical domain kairos appears as justice or the proper measure according to 
merit or what is “due” to an individual in an order of equality” (Smith 56). This sense of 
what is due can change through complex accommodation, but there will be a 
proceduralized sense of “what is due” in place at the moment of encounter. 
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program and his/her experience in the discipline. This process will clearly differ for each 
instructor, but the following heuristic flowchart (Figure 2) suggests the sorts of questions 
an instructor might ask, how these questions may lead to other critical questions, and how 
s/he might proceed in the moment: 
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Student Presents 
Disability 
Documentation and 
Required 
Accommodations 
Student Self-
Identifies as 
Disabled and Lacks 
Documentation 
Instructor and 
Student Meet to 
Discuss the 
Accommodations 
and how Best to 
Implement Them  
Instructor and 
Student Meet to 
Determine how Best 
to Work Together 
Implement 
Accommodation(s) 
Workable 
Accommodation(s) 
No Workable 
Accommodation(s) 
Deny 
Accommodation(s) 
What do you need to 
succeed in our class? 
 
What seems 
impossible or really 
difficult about writing 
and/or our class work? 
Basic Accommodation Questions 
Figure 2. The Ad Hoc Heuristic 
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When an instructor encounters a student with a disability, then, there will be an initial 
binary situation where the student will either have disability documentation and attendant 
accommodation requirements, or the student will self identity without documentation.42 If 
the student lacks documentation, a further binary situation ensues wherein the student 
either has not gone through the accommodative channels at the institution and received 
resultant accommodation recommendations, or the student is unable to receive 
accommodations through institutional channels.43 If the student is eligible and willing, 
the instructor can refer him or her to the proper agencies on campus (at which point, the 
left-hand branch of the heuristic may be followed). If the student receives 
accommodation recommendations or requirements from the institution, s/he can then 
meet with the instructor to negotiate how those accommodations might best be 
implemented within the context of the specific class. Such a meeting can be profitably 
structured in a variety of ways, but the “Basic Accommodation Questions” capture the 
gist of the meeting: the instructor and student should strategize for the student’s success 
by identifying potentially-problematic elements of the course and how the required 
accommodations may profitably remediate those elements. It is absolutely essential to 
note that both the student and the teacher must be active participants in this process. The 
teacher will serve as the expert administrator of the course, curriculum, and pedagogy, 
                                                
42 This binary is, ultimately, an oversimplification. Students’ disabilities may remain 
invisible, or the instructor’s “encounter” of a disability may take place outside of any 
particular interaction with a student (the “encounter” may be a conceptual one). These 
issues are not objections to the binary encapsulated in this heuristic; rather, they are 
situations and possibilities that are taken up in the process of complex accommodation, as 
I show later. 
43 Such inability may more broadly include unwillingness; i.e., some students may fear 
stigmatization through institutional labels, but may be willing to approach individual 
instructors if they feel those instructors may be sympathetic. 
  113 
but the student will be the expert on him or herself, his or her personal configurations, 
and the ways in which the environment disables or may disable him or her. Once this 
process is worked through, the accommodations may then be implemented. In cases 
where a student self-identifies and cannot obtain documentation and resultant 
recommendations, there are a number of critical differences in how one might proceed, 
but there are also some valuable similarities as well.  
 Just like the case of the student who has obtained institutional accommodation 
requirements, the self-identifying student should meet with the instructor to determine 
how they might best work together given the student’s own sense of his or her disability. 
Based on this meeting, the instructor and student may determine either (i) there are 
workable accommodations that may be put in place (remediation of particular practices, 
alternative formats of materials, and so forth), or (ii) there are no workable 
accommodations available for the student: the student is either requesting “unreasonable” 
accommodations44, or the instructor and student cannot think of ways to ameliorate what 
the student sees as a disability in medias res. When workable accommodations can be 
determined, then they may be implemented. In cases where no workable accommodations 
can be found, then the accommodations must be denied. Obviously, this procedure and 
the larger heuristic is somewhat simplistic and depends on a number of critical 
assumptions. 
 In broad strokes, the steps in this heuristic are kept purposefully general because 
this procedure is meant to represent an accommodation occurring in the moment, within 
                                                
44 I’m using “unreasonable” here to include both accommodations that would pose an 
“undue burden” to the instructor or require a “fundamental alteration” of the course, but 
these legal corollaries need not exhaust the sense of the “reasonableness of the 
accommodation” as the student is identifying solely to the instructor.  
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an instructor’s extant pedagogical, administrative, and theoretical frameworks. So, terms 
like “success,” “best,” and “workable” will all be defined/parsed with reference to an 
instructor’s sense of the class’s structure, teloi, and so forth in medias res. This means 
that the instructor will need to draw upon his or her extant resources and work with the 
student to determine what possibilities are afforded by potential accommodations. 
 The Ad Hoc Heuristic is underwritten by what I have been calling a “rhetoric of 
affordance” that centers accommodation as a moment wherein critique and possible 
transformation are the goals rather than requirement-fulfillment. Even though I 
foreground how extant accommodative procedures should be followed in terms of 
requirements, I also indicate that instructors and students should meet to see how the 
student can best be accommodated and to see how teacher and student might best work 
together. Such a meeting assumes that the goal of accommodation is not mere 
requirement-fulfillment but is actually the generation of options, possibilities, and 
generative relationships. While I believe there is an ethical imperative tied to such a 
meeting, I also think that the affordances are not asymmetrical; in other words, such a 
meeting does not merely benefit the student, but also benefits the instructor as well by 
opening up new horizons of pedagogical and theoretical inquiry. I will return to this in 
the coming pages, but before doing so, I need to first suss out additional assumptions in 
the heuristic. 
 A major assumption here is that students can articulate their own conditions of 
success within a course, either by themselves or in consultation with an instructor. This 
may not be the case for many students, especially at the beginning of a semester: students 
may not understand exactly what a particular course is supposed to accomplish, let alone 
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how the daily work of the semester works towards the courses’ outcomes, deliverables, 
and objectives. However, beginning a dialog and working together towards an 
understanding of what that relationship might look like creates the possibility that 
tenable, beneficial working conditions may be achieved. A related and critical 
assumption is that students who self-identify will do so to the instructor. In reality, many 
students will balk at approaching an instructor in such a situation, especially if the 
instructor’s framing of disability within the classroom is limited to a syllabus addendum, 
a limitation which can locate disability within an administrative/bureaucratic rhetoric of 
requirement. So, an instructor must carefully frame disability itself if s/he wants to create 
the classroom environment wherein students without official documentation are 
encouraged to come to them with accommodative requests. While foregrounding 
disability within the curriculum may go some distance towards creating such an 
environment, one can also alter the way that disability and accommodation are encoded 
in course syllabi. For example, if one’s institution has a required and/or uniform syllabus 
disability statement, an instructor can undercut a rhetoric of requirement by moving 
beyond the institutional statement. Margaret Price’s excellent addition to Spelman 
College’s required statement shows how this might work: 
I assume that all of us learn in different ways, and that the organization of any 
course will accommodate each student differently. For example, you may prefer 
to process information by speaking and listening, so that some of the written 
handouts I provide may be difficult to absorb. Please talk to me as soon as you 
can about your individual learning needs and how this course can best 
accommodate them. If you do not have a documented disability, remember that 
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other support services, including the Writing Center and the Learning Resources 
Center, are available to all students. (Wood and Madden) 
In the above example, Price moves beyond a rhetoric of requirement as she foregrounds 
the learning differences of all of her students. By invoking the Writing Center and 
Learning Resources Center as support services for all students and by demonstrating 
openness to a more capacious sense of accommodation, she simultaneously centers 
differential learning as the norm and encourages her students to make use of all available 
avenues to success. Such a simple addition to a standard syllabus statement can 
powerfully alter student-teacher dynamics,45 and perhaps such an addition would be a 
precursor or necessary initial condition for the Ad Hoc Heuristic.  
 At many institutions the broader procedures captured in the Ad Hoc Heuristic are 
already in place, but formalizing and implementing the heuristic creates a number of clear 
benefits. First, where procedures are not clearly articulated or easily shared, the Ad Hoc 
Heuristic can provide a common accommodative ground and set of steps for instructors. 
This can be particularly beneficial, for example, in cases where large numbers of 
graduate student instructors or contingent faculty enter into a writing program each year. 
Sometimes, in such cases, the nuances of disability accommodation training can be lost in 
the rush to acclimate these new instructors to the writing program’s culture. The Ad Hoc 
Heuristic can help these instructors negotiate accommodation in a new writing program, 
and it can also structurally position disability as a complex and central element of human 
                                                
45 Wood and Madden also point out how the placement of such a statement is important, 
and positioning such a statement near the beginning of the syllabus rather than towards 
the end “allows instructors to foreground their flexible approach to disability and 
demonstrate their interest in providing an inclusive and accessible classroom for all 
students.”  
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and pedagogical experience. Second, the Ad Hoc Heuristic links up with the next step in 
the process of complex accommodation, what I am calling the “Kairic Question,” or the 
third question in the sequence I describe above: “Where does the disability come from?” 
 
The Kairic Question 
In keeping with the broader appeal to kairos, it is important to again note that kairos time 
is not chronos time; where chronos time is linear and successive, kairos time may be 
interrupted and fragmented. I make this caveat here because the “Kairic Question,” the 
second major step in complex accommodation as I am conceiving of it, may not stand in 
relation to the Ad Hoc Heuristic in a neat, successive, “chronic” way. An instructor may 
ask this question in the midst of working through the Ad Hoc Heuristic, after a semester 
in which s/he worked to accommodate a student, or it may even occur before an 
instructor works to accommodate a student. The ability to ask and the resultant asking of 
where a disability comes from is kairic in the sense that it is only possible at certain 
moments. The moment of an instructor’s initial encounter of a disabled student is kairic 
in the way it marks a confluent (administrative, pedagogical, environmental, etc.) 
privileging and carries with it the opportunity to potentially correct for that privileging 
through accommodation. In other words, asking where a disability comes from in the 
writing classroom is kairic in its opportunity to create an account of the disability: from 
the initial encounter and ad hoc accommodation of disability, conditions become 
“opportune” (Smith 47) to explore why some individuals are disabled in the writing class 
while others are not. In such a way, the instructor may uncover unmarked normalizations 
not only in his/her pedagogy, but also within his/her writing program, institution, and 
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larger field. Such a process can, in turn, make these normalizations available for critique 
and potential transformation in previously unavailable ways. Before turning to these 
ambitious ends, though, I think it important to carefully explore the multiple localizations 
of disability, the “where,” in “where does the disability come from?” 
 When an instructor first asks “where” a particular disability originates from, there 
are a number of initial directions such inquiry can take. One possibility is that the 
disability originates from a students’ interaction with the physical environment of the 
classroom. For example, certain kinds of lighting might disable photophobic individuals, 
as I note above. Likewise, only providing chairs with affixed desks may disable 
individuals who use wheelchairs, obese students, and so on. The pedagogical 
environment—the way that classroom practices are enacted to deliver content—is another 
location of disability generation. Student-teacher conferences, in-class group work, and 
monomodal lectures can disable students in a variety of ways. Finally, the genesis of 
disability can come from an administrative direction. For example, a face-to-face 
composition class may have a strict attendance policy because of writing-process 
requirements (e.g. workshopping requirements), as my university does. Such a policy, 
though, may disable those students who might have differential attendance abilities due 
to migraines, anxiety disorders, and other conditions. These divisions between physical 
environment, pedagogy, and administration are artificial, and there will often be cross-
over between them in terms of how they may locate disability generation, as Figure 3 
shows:  
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In addition to locating the broader disabling vector or location, one must also ask: Where 
is the disabling practice/policy/environmental aspect located in relation to the rest of the 
course’s structure? 
 In trying to further specify the disability’s location within the course, an instructor 
should try to locate it relative to the other elements of the course insofar as all locations 
are relative and such relationships can themselves be illuminating. One way to achieve 
this is to try and suss out whether the disabling aspect is 
• fundamental, essential, and/or nonsubstitutional (in an immediately apparent 
way); or 
• accidental, nonessential, and/or substitutable (in an immediately apparent way). 
I include the caveat “in an immediately apparent way” for two reasons. First, if the 
disabling cause is ancillary, nonessential and/or substitutable, then the instructor can 
immediately work at finding a valuable alternative/alternatives in media res while still 
engaging in the broader work of complex accommodation. So, for example, an instructor 
may find that grading based on oral participation is disabling and provide a particular 
student with a written participation option while simultaneously working towards a more 
Environment Pedagogy Administration 
Figure 3. Locating Disability 
Disability 
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accessible, capacious definition of “participation” for an upcoming semester. Second, I 
include the “immediately apparent” caveat because the natures of these disabling 
aspects—whether they really are central, essential, etc.—is still very much up for grabs. 
This is important to note because at this stage in the process, it might be tempting to 
revise one’s overall practices based on the identification of a disabling element and 
consider the issue “solved.” For some basic accommodations, this may very well be 
possible and ought to be done (e.g., providing classroom materials in broadly accessible 
formats). However, ending inquiry with ad hoc accommodation (or even UDL 
accommodation)46 and disability localization risks leaving the underpinning mechanisms 
of normalization and their causative theories intact and operative. And it is the opening 
up of these mechanisms of normalization that adds a deeper kairic aspect to complex 
accommodation. In what follows, I present an additional heuristic procedure to uncover 
such normalizations. 
 Opening up disabling elements of the composition classroom will often lead to 
inquiry and critique of the writing program that a classroom resides in. This inquiry is 
not, however, as simple as may appear (as the following flowchart indicates): 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
46 What I mean here is redesigning a disabling course element following UDL principles 
once that course element is recognized as disabling. This step may eventually occur, but 
without further movement in complex accommodation, this step may only relieve an 
immediate symptom without curing the ill. 
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In broad strokes, the Programmatic Heuristic above offers a series of steps one may take 
in tracking where a disabling element of one’s writing program comes from and, in so 
doing, create the possibility for systemic inquiry and potential reformation. The first step 
suggested by the heuristic is determining whether a disabling element is a programmatic 
requirement or a programmatic norm. 
 While the heuristic eventually shows that programmatic requirements may 
actually be norms in disguise, it is helpful and necessary for an instructor to figure out 
whether and how something is a requirement, as this will shape further inquiry and 
action. There are two initial possibilities for a required element: the element may be 
institutionally required or programmatically required. If a requirement is institutionally 
required, an instructor should ask whether it is fixed at the institutional level or whether it 
is adjustable/specifiable at the programmatic level. For example, in hybrid courses hours 
of student work associated per credit hour may be fixed at the institutional level, but 
physical contact hours may be programmatically specifiable. If a disabling element is 
fixed at the institutional level, an instructor may ask a number of questions to continue 
inquiry: 
• Where does the required element come from? What is its institutional history? 
• Who (persons, divisions, etc.) is responsible for it? Who guides associated 
policies and procedures? 
• Can and should the instructor attempt to work directly through institutional 
channels to change it? 
The first two sets of questions are geared towards identifying the responsible vectors of 
the requirement and also trying to understand how the element is situated within the 
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larger institution. Through answering these questions, one might find that the current 
practice/procedure/policy is less disabling than alternatives. Or they might not. In either 
case, the third question draws on what is discovered to determine whether action can and 
should be taken. Note the “should” included here. This is a kairic term: the wrong person 
at the wrong time simply will not be in a position to encourage the responsible 
individuals (or individuals in power positions) to attend to their inquiry as kairic. 
Conceivably, this might sabotage efforts to change disabling elements, or it could even 
lead to negative repercussions for the rhetor depending on his or her position. 
Accordingly, instructors must attend to institutional realities and limitations in addition to 
possibilities when exploring institutionally-fixed requirements, just as they must do so 
when exploring those requirements that are specifiable at programmatic levels. 
 One possibility in exploring requirements at the programmatic level is that these 
requirements will be institutional requirements that are capable of being specified or 
articulated at the programmatic level. As such, there may or may not be some flexibility 
in formulation, implementation, and so forth that may potentially be regeared for greater 
accessibility. For example, it may be an institutional requirement that disability 
statements appear in syllabi, and there may be certain sentences that must be included, 
but a program may specify further text, the placement of the statement in the syllabus, 
and so forth in an effort to make a course more accessible (see 115-17 above). In cases 
where an instructor discovers that certain institutional requirements are more specifiable 
at the program level, s/he may ask questions like: 
• What does the program’s specification reveal about the program’s commitments?  
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• Given these commitments, how can the requirement be respecified for greater 
accessibility? 
The first question obviously leads to interpretation and, like most of the questions in this 
and the other heuristics, should not be taken as algorithmic; in other words, answering 
this question and the others like it will not lead to necessary implications, even if it might 
create interesting, revealing, and potentially generative/equalizing opportunities. The 
point is to try to theorize these disabling elements in order to imagine other possibilities 
and see if these elements might yet exist in other more accessible forms. I say “theorize” 
here to underscore the fact that these heuristic procedures create hermeneutic 
systematization; in other words, to try to understand how and why these disabling 
elements occupy the places they do, an instructor attempts to interrelate the programmatic 
and institutional requirements in structured ways that make sense to him or her. This is 
especially important in terms of those disabling required elements that are program-
specific rather than institutional requirements.  
 As I represent them in Figure 4, program-specific requirements may either 
articulate with essential aspects of the program’s identity and/or mission, or they may be 
more accidental. For example, a writing program’s commitment to ethical writing 
practices may connect with its commitments to social action. Alternatively, the same 
ethical commitment may connect with the program’s rhetorical approach to writing and 
its emphasis on ethos. In the case of a religious institution, the ethical commitment may 
be tied to the program’s (and/or department’s) religious inflections. Obviously, if and 
how these elements articulate with one another is going to be theoretically and practically 
revealing, and such articulations will sometimes constrain and sometimes open up 
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possibilities for policy revision. Some seemingly essential elements really will be 
essential or foundational, and it might not be possible or desirable to substitute them 
(like, for example, a writing program’s commitment to teaching writing as both process 
and product and the production schedules this might necessitate). However, tracking how 
these commitments interrelate and submitting the centrality (or essentiality) of each 
element to examination and critique may reframe essential disabling practices as 
accidental ones. 
 In cases where a program requirement does not articulate with other essential or 
central elements of the writing program’s identity and/or mission, then the instructor can 
begin to explore how and why such elements have been cast as requirements. In such a 
case, the “requirement” becomes a “norm” (as Figure 4 indicates), but such conceptual 
transformation may not diminish the force of requirement (after all, norms generally 
retain a great degree of power). However, the transformation—even if it is only in the 
mind of the inquirer at this point—does create further possibilities for productive inquiry. 
Before moving to that, though, it will be helpful to take a step back as this location moves 
the inquirer from the “Programmatic Requirement” prong of the heuristic to the 
“Programmatic Norm” prong. 
 In inquiring into the nature of a program-level disabling element in a composition 
course, an instructor may initially find that the element is a norm rather than a program 
requirement. In such a case, the norm may be traced to field-level theories or best 
practices. If an instructor in his/her inquiry reaches this point in their tracking of a 
programmatic disabling norm, s/he can then take his/her exploration to field-level inquiry 
(I will have more to say on this below.) On the other hand, an instructor may only be able 
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to determine that a norm is in place because of program administration.47 In that case, the 
question to ask is “Why is it normed in the way it is?” The answer to this question will 
often be tied to the field’s theories and best practices (as Figure 4 indicates), but it might 
also be tied to politics, preference, and/or inertia. When it is, an instructor might ask the 
following questions: 
• How might these normalizations be reframed as denaturalized preferences? 
• When such normalizations are denaturalized, how might they be reformulated and 
implemented for greater accessibility? 
Depending on program structure and instructor positioning, one’s options might be quite 
limited in this circumstance. The first question gets at this in asking how such 
normalizations “might” be reframed as preferences. Simply put, such a process might be 
a delicate one and undecidable outside of local contexts. When (if) these normalizations 
are denaturalized, then an instructor and writing program more broadly can begin to 
rethink such norms, their centrality, their utility, and the ways in which they may be 
reformulated for greater accessibility or even outright discarded if they are merely 
inertial. Such a process may lead to field-level inquiry, thought it need not (hence the 
lack of connection in the diagram). When it does lead to field-level inquiry (as it may 
earlier in the diagram), heuristic diagramming loses its utility. 
 
 
 
                                                
47 Please note: “program administration” is not coextensive with “writing program 
administrator” as some writing programs will not technically have a writing program 
administrator. Additionally, “program administration” is selected here to point to the 
multiple persons/positions that may be identified with it. 
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Field Level Inquiry/Moving Beyond the Local 
Before addressing field-level inquiry, I believe a few caveats are in order. First, while the 
program-level heuristic separates out norms and requirements, in practice there will be a 
good deal of slippage between the two. As I point to above, norms often seem to be 
requirements, even if they are not framed as such, and they tend to retain the force of 
requirement at various levels (among administrators, instructors, etc.). What I do not 
directly address is the fact that requirements are often understood as norms as well. 
Required elements in a writing program norm instructors, and policy can normalize what 
it means to do composition in a particular time and place. In working through the 
heuristics, instructors can try to disentangle which elements of teaching composition at 
their particular institutions are unshakeable requirements (programmatic and/or 
institutional) and which are norms, but given the way that normalization can work, the 
visibility of such norms and requirements may remain muddled.48 Sometimes the 
heuristics may not elucidate such differences, and how instructors understand and 
implement them is clearly something that requires additional research. This brings me to 
my second caveat. 
                                                
48 One might even make the argument that composition is an even broader system of 
normalization. Beyond the ways that instructors’ approaches to composition are normed 
by requirements and institutional cultures, students too are normed in a variety of ways. 
As an introductory college writing course, composition is positioned—sometimes 
implicitly, sometimes explicitly—as the foundational or fundamental writing course; in 
other words, the approaches to writing taught in particular composition classrooms may 
be normed (for students) as the ways to approach writing across multiple contexts. While 
composition’s norming of student writing and its consequences could be explored 
through learning transfer, to my understanding instructor norming has not been explored 
in terms of learning transfer. In other words, how instructors generalize both from local 
requirements, norms, and interactions to future interactions in terms of learning transfer 
might provide a productive area of further research to extend and further complicate the 
work of the present project. 
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 The heuristics in this chapter are not meant to be taken as algorithms. The flow-
charts are meant to suggest the sorts of inquiries, questions, and processes one might 
invoke to make sense of the structurally-disabling practices that may frame, construct, 
and underwrite one’s composition course and writing program. The sheer heterogeneity 
of programs, curricula, and individual instructors makes an algorithmic approach 
incoherent. To riff off of Dolmage’s increasingly famous quote: if UD is a “way of 
moving” (26),49 complex accommodation is a way of thinking about moving; it is a 
marking of the dance floor, a turning up of the lights, and a suggestion of the sorts of 
dance steps one might tentatively try, when they might be tried, and with whom they 
might be ventured. In some ways, it keeps to the metaphor of accommodation as a 
“fitting,” but it seeks to reverse the direction of fit by trying to discover where and how 
the classroom and program may be more pliable than they currently are. Perhaps more 
importantly, it tries to uncover a more fundamental sense of why the configuration that 
causes the lack of fit has come to be as it is. In such a way, complex accommodation 
seeks to interrogate and transform the writing classroom and program systemically (in 
addition to the more direct types of accommodation outlined earlier in this chapter) and, 
in so doing, potentially critique and transform the field as well.  
 In Figure 4, I indicate that field-level inquiry may become necessary in the course 
of complex accommodation, yet I do not provide a heuristic for what this may look like. 
This omission is intentional. In Chapter 5, I address this issue and provide a few ideas for 
                                                
49 “We see ourselves as teaching in highly localized contexts. For this reason, our 
skepticism about the universe of UD is well founded. Whose universe will this be? Yet, 
UD does offer ways to move, theoretically, that have everything to do with the 
universal—not as a means of homogenization but as a way to complicate divisive notions 
of difference with new models of cooperation” (Dolmage 26). 
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pursuing field-level inquiry, but I believe that complex accommodation might lose its 
focus as a thoroughly-localized mode of inquiry and action if field-level inquiry is 
foregrounded within the process. Accordingly, the following chapter concretizes my own 
process of complex accommodation and, in so doing, demonstrates some of the 
possibilities and limitations of the heuristics outlined here.  
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Chapter 4: Considering and Concretizing Complex Accommodation  
Introduction 
From the previous chapters, it might seem as if complex accommodation is complicated, 
difficult, and confusing. On one hand, complex accommodation is complicated, difficult, 
and confusing. On the other hand, it is complicated, difficult, and confusing in all the 
right ways. It invites us to discover, parse, and utilize accommodation as kairos as we 
denaturalize our practices and theories in composition instruction and as we realize the 
opportunity to deliberately and reflectively theorize and revise those same practices and 
theories for the good of all students. This is well and good, one might rejoin, but there is 
still an abstract complexity unclarified by Chapter 3’s heuristics, an underdetermination 
about complex accommodation, that necessitates something a bit more concrete. 
 While necessary to fully explicate the concept/method, using situated examples to 
demonstrate and elaborate complex accommodation is more problematic than it may 
initially appear. If complex accommodation is kairic, if it occurs in specific contexts 
among specific people, then providing instantiations of the dialectic risks 
decontextualizing complex accommodation and mistaking the sort of theoretical and 
practical work that might occur in one context for theory and/or practice that can apply in 
a number of different contexts. This is not to say that examples of complex 
accommodation would not be useful in an elaboration of the concept, but it is to say 
providing (and generalizing from) such examples requires both care and attention to how 
local contexts construct composition, teachers, students, disability, and the various 
possibilities for accommodation. Accordingly, the elaboration of complex 
accommodation that occurs in this chapter is situated within my own experience teaching 
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in a particular writing program. The experiences I relate are not meant to determine 
which accommodations should occur in other programs with other students and 
instructors; rather, my experiences provide a procedural analog to what might occur in 
other contexts. In such a way, I underscore that complex accommodation is essentially 
tied to the local, to particular classrooms, teachers, programs, and—above all—particular 
students with disabilities and their perspectives. That said, I also argue that we may still 
learn ways of moving and ways of thinking from the experiences of other instructors and 
scholars in the field. Complex accommodation can thus inform disciplinary-level 
discussions, resulting in a feedback loop between field-level inquiry and local 
theorizations of accommodation and composition. Such considerations are better left for 
after complex accommodation is instantiated, though. Accordingly, this would be an 
appropriate time for a turn to a local context. Before doing so, however, a caveat is 
necessary. 
 The complex accommodation that I describe in the coming pages does not exactly 
follow the procedures laid out in Chapter 3. Part of the reason for this is that these 
instances formed the experiential basis of complex accommodation’s conceptual genesis, 
and I later theorized and worked on the basis of these experiences. Of course, I could 
retrospectively reformulate those experiences to better fit with the procedures from 
Chapter 3, but in addition to being unethical, such massaging might make it seem as if 
complex accommodation is a clear procedure or set of procedures. In creating heuristics 
for complex accommodation, I recognized (and noted) this danger, but I also recognized 
the need for something concrete, something that instructors and programs could follow. 
At this point, I reaffirm that the heuristics are heuristics and not procedures: complex 
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accommodation will always be local/situated, and it will always be tied to particular 
circumstances, people, and orientations—it will take place kairically not chronically. 
 
 FYC, Midwest Style 
As I prepared to write this chapter, I struggled with how to approach my local context. 
While I need to accurately construct the context within which my encounters with 
disability became kairic, I have to wonder: Which context or which parts of which 
context? Put another way, what is my “local?” If I approach the context too broadly, I 
risk constructing some artificially-general context wherein the particular accommodations 
I wish to describe occur. The way that I have framed accommodation thus far argues 
against such an approach to context, but given that complex accommodation is 
interactional, it is important that the interactional nature of context is also foregrounded 
as constituting and being constituted by particular composition courses (among other 
elements). That said, some features of the local context will interact more directly with 
the instances of complex accommodation as I describe them in this chapter, so some 
broad contextualization (with an increasingly finer-grained specification) can provide 
useful background and situation for the more robust and fluid context that I will describe 
within the specific instances of complex accommodation. 
 At the time of writing, I teach in a public Midwestern research institution with a 
sizable FYC writing program. The program is staffed by a large number of contingent 
faculty and a much larger number of MA and PhD graduate teaching assistants from the 
department of English. While some of the these graduate students work in the Rhetoric 
and Composition MA and PhD programs of study, the majority are pursuing degrees in 
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the Literature and Cultural Theory, Creative Writing, Professional and Technical Writing, 
and Media, Cinema, and Digital Studies plans of study. A rhetoric scholar heads the 
Writing Program Administration team (WPA), and the broader WPA is composed of a 
mixture of contingent faculty and graduate students who supervise and mentor 
instructors, administer the writing program, organize professional development and 
continuing education opportunities in composition (such as forums, colloquia, and so 
forth), and craft writing program policy. The WPA is responsible for classes in English 
095: Fundamentals of Composition; English 101: Introduction to College Writing; 
English 102: College Writing and Research; and ESL 118: Advanced College Writing in 
English as a Second Language. Receiving a grade of “C” or better in English 102 or 
testing out of English 102 is a requirement for graduation.50 Instructors who teach these 
courses receive course-specific training and continued instructional development 
throughout the school year. 
 Each level of FYC is headed by either a contingent faculty- or graduate student-
coordinator. These coordinators work with the Director of Composition and the Assistant 
Director of Composition to craft and revise “standard sequences” each year. These FYC 
assignment sequences are required for new instructors (new to each particular course) as 
a way to scaffold their teaching, but they are also meant to serve as gold standards for 
veteran instructors. While veteran instructors are encouraged to adopt or fold in the work 
of the standard sequences in their classes, they are not required to do so. The standard 
                                                
50 Students may test into English 095, English 101, English 102, or out of the General 
Education Requirement. As the courses are sequenced, once students test into a particular 
course in the sequence, they must complete the remainder of the courses. So, for 
example, if a student tests into English 095, s/he must next take English 101 followed by 
English 102.  
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sequences are structured to provide formative, process-based assessment for students, 
leading to an end-of-term summative assessment. 
Each level of FYC employs a portfolio system of assessment where students 
produce a number of rhetorical/analytic and reflective texts that are holistically assessed 
by an anonymous committee of 2-3 course-specific instructors (other than the instructor 
of record) according to a course-specific set of “Goals and Outcomes for Portfolio 
Assessment.” These instructors make a pass-fail decision based upon their holistic 
assessment, and the instructor of record assigns a grade within either the “pass” or “fail” 
spectrums based on quality of the portfolio, course work, and so forth.51 These Goals and 
Outcomes are revised each year by the WPA as a whole based on input from the previous 
year’s instructors, students, and WPA members. Each of the sets of Goals and Outcomes 
are crafted to provide scaffolding for backward-reaching, near transfer (Perkins and 
Salomon 26; Brent 397)52 by building upon the Goals and Outcomes of earlier-sequenced 
courses. So, for example, the “2014-15 Goals and Outcomes for Portfolio Assessment” 
for English 095, 101, and 102 each include goals which focus on a “controlling purpose.” 
English 095’s controlling purpose Goal reads: 
! Maintain a controlling purpose that… 
o Reflects what matters to you and to others who are addressed in and affected 
by your interpretation. 
                                                
51 If a student’s portfolio “passes” the instructor must assign a grade between “C” and 
“A.” If a student’s portfolio “fails,” the instructor must assign a grade between “F” and 
“C- .” 
52 “Near” and “far” transfer refer to the similarity/difference between two contexts in a 
given instance of transfer. “Near transfer” refers to transfer that happens between 
relatively similar contexts (such as between a rhetoric course and a cultural studies 
course), while “far transfer” refers to transfer that occurs between contexts that differ to a 
greater degree (such as between an academic course and a workplace) (Brendt 397). 
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o Creates coherence throughout the essay. (First-Year 5) 
English 101’s/118’s controlling purpose Goal reads:  
! Maintain a controlling purpose that… 
o reflects what matters to or is at stake for you in the interpretation. 
o responds to what matters to or is at stake for those you address and those 
you respond to in the writing. 
o creates and maintains coherence and clarity for readers by shaping patterns 
of arrangement and other writing choices. (First-Year 6) 
English 102’s controlling purpose Goal reads:  
! Maintain a controlling purpose that… 
o emerges from a clearly defined central research question that reflects your 
concerns and interests. 
o responds ethically to what matters or is at stake for others who are 
addressed or affected by the research project. 
o creates and maintains coherence and clarity for the intended audience(s) 
through arrangement and design. (First-Year 7) 
Obviously, each of these goals is parallely-structured in the “Maintain a controlling 
purpose that…,” but each of the precisings and/or operationalizations of “maintaining a 
controlling purpose” varies among the different course levels. This variance can be read 
as tracking increasing complexity, backward-reaching near transfer, or both. So, for 
example, the “coherence and clarity” outcome moves from merely being created in 
English 095, to being directed to readers via “arrangement and other writing choices” in 
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English 101 to being directed to “intended audience(s)” via “arrangement and design” in 
English 102. 
 The above example is not meant to closely track structured transfer or scaffolded 
learning insofar as the two are difficult to disentangle from one another in this (or 
perhaps any) context. However the “controlling purpose” goals are offered here to show 
that and how the program conceives of its FYC courses as conceptually unified or 
motioning towards unification. While such unification and goals exert a methodological 
backward influence in each course53, the program’s unification also occurs in and through 
instructor training in the writing program, including overt “norming.”  
 Instructors of each course level in my school’s FYC program meet at the 
beginning, middle, and near the end of each semester to norm their responses to student 
portfolios. Such norming is meant to calibrate assessment while simultaneously sparking 
debates and discussions about the texts used as norming instruments, procedures in each 
course, and the goals and outcomes of each course. Leaving aside issues associated with 
portfolio norming54, I can say that these sessions are generally meant to construct and/or 
reinforce some degree of unification (or coherence) in the writing program’s vision and 
operation. As I mention above, the FYC program is staffed by both contingent faculty 
(who may have learned how to teach in programs with substantially-different priorities 
and visions) and graduate students who are often learning how to teach as they teach. 
                                                
53 If portfolios in each individual class are evaluated by the same Goals and Outcomes for 
Portfolio Assessment, this will result in certain methodological commonalities by 
necessity, even if those commonalities are as seemingly simple as foregrounding the 
importance of coherence and clarity in academic writing. 
54 Elbow and Belanoff argue that even expert readers will disagree on holistic portfolio 
assessment (27-28), and O’Neil, Moore, and Huot go further, arguing that norming 
readers to read and assess consistently is often futile given variance between readers (see 
esp. Kindle Locations 1492-1497). 
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Such learning takes place both in the classroom but also within these programmatic 
spaces. But this learning also occurs in the direct teacher training that each graduate 
teaching assistant must complete if he or she is to teach in the FYC program. 
 Each graduate teaching assistant (GTA) in the FYC program must go through 
rigorous initial and continuing training in order to teach in the writing program. The first 
semester that the GTAs begin working, they must enroll in a graduate seminar that 
focuses on composition theory, pedagogy, and programmatic norms within English 101 
(the course they all initially teach for 1 year). The seminar meets one night per week for 
three hours and is taught by the Director of Composition. In addition, GTAs must meet 
weekly with a mentor group composed of other new GTAs in the FYC program and 
headed by an English 101 mentor (a veteran instructor serving on the WPA in a 
mentoring capacity for new GTAs). Within mentor groups, the instructors tend to talk 
about their classes’ work through the standard sequence (remember that they are working 
through a programmatically-designed standard sequence of assignments), in-class 
pedagogy, portfolio assessment, and any other questions or concerns that might arise 
from their work. Prior to embarking on teaching English 101, working with mentor 
groups, or attending their graduate teaching seminar, GTAs first attend a week-long 
orientation to the writing program, what some graduate students have affectionately 
dubbed “comp camp” for various similarities to “boot camp.” 
 The new GTA orientation is a highly-structured series of talks and workshops 
which introduce the FYC program, English 101, and teaching composition in general to 
new GTAs in the English department. The orientation is organized and facilitated by the 
Director of Composition, Assistant Director, and English 101 Coordinator/mentors; 
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however, many of the “talks” and workshops are organized and run by veteran GTAs and 
contingent faculty within the writing program. While these talks may introduce 
programmatic concepts like the “controlling purpose” or might work through course 
readings, they also often introduce and (begin to) norm pedagogical practices like written 
commentary on student texts or student-teacher conferencing (I’ve spoken on both 
subjects at separate orientations). These talks code such pedagogical practices as 
“normal” or, at the very least, proceduralizations of programmatic norms and values. This 
normalization is extended in mentor groups and in the standard sequence which, for 
example, schedules the weeks student-teacher conferences should occur. Interestingly, 
there is an additional norming that occurs for the instructors delivering these talks and 
workshops in the sense that they are ostensibly teaching the new teachers how to teach, 
so they see and replicate what is meant to be central for those teachers and, by extension, 
all teachers in the program. Given such a programmatic structure, the ways in which 
certain practices and beliefs come to be naturalized and made to seem essential to the 
teaching of composition is understandable, and so it was likewise understandable that it 
took me a number of years before I was able to begin the process of complex 
accommodation with a particular practice, even thought it was myself and not my 
students that I was accommodating. 
 
Complex Accommodation Case I: Confounding the Conference 
I had actually taught composition at two other schools before I arrived at my current 
institution, and each school normalized or even required student-teacher conferences as 
part of “the” writing process. At my current institution, the conference was even more 
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valued than at my previous institutions: it was introduced in orientation, read about in the 
composition instructor seminar, and commiserated over in mentor groups. The program’s 
informal policy regarding the conference underscores its seeming centrality in the 
program’s conception of composition: in order to spend enough time with each student, 
instructors were allowed and encouraged to cancel one week of class meetings in order to 
work with students in a one-on-one capacity. With such a high value placed upon the role 
of the conference in teaching FYC and with its multi-directional norming (orientation, 
mentor groups, implementation in all the FYC courses), beginning a critique of 
conferencing beyond any sort of “tweaking” is difficult to get off the ground. Indeed, it 
took me a number of years teaching at various levels in the FYC program and multiple 
years of PhD-level coursework in composition theory and practice before I was able to 
ask an almost unthinkable question, “Why do we really need student-teacher 
conferencing?” Before getting to that point, however, a bit more fine-grained 
contextualization is necessary. 
I find close-quarters communication often difficult and anxiety-inducing with 
anyone other than my closest associates. The socially-constructed need for eye contact 
and physical proximity in discussion makes it difficult for me to concentrate, and I 
become easily distracted in such circumstances. While some of my peers praise the 
authentic, personal, and wall-breaking power of conferences, I find conferences to have 
ambiguous utility. In addition, they tend to make me appear confused or disengaged to 
my students, and I have often looked forward to them with dread. My position on 
conferences, given their normed centrality, has variously cast me as an inferior instructor, 
aloof, uncaring, and/or incapable of authentic communication with students. Even given 
  140 
the ways the conference disabled me,55 I continued to conference each semester, to sit 
with one student after another, to have a “chat” about one of their texts, their sense of the 
class, whatever. It wasn’t until I worked in the program and had studied composition 
pedagogy and theory a number of years that I began to think about how this practice 
might not be benefiting students in the program as much as I previously thought; it 
wasn’t until I reflected upon how this practice disabled me and extended that reflection to 
considerations of students with similar sensory configurations that I was able to ask: 
“Can I make this practice more accessible for students and for myself, or should I get rid 
of it?” 
 Given the naturalization of conferencing within the FYC program at my school, it 
is unsurprising that my first impulse was to turn to ad hoc and, eventually, Universal 
Design approaches to accommodation rather than to more broadly question the general 
utility or centrality of the practice. Since the conventional conference caused anxiety and 
decreased focus in me, I reasoned that other students who had heightened anxiety 
responses and/or attention disorders56 might benefit from remediating the conference. As 
a result, I piloted asynchronous, e-mail based conferences based on Kathleen Blake 
Yancey’s idea of the “talk-to” (Reflection 31-37). The “talk-to” asks students to inhabit a 
                                                
55 It is worth noting—in passing—that literature on classroom accommodation almost 
exclusively treats the accommodation of students and not instructors. Readers may 
already have noted that beginning a concretization of complex accommodation with my 
own disablement seemingly lies outside the scope of the heuristics provided in Chapter 3. 
As long as the heuristics are taken as heuristics (see the caveat that opens this chapter), 
beginning with an instructor’s need for accommodation is unproblematic. 
56 I use “attention disorders” here to refer to a spectrum of conditions that may result in 
alternative attentional configurations such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD), sensory processing disorder, but also anxiety itself (e.g., if an individual is 
anxious about having a panic attack, he or she may be attending to triggers and/or 
phenomenological indicators of an impending attack and, by extension, find it difficult to 
attend to other stimuli such as the back-and-forth of a conference). 
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number of reactive positions in response to a text they compose: arguing it is the best and 
then worst paper they have ever composed, predicting how the instructor will respond to 
the text, and then answering the instructor’s imagined prediction of the text (32). In my 
classes, I experimented with having students turn in their texts with meta-texts describing 
the above imaginative/analytic exercises. I could then draw on both sets of texts to gain 
some understanding about (i) a student’s product, (ii) their sense of their product, and (iii) 
their sense of how I would respond to their product. This diagnostic measure could—in 
theory and sometimes in practice—help me identify disconnects between intention and 
execution along with a student’s sense of audience (at least with myself as audience). 
Upon receiving the texts via e-mail, I would write back to the student with my reflections 
and a few additional questions. After the student responded to those questions, I would 
wrap up our “conference” with some further reflections and suggestions for future texts. 
While such exchanges produced a good deal of text—a seeming indicator of some sort of 
valuable exchange, I thought—and they significantly decreased my anxiety while 
increasing my attention to student responses, there were significant issues associated with 
asynchronous, text-based exchanges. 
 The production of so much text, while a seemingly positive indicator, also could 
potentially disable some students. For example, dyslexic students might find the 
abundance of text difficult to manage in terms of parsing and producing within a short 
time-frame. While dyslexic students could be accommodated through other ad hoc 
accommodations such as asynchronous audio commentary, this sort of accommodation 
could become enumeratively-problematic for the meaning of “conference”: if some 
students require text-based exchanges, others require asynchronous audio exchanges, and 
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still others require (or at least request) synchronous face-to-face exchanges, then where 
does the “conference” reside? Are all of these “conferences,” or is there something about 
one or another that makes it a conference while the others are merely commentary? Over 
the course of a few semesters, I started to work through these questions with some 
interesting results. But before I turn to this, a brief aside may prove helpful. 
 I began this chapter with a warning that the cases of complex accommodation 
described herein would not cling tightly to the heuristics outlined in Chapter 3, but I do 
think some general orientation may prove helpful in this case before I move further. 
Beginning with myself as the case to be accommodated and then working outwards to 
other analogous disabilities students may possess, I circumvented The Ad Hoc Heuristic 
altogether. I did, however, try to track the location of the disability (a la Figure 3), and as 
I predicted in Chapter 3, there was some overlap between environment, pedagogy, and 
administration. Recalling “The Programmatic Heuristic” (Figure 4), I can track my 
movement as follows: 
1. The Institutional Requirement branch could be immediately eliminated, insofar as 
the teacher-student writing conference is often specific to writing programs. 
2. Given the conference’s strongly naturalized presence in the writing program, I 
initially took it to be a program requirement and tried to accommodate in media 
res. 
3. At that point, however, I could not determine whether or how the requirement 
indicated or articulated with other central elements of the writing program, and I 
moved to field-level inquiry. 
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While this movement does not follow the heuristic precisely, it does mirror the sort of 
movement captured in it, and the jump to field-level inquiry is understandable given that 
I was a Rhetoric and Composition PhD student at the time (the jump to field-level inquiry 
is never a far jump in such a context). 
 As I turned to scholarly treatments of conferencing57, I first tried to pin down 
what exactly the “conference” is. I started my search with the idea—held by many in my 
FYC program and in programs I had previously taught in—that the conference offers a 
liminal space where the power relations structuring student and teacher interactions can 
be disrupted and altered, where the student-teacher relationship can more closely 
approximate the mentor-mentee relationship. The word I heard bandied around the most 
was “chat”: the conference was a chance for the teacher and student to come together to 
have an informal chat and, in so doing, talk about the student’s work outside of 
evaluative and directive matrices. I found echoes of this in the literature. Murray, for 
example, waxes poetic over the deeply-interpersonal affordances of the writing 
conference: “I have been instructed in other lives, heard the voices of my students they 
had not heard before, shared their satisfaction in solving the problems of writing with 
clarity and grace” (13). Neal Lerner even goes so far as to maintain that it is the intimacy 
of the one-on-one conference that sustains many instructors in their teaching: 
The desire for intimacy, for meaningful connection with student writers, is a 
powerful force, a veritable ‘Rosebud’ that keeps us going despite overwhelming 
                                                
57 What follows should not be taken as an exhaustive exploration of the literature on 
conferencing; rather, it is closer to a narrative of the research and inquiry I conducted at 
the time and the working conclusions I developed as a result of that research and inquiry. 
As I note below, there are salient limitations to the thinking about conferences I describe 
here and to the research I employed at the time. 
  144 
working conditions and precarious professional status. The writing conference, 
then, is a window into the structural impediments to effective teaching of writing, 
impediments long established in higher education generally and in composition in 
particular. (187) 
While Lerner and others may take a good deal of satisfaction from such encounters, 
Lerner also points out that conferences—and talk about conferences—tend to wax 
popular as enrollments spike and diversify: conferences are seen as a vehicle for 
individualized instruction and as a way to meet the various needs of diverse students. 
Most of my past and present peers would agree with this sentiment, and some scholars 
have even proposed (and piloted) composition courses modeled after continuous 
individual writing conferences rather than large-group writing classes (Simmons). So, 
which is it? Is the conference a more “intimate” conversation between mentor/mentee, 
another form of direct instruction, both, or neither? Laurel Johnson Black’s extended 
discourse analytic treatment of the student-teacher writing conference sheds some light 
on this. 
 While many writing instructors conceive of the writing conference as 
conversational, Black argues that writing conferences tend to more closely approximate 
the roles and behaviors of the classroom than a conversation (11). As she says, “Simply 
put, the structure of conversation and the structure of traditional teaching are quite 
different: the purpose of communication is different, the speaker’s roles are different, and 
the status of speakers is different” (13-14). The writing conference does not take place 
(generally) in a bar of coffee shop, it does not take place among friends or occupational 
equals; the student-teacher writing conference occurs between an instructor and a student, 
  145 
and it is the instructor who ultimately judges and evaluates the student’s work (and the 
student through that work) along with other performative metrics (attendance, class 
participation, and—perhaps—conference performatives as well). In concrete terms, the 
power relations of the conference are a priori framed as asymmetric insofar as the 
instructor calls for the conference (40) and often determines where the conference is to 
occur. More importantly, though, Black shows (through analysis of transcripts) that 
instructors talk far more than students (41-42), continually claim and re-claim the 
conversational floor (42-46), and naturalize their own perspectives and positions as 
authoritative through certain discourse markers such as “you know” (47). Additionally, 
Black argues, the writing conference (and some genred responses in composition in 
general) can create conflicting and confusing codes as a result of a special breed of 
doublespeak. As Black says, “Many mainstream teachers hide their power; they do not 
display it openly but expect students to understand their ‘suggestions’ as orders because a 
suggestion from a person with power IS an order” (108-09). Lacking experience with the 
specialized codes of the writing conference (what Delpit has called access to the “culture 
of power”) can thus not only result in confusion, but could also result in negative 
evaluation such as when an instructor says “You might want to think about changing your 
thesis,” the student (reasonably) parses the hedges (“might” and “think about”) as 
suggestive, and the instructor irritatedly marks the student’s eventual paper poorly 
because s/he did not change the thesis as “instructed.”58  
                                                
58 Of course, this hypothetical example is an extreme example of how a writing 
conference could unfold negatively and does not reflect what is commonly approached as 
an exchange underwritten by feelings of good-will, the spirit of dialogue, and the goal of 
mutual growth. That said, this sort of reaction does sometimes occur, as it has occurred in 
each writing program I have taught within. 
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 As I worked through some research and my own experience, I came to see the 
conference as a highly-performative space wherein the student is expected to receive 
directive instruction and perform understanding/authority/acceptance of instructor 
authority (Newkirk 204), all while buying into the fiction that the exchange is a low-
stakes “conversation” among interested writers. While the conference is clearly 
asymmetric in terms of power, confusion surrounding the conference seems to retain a 
sort of symmetry: some students and instructors do not seem to understand or at least 
clearly articulate the purposes and possibilities of conferences, with the confusion of 
purposes leading directly to a constriction of possibilities. In an attempt to disentangle 
some of these issues, I stepped further back, after a fashion, and posited that the purpose 
of the conference was to engage in more direct, individual dialog with a student about his 
or her work, that it was a way to respond to the student’s work and point out changes that 
needed to occur and/or additional directions that needed to be taken. This is not to say 
that this is the only purpose of the conference; rather, within my own program and 
pedagogical experience, this is the purpose that tended to emerge outside of ambiguous 
commitments to, or desires for, informal chats. All this brought me back to the questions 
I encountered when trying to accommodate via asynchronous exchanges: Where is the 
“conference,” and how does it differ from other response modalities? 
 If the conference is stripped of its ambiguities, if its interface is reconfigured for  
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transparency59, if its privileged orality is marked (Hewett xvi-xvii) and dispensed with, 
then it becomes difficult to separate it out from other species of response. Perhaps this is 
not a bad thing. The literature on response is rich with ways in which the power relations 
between teacher, student, and text have been profitably exposed, disrupted, and 
transformed. Brannon and Knoblauch spearheaded the process-movement’s focus on 
bridging the gap between students’ own intentions and executions rather than the gap 
between the students’ text and instructors’ perceived ideal texts (161-63). Sommers 
pushed compositionists and students to see comments not as edits or evaluations and 
revision not as micro-level editing, but commentary as invitation and impetus for revision 
and revision as re-visioning new texts (“Responding”; “Revision Strategies”). Building 
on such work, Welch retheorized revision and the commentary that leads to it, arguing 
that while such processes can lead to greater focus and coherence, they can also lead to a 
profitable uprooting: 
I’m arguing that we should consider revision not only as a process of increasing 
orientation toward a particular thesis, position, or discourse community, but also 
as a process of increasing dis-orientation: an act of getting restless with received 
meanings, familiar relationships, and prefigured disciplinary boundaries, a 
                                                
59 DePew and Lettner-Rust explore the conference qua interface and the ways in which 
different technologies can remediate the interface and disrupt the power relations that 
Black describes in her book. For example, while the conventional face-to-face writing 
conference subjects the student to the instructor’s physical and disciplinary gaze, in a 
web-based video conference, students can avoid the gaze by shutting off their webcams, 
or they can disrupt the physical gaze and power relations by positioning the camera to the 
side or even angling the camera upward to project more power (184-86). 
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process of intervening in the meanings and identifications of one’s texts and one’s 
life. (Getting Restless 7)60 
This progressive movement from red-penned directivity to something less determined 
and more student-driven seems closer to the desire for intimacy wrapped up in the idea of 
the conference as “conversation.” Indeed, there are even a number of scholars who have 
directly worked at creating response that is conversational, where “conversational” is not 
wishy-washy, non-directive, or “soft” (Straub 381) but instead is something that 
combines the best of clear direction and student autonomy (390-91). If there is a 
pedagogical practice that captures the intimacy of the one-on-one exchange so valued in 
the idea of the conference, if this practice both recognizes (or can recognize) and can 
profitably capitalize upon the power asymmetries between instructor and student, then 
why should we hold onto the conference? Why should we perpetuate a practice that not 
only potentially disables students with impairments like dyslexia, anxiety, and sensory 
disorders, but also potentially disables a wider group of students through conflicting and 
shifting codes? As Black puts it at the end of her book: “We have to examine what it is 
we want from conferencing and we have to explore the possibility that it often doesn’t 
accomplish those things—it just doesn’t work” (167). And it wasn’t working, at least not 
for me within my particular writing program at that particular time. So now what? 
 Through the process of complex accommodation, I came to this “now what” 
point. I began from my own disabling by a particular practice to its place in my program 
                                                
60 In “One Student’s Many Voices: Reading, Writing, and Responding with Bakhtin,” 
and in “Sideshadowing Teacher Response” Welch uses Bakhtin’s theories of language to 
show how response can move away from imposing univocity in student texts and can, 
instead, identify the various voices at play and the discourses animating them. In so 
doing, the instructor and student can identify texts that might yet come to be rather than 
positing and disciplining a singular voice within a singular text. 
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to some wider treatments in the discipline, and I ended with a rather surprising discovery: 
I conferenced, and many in my program conferenced, because of its programmatic and 
historic naturalization within our pedagogies. In terms of The Programmatic Heuristic, I 
discovered that conferencing was a programmatic norm and that both it and a number of 
scholars in the field may have normalized the practice due to a belief that conferencing 
somehow creates more intimate relationships between students, instructors, and texts. But 
conferencing doesn’t always fulfill its promises, and other practices might to do a better 
job doing what it is we want conferencing to do. I felt like I should simply dispense with 
the practice and focus, instead, on those other practices that might more profitably open 
up student texts and student work, those practices that might reconfigure power dynamics 
into something closer to the master-apprentice or coach-athlete roles. It is not so simple, 
however. 
 As I say above, norms often have the force of imperatives, and even though I may 
have come to the conclusion that conferencing is a disabling programmatic norm, it is 
unlikely that I will dispense with it altogether. Given that conferencing is built into the 
FYC standard sequences; given that conferencing is administratively naturalized (either 
through field-level considerations, politics, preference, or inertia)61; given that other 
administrators outside of the FYC program experienced the student-teacher writing 
conference as part of their education and identify it as a central part of composition, I 
cannot simply abandon the practice. To do so would risk negative impressions of my 
pedagogy and might even result in censure. What I can do, however, is attempt to 
                                                
61 In the Programmatic Heuristic, administrator politics/preference/inertia form a distinct 
branch from field-level inquiry and considerations, but as with each part of the heuristic, 
there can be some blurring and overlap. 
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continue the complex accommodation dialectic by working at the programmatic level to 
change the position of conferencing within the program. In this manner, I can potentially 
weaken conferencing qua pedagogically essential at the programmatic level and thereby 
make room to dispense with it within my local classroom level. Until such a point, 
however, I can take what I have learned from locating the position of conferencing within 
the program and within the broader field and reposition/reformulate the conference to 
make it more accessible and more productive for my students and I. For example, while I 
currently hold conferences, I no longer approach them as “conversational,” 
underdetermined spaces; instead, students complete extensive pre-conference memos, 
part of which includes listing a number of questions the students may have for me about 
the text under discussion, the work of the course, and so forth. At the conference, I can 
address a student’s questions, indicate my own assessments of the text under discussion, 
and push the student towards revision as inquiry rather than editing. I can also give 
students options in terms of modality: face-to-face, online asynchronous, video chat, and 
so forth. I do not pretend that we are having a low-stakes “chat,” and students understand 
that our “conference” is individualized instruction. It’s not perfect accommodation and 
it’s not perfect pedagogy, but until I can change the programmatic framing of the 
conference as curricularly-essential to composition, it is a negotiated accommodation. In 
addition, such negotiation can direct me back to field-level inquiry. 
 The progressive complications of conferencing that I previously experienced 
point to additional inquiry to be pursued as complex accommodation continues to unfold. 
During my graduate program, my material circumstances largely dictated my ability to 
conduct certain sorts of inquiry: where I looked, how I looked, what counted as 
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confirmation all were tied to my particular circumstances and their functional limitations 
and affordances; conferencing emerged as a certain sort of dialectic for me within very 
particular circumstances. Black’s work makes me wonder about what other discourse 
analysts and linguists have discovered about student-teacher conferences.62 More 
importantly, it makes me wonder what, precisely, happens in the exchanges between 
myself and my students at the level of interaction within particular contexts. Indeed, 
parsing these interactions in detail, tracking how both students and myself attend to these 
exchanges in context, will provide a fecund and necessary continuation of the process of 
complex accommodation.   
 As this section has shown, complex accommodation is not clean or unidirectional. 
Like the writing that we hope for from our students, it is unpredictable, multi-directional, 
and constantly subject to foundational re-vision. That said, the case of conferencing here 
foregrounds the value of complex accommodation and how such an approach can result 
in local, programmatic, and disciplinary inquiry. Further, this case shows how such 
inquiry can result in re-visioning not just the specifics of a pedagogical practice and how 
it might be accommodated in individual cases, but also the theories and policies that 
underwrite that practice’s existence and longevity. This process does not always result in 
a clean conclusion or clear direction, but the inquiry and potential for equitable 
accommodation that comes from complex accommodation is never useless. 
 
 
                                                
62 Black’s book is almost twenty years old and neither it nor myself account for decades 
of work in discourse and conversation analysis. As I mention above, I include here the 
process that I went through at the time, including the research that I accessed, and such 
work will necessarily be incomplete.  
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Complex Accommodation Case II: When Practice, Theory, and Impairment Clash 
The second case of complex accommodation I describe here centers on my experience 
working with a student who experienced regular seizures. Before I get to that, though, a 
bit more context is necessary as this case is a bit closer to “complex accommodation” as 
schematized in Chapter 3 insofar as it begins with a particular student’s need for 
accommodation within a particular course (English 102) rather than beginning with the 
instructor’s own person. 
 English 102 is a General Education Requirement course at my institution, and it is 
the terminus of FYC requirements. Each student needs to receive a “C” or better in 
English 102 (or pass out of the course via placement test) in order to graduate from the 
university. Additionally, if a student fails English 102 (receives a failing assessment at 
portfolio review) three times, that student is unable to graduate from the institution. 
Accordingly, it is easy to see how this course is a high-stakes one for students.  
 English 102 is a course focusing on academic research, writing, and “critical 
inquiry.” The 2014-15 Goals and Outcomes for Portfolio Assessment define “critical 
inquiry” thusly: 
! Engage in critical inquiry in ways that support your purpose by… 
o making appropriate use of sources, including scholarly sources. 
o going beyond summary to position yourself and your ideas in relation to 
the ideas of others by engaging sources through interpretation, analysis, or 
critique. 
o developing knowledge, insight, or perspective about the matter being 
researched. 
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o using sources to frame or critically question other sources or issues. 
o situating your sources relative to each other and the broader discourse—
both academic and nonacademic—on the matter being researched. (7) 
In rough summary, then, critical inquiry is a way of researching knowledge and issues 
within particular discourses with an eye towards entering into those discourses as a 
participant; it is both productive and critical in that it calls for critique of the student’s 
methods and perspectives along with those in the discourse community the student is 
trying to enter. How this critical inquiry is enacted varies to some degree between 
sections insofar as some instructors theme their courses and, by extension, what sorts of 
discourse communities the students will be attempting to enter via their writing. 
However, the majority of English 102 sections do not have a content theme, and students 
are allowed and directed to pursue their own interests in whatever field of study they 
would like provided those interests lend themselves to critical inquiry. In addition to 
completing a final research project in English 102, students must also create a reflective 
component for their final portfolios.  
 Each FYC level requires reflective writing in its final portfolios with the idea that 
such writing helps writers identify and learn about their own writing and thinking 
processes. The Goals and Outcomes for English 102’s reflective writing are as follows:  
! Present compelling REFLECTIVE WRITING that accounts for and evaluates… 
o the evolution of your controlling purpose, through successive revisions, in 
relation to the project’s audience(s) stakeholders, and your own interests. 
o your composing and design strategies, developed through successive 
revisions, given your rhetorical situation. 
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o how and why sources were chosen and used in the project. 
o your project in relation to your understanding of academic research and 
writing (7). 
Understanding that the research writing to be included in the final portfolios will vary 
widely given different discourse communities, areas of inquiry, etc., these goals push 
students to explain how they made choices in relation to the discourses within which they 
find themselves. In a way, then, there is a fair degree of individualization built into the 
fabric of English 102, and this individualizing aspect has been crucial as I’ve worked 
with accommodating students in various English 102 classrooms. 
 A few years ago, while teaching a section of English 102, one of my students 
came to me outside of class to disclose that she suffered from seizures and that the 
seizures had been increasing in frequency and in intensity. While Rai (a pseudonym) 
provided me with paperwork from the Student Accessibility Center, the information had 
no functional utility other than to inform me that Rai had seizures. Early in the semester, 
Rai and I worked out what to do in case of an impending seizure—what signs to look for, 
what I could do, what the effects would be on her during and after, and so forth. Without 
going into too much detail, Rai’s seizures increased in intensity and frequency, including 
having severe seizures in office hours with me and during a class meeting. In talking with 
me, Rai disclosed that school was currently a trigger for her seizures, and she was 
worried they would continue to happen in class. Given this information, I tried to figure 
out a way to accommodate Rai in our English 102 class. 
 At the time I was teaching Rai’s English 102 course, I was also the Online 
Composition Coordinator, part of the larger Writing Program Administration team. My 
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position and experience working online led me to forward a proposal to the English 102 
coordinator, Director of Composition, and Rai that we move her experience of the class 
online for the remainder of the semester. Rai was an excellent student, and we were at a 
point in the semester where much of the work could be done remotely, with workshops 
happening asynchronously for both her and other students in the class. Everyone agreed 
to the accommodation, and I began working with her online, providing workshop 
materials, conducting asynchronous conferences, and so forth. There were not many 
lectures to be had at this point in the course, so it was easy to provide brief summaries of 
anything discussed or covered in class. It seemed like a promising plan, and I was excited 
to have a chance to help a talented student succeed when in other circumstances she 
would fail the course. Unfortunately, while it began promisingly enough, it did not end 
well. 
 As the semester progressed with the new distance accommodation in place, Rai 
experienced a number of complications with treatment for her seizures, and she became 
progressively unable to complete any of the coursework. Eventually, it became clear that 
Rai would be unable to finish the course. Given the particular circumstances, she was 
able to obtain a medical withdrawal and, unfortunately, I have not heard from her since. 
At the time, I felt like this was somehow a failure of accommodation. Eventually, I 
situated this occurrence within a complex accommodation framework, and the question 
of whether the accommodation at the time was a failure or not became—and continues to 
become—much more complicated. 
 Rai’s case not only led me to reflect on what it means for an accommodation to 
fail, but it also helped me to uncover the imbrication of “presence” with composition in 
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my own classes and beyond. Rai was unable to complete the course, so it seems natural to 
say that the accommodation somehow failed. Except it didn’t. At that point in time, with 
the particular circumstances of Rai’s impairment, the accommodation was by itself 
insufficient, but any accommodation would have been insufficient. However, as a 
systemic question, the failure is much harder to track. For example, within the FYC 
program, this particular case created a precedent wherein the inability to be physically 
present in a face-to-face class due to emergency does not automatically preclude course 
completion. This creates a new (ad hoc) accommodative horizon in the writing program’s 
future; in other words, the online accommodation I offered showed that such 
accommodation was possible, thereby creating the possibility programmatically and/or in 
other individual classes. Additionally, this experience led me to begin inquiry (a la 
complex accommodation) into the place of presence in my own pedagogy, the writing 
program, and the field at large. 
In my own pedagogy (and due, I think to my online work), physical presence was 
clearly not essential to composition: otherwise the accommodation that was forwarded 
would never have been suggested to begin with. The concept of “presence” was already 
complicated in my own thinking as it was embodied and enacted differently among face-
to-face, online, and hybrid courses, all of which I have experience teaching. That said, I 
still conceived of presence as somehow essential to each course even if it was structured 
in different ways depending on the course’s context. For example, I tended to associate 
“presence” in a face-to-face course with physical presence and perhaps participation; in 
an online course, I equated presence with the completion of assignments like discussion 
forums; in hybrid courses, presence might be a combination of my face-to-face and 
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online expectations. Within the broader writing program, however, “presence” is almost 
always equated with physical presence within a classroom. The very lack of physical 
presence is what led some instructors I worked with to believe that online composition 
instruction is necessarily inferior to face-to-face composition.63 Online composition has 
to be tolerated for various institutional reasons, and hybrid composition can capitalize on 
the digital affordances of online courses, but the gold standard of composition education 
for some seems to be face-to-face instruction. 
But why? 
 I began to wonder—as complex accommodation pushes one to do—where this 
privileging of presence comes from, and how essential is presence to composition? It 
isn’t much of a stretch to believe that face-to-face education is naturalized as the right or 
best way to learn at institutional and programmatic levels; after all, it’s the way the 
majority of education has always occurred, and almost all instructors across 
subjects/disciplines cut their instructional teeth on face-to-face classes. Additionally, 
there is the potential for multiple channels of communication in face-to-face exchanges, 
which may indicate that is a more information-rich exchange modality. Of course, these 
channels may be circumscribed by acquaintance with genred communicative codes (see 
the earlier section on conferencing in this chapter), neurotypical communicative 
orientations, and so forth. However, there seem to be ways to reproduce the multiple 
channels that might occur in face-to-face interactions in other modalities while more 
effectively working through them. In an online class one could, for example, write the 
                                                
63 When I began working as the Online Composition Coordinator, some online 
composition instructors were still requiring their students to meet them face-to-face for 
conferences, contrary to university policies. For some of these instructors, this was their 
only opportunity to really do the “teaching” of composition. 
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script for a particular lecture and then create an accompanying video. In such a case, 
students would have access to the exact text and also be able to see how the audio-visual 
text intersects with the transcript via emphases, pauses, body language, and so forth. It is 
not difficult to see how this could be a significant improvement over a singular lecture 
where one text could drown out the other, where repetition is impossible or complicated, 
where students might be disabled by a purely textual approach or a purely audio-visual 
approach, and so forth. This is well and good, but surely the dialogical nature of 
exchange in the composition classroom is what is central and what is lost in online 
modalities? 
Those who lament the dialogical limitations of online composition courses may 
misunderstand the nature of online composition instruction. At my institution, discussion 
forums provide a space and technology for back-and-forth discussion between all 
members of a composition class. These forums are usually guided by an initial prompt on 
which each student is asked to write in the discussion forum. After an initial posting, 
students will generally be required to respond to 2-3 other students’ posts. In this way, 
every student (rather than a small handful of excited and enthusiastic students) is both 
required and allowed to participate. Students who might be too anxious to participate in 
face-to-face contexts might be able to participate at a distance with (perhaps) less anxiety. 
Additionally, every participant can choose points for response, weigh their words, and 
craft their responses to best capture what they are trying to convey/accomplish (an 
practical impossibility for both students and instructors in the back-and-forth, face-to-
face class). While these exchanges are doubtlessly performative and mediated by 
surveillance/evaluation, it is naïve to think the same does not apply to face-to-face 
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courses. To appeal to the spontaneous, off-the-cuff advantages of face-to-face exchange 
fails to recognize that such spontaneity sacrifices the greater control and crafting that 
online (or other distance-mediated) approaches to presence can result in. Finally, one 
cannot easily appeal to the workings of the larger discipline or broader writerly 
exchanges as being mirrored in the classroom’s dialogical format insofar as such 
exchanges (e.g., communications having to do with publication, revisions, etc.) almost 
always take place asynchronously via e-mail. In short, and at the very least, physical 
presence neither implies greater/better dialog nor indicates an absolutely central aspect of 
composition instruction. 
 As I worked from my classroom, through my writing program (and my place 
within it), up to field levels, I realized that multiply-mediated communication has 
disrupted our notions of presence/space and that the requirement for physical presence 
implies an equation between physical presence and participation/attention. This equation 
may be a panoptic holdover that does not actually hold; after all, students may be 
physically present but not engaged in the work of the class. Likewise, students can be 
remote while being thoughtfully and energetically engaged. As I brought my inquiry back 
to my context within the writing program and broader institution, though, I saw that any 
sort of shift in the physical presence requirements in my course—theoretically sound or 
not—would need to be mediated by programmatic and institutional realities. For 
example, while students might be asynchronously accommodated in face-to-face classes, 
these classes are structured and organized in accordance with the face-to-face modality in 
mind; in other words, other pedagogical practices and individual class planning will be 
couched in the face-to-face configuration. Any widespread remediation could result in 
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serious disruptions of the course’s infrastructure and necessitate a fairly robust, 
concurrent online infrastructure if enough students exercised the online accommodation 
option (though limited accommodations need not result in such disruptions). 
Additionally, at my particular institution, students must pay an additional fee to take a 
class in an online format. If a significant number of students registered for face-to-face 
courses but ended up taking an online accommodation, it might become unfair for other 
students and lose the institution revenue from the online fees. Lastly, and perhaps most 
important, my case was exceptional. Not only was I an online instructor, but I also trained 
online instructors and developed online curricula. Accommodating students in the way 
Rai was accommodated might not be an undue hardship for instructors with different 
backgrounds, but accommodating a number of students in such a way at the same time 
presupposes a level of online instructional facility that many teachers will lack. Of 
course, this is not terribly problematic as complex accommodation doesn’t immediately 
lead to programmatic transformations; rather, it should lead to individual explorations 
moving from the instance of accommodation to one’s broader pedagogical/theoretical 
orientations to one’s nested institutional context to field-level inquiry and back down 
again, with accommodations perhaps creating some programmatic precedent. 
In Rai’s case, I came to understand presence in a way that took account of 
individual, institutional, and field-level concerns. Presence, I learned, was indeed central 
to composition insofar as exchange is central to composition, but this presence can be 
negotiated and remediated. These remediations and negotiations are—as they tend to 
be—circumscribed by institutional policies and procedures, but like in the case of 
accommodating conferencing described above, these institutional policies and procedures 
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can be changed as a result of the complex accommodation dialectic. After working 
through Rai’s case, not only did I have a new ad hoc accommodation at my disposal, but 
I also created (or perhaps strengthened) precedent within the writing program for other 
instructors to use a similar accommodation in extreme cases. Lastly, program policy on 
class cancellation changed.  
 Previously, when instructors could not make it to a scheduled class, they were 
required to find a face-to-face substitute teacher or cancel class if unable to find a 
substitute. After disrupting the place of physical presence in my own theorizing, I 
forwarded a proposal to the WPA wherein instructors could migrate an individual class 
period online in the event of unavoidable absence.64 This new policy mitigated 
discontinuities that might occur with cancelled or substituted classes. Through this new 
policy and through the precedent created in Rai’s case, the programmatic vector of 
“presence” in the writing program began to shift to a degree: presence, its imbrications 
with composition, and the ways it may disable students and teachers became more 
available for critique not only for me, but for other members of the writing program with 
whom I work. In fact, working with Rai and working through complex accommodation 
and conferencing led me to compose a book chapter on conferencing, presence, and 
complex accommodation. This work may result in field-level shifts, which may enter into 
a number of feedback loops within my own program including institutional/programmatic 
shifts, individual instructor shifts in individual classrooms based on their own research, 
and so forth. The point is that the very possibilities of critique and even the construction 
of composition change when accommodation is reconfigured to move past ad hoc fitting-
                                                
64 Instructors could only exercise this option provided their students were aware that such 
a migration might occur, notification channels were clear, and so forth. 
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in or a priori universal design and is instead understood as the complex, kairic moment 
that it can come to be. 
 
Complex Accommodation: Closing Remarks or Opening Salvos? 
The model of complex accommodation concretized in this chapter is far from simple, and 
the heuristics that underwrite it do not guarantee or even identify any sort of successful 
accommodational conclusion. However what complex accommodation may yield makes 
the investment well worth it ethically, theoretically, and practically: complex 
accommodation helps us to move from asking “What do I have to do in this case” to 
“What can I do in this case, and what do these affordances tell me about myself, my 
work, my discipline and how I might make each of them better for all students?” 
 But is complex accommodation realistic? Is it “reasonable?” Colleges and 
universities are often organized according to efficiency and rhetorics of requirement 
rather than rhetorics of affordance. To put it colloquially, complex accommodation 
sounds nice in theory, but can it work in practice across institutions or even across 
sections within a given writing program? Chapter 5 takes up these issues and other 
worries about, objections to, and expansions of complex accommodation in college 
composition. 
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Chapter 5: Objections and Directions 
Introduction 
When new models, theories, procedures, and policies are forwarded in Composition 
Studies (really, in any field of inquiry), it has become a commonplace to predict and 
address potential objections, provisionally answer such objections, and point in the 
direction of further inquiry that may yet be done. I will attempt to reproduce this 
commonplace as much as I am able, but I will show how complex accommodation makes 
such a move more…complicated. 
 As I’ve tried to show in the preceding chapters, disability, accommodation, and 
especially complex accommodation occur or come-to-be in highly local conditions and 
contexts. Decontextualization often plagues work on disability and accommodation. In 
fact, one might argue that decontextualizing disability reinscribes medical model 
approaches; in other words, discussing “disability” without referring to particular people 
and how they are actively disabled through particular circumstances implies static 
disabilities that reside in individual bodies rather than in social relations. Similarly, 
decontextualizing accommodation may suggest that disability is not a function of 
concrete, individual experiences and, in so doing, may slide accommodation back 
towards an over-general social model of disability or even a medical model. Because of 
these issues, complex accommodation as I have presented it remains firmly entrenched in 
the local. It is a kind of inquiry that reverses the normal accommodative direction: it is a 
way of directing exploration, analysis, and critique en route to systemic accommodation 
and individual negotiation rather than minimally making room for an individual and the 
critiques that individual’s lack of fit afford. 
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 I think the above sounds nice in the abstract, and in the abstract it seems difficult 
to level criticism at a conceptual model that directs practitioners to inquire into their local 
circumstances as the locus of inquiry and action. But perhaps it is too “nice.” Surely, a 
model of accommodation like the one I forward, a model that casts disability as a kairic 
crisis for instructor/program/discipline might warrant some strong objections. Indeed, it 
does, and these objections dovetail with the underwriting essence of complex 
accommodation: they tend to be answerable only within local contexts. However, like 
complex accommodation, I do believe they can and should be discussed beyond the limits 
of one’s own program and classroom. 
 For the sake of simplicity, this chapter will address three broad sorts of objections 
to complex accommodation: objections concerning standards, the nature of disability, and 
the feasibility of complex accommodation as a regular practice. After describing and 
addressing these sorts of objections, I will then show how these objections point to the 
most glaring issue with complex accommodation: the need for further experimentation, 
research, and discussion within and outside the local contexts of Composition Studies. 
 
Objection 1: Complex Accommodation Might Lead to Lower Standards 
One knee-jerk fear that I have encountered in discussions on disability with instructors in 
various disciplines is the anxiety that accommodating students always lies on a razor’s 
edge between legal requirement and unfair advantage. The idea is that providing students 
with extra test time, a note-taker, or any number of other accommodations will somehow 
“unlevel” the playing field and result to uneven or lowered standards. Of course, this sort 
of hand-wringing abelism tends to ignore the systemic, hegemonic advantaging already in 
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place and the ways in which accommodations—like, say, affirmative action—can make 
“normal” practices, policies, and environments more equitable.65 Pointing out the 
equalizing ability of accommodation is one sort of answer to this question of changing 
standards, but it is a general response to a general kind of accommodation rather than a 
specific response made in terms of complex accommodation. 
 Complex accommodation confounds the standards objection in a number of ways. 
While complex accommodation does call for ad hoc accommodation en route to inquiry, 
none of the heuristics mention lessening standards. In fact, one of the outcomes of the ad 
hoc heuristic is a situation wherein no workable accommodations can be found. This 
outcome is keeping with the broader idea that there will be fixed, non-negotiable aspects 
of particular classrooms, writing programs, and broader institutions, as the programmatic 
heuristic makes explicit. These fixed requirements or essential elements may differ 
radically between institutions and circumstances, but particular standards will often be 
included in their number. Of course, the inquiry that complex accommodation entails 
may lead to the interrogation, critique, and reformulation of those standards. Such inquiry 
may lead to a more robust articulation and clarification of programmatic standards and 
the theories, practices, and policies that underwrite them. This clarification may, in turn, 
create the possibility for greater consonance between programmatic standards and 
programmatic values or priorities. Rather than vitiate standards, then, complex 
accommodation could potentially lead to better, more valid standards. I am using “valid” 
                                                
65 I am in no way equating race and disability beyond the ways in which both race and 
disability have been systemically marginalized and in the ways that systemic correctives 
are often met with fears that “normal” individuals will somehow be disadvantaged as a 
result of such correctives. I have more to say on this below. 
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in a rather broad sense here, which can be captured best in Edward White’s assessment-
centered formulation:  
Validity in measurement means that you are measuring what you say you are 
measuring, not something else, and that you have really thought through the 
importance of your measurement in considerable detail…Validity is important as 
a concept because, by forcing us to ask what we are really measuring, it forces us 
to ask what we are really teaching, and why. (10-12)66  
In other words, complex accommodation and the kinds of inquiry it suggests may lead to 
interrogation and critique of whether and how the standards that a writing program 
upholds are being met, how such standards articulate with pedagogy/policies, and 
whether such standards are consonant with the program’s mission/identity/framing 
theories. Of course, this sort of inquiry would only be possible in local instances, as 
complex accommodation requires, and would implicate empirical research as well as 
theoretical work.67  
                                                
66 As a brief aside, it is worth noting that some scholars advocate for moving away from 
psychometrics in assessment. Patricia Lynne, for example, argues that “reliability” and 
“validity” are naturalized positivist or objectivist psychometrics that are inappropriate in 
writing assessment. Lynne advocates for replacing these terms and their theoretic 
baggage with “meaningfulness” and “ethics”: “‘Meaningfulness’ and ‘ethics,’ that is, 
bespeak social values: the terms suggest neither objectivity nor subjectivity, but social 
reality constructed by persons in concert and in specific settings” (121). Lynne argues 
that these terms—and what they represent—should be defined in local contexts through 
negotiation with relevant stakeholders.  
67 In some ways, complex accommodation nicely dovetails with what assessment scholars 
call “validity inquiry.” In short, validity inquiry moves beyond tracking validity as a 
function of an assessment instrument and the output to be assessed and explores local 
contexts and how such contexts construct the assessment instrument and procedures. This 
can include considerations of the specific writing program, its curricula, particular 
student populations, and even the broader cultural landscape (Adler-Kassner 74-75). 
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 In the end, the standards objection to complex accommodation can be answered 
with a simple response: complex accommodation entails inquiry and does not necessarily 
imply the diminution or even adjustment of standards. If anything, complex 
accommodation can lead to clearer, better, more “valid” standards. As I note above, 
though, site-specific research would be needed to bear this out. I will have more to say on 
site-specific research below, but before doing so, I have a number of additional 
objections to address. 
 
Objection 2: Complex Accommodation Might Obscure the Extension of “Disability” 
Given that complex accommodation flips the direction of accommodation and works at 
analyzing and critiquing the conditions that lead to disability in writing curricula, there 
seems to be a danger that “disability” may disappear, become conflated with general 
social marginalization, or lose prominence as pedagogy, policy, and theory become more 
attuned to individualization. This echoes the critique of the social model of disability that 
I reproduce in Chapter 2, and it creates tension with the complex model of disability that 
I espouse. In reality, though, this is not really an objection to complex accommodation 
and its heuristics as I frame them. 
 While complex accommodation focuses on the conditions that construct 
difference as disability, it is not grounded in the social model of disability, but in 
something more complex. The heuristics as provided align more closely with Siebers’ 
concept of “complex embodiment” wherein one’s body and the experience of one’s body, 
representations of bodies, and the environment all exist within a mutually-transformative 
relationship. In complex accommodation, the ad hoc heuristic foregrounds negotiation 
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between the instructor and the student. This negotiation includes the instructor’s own 
capacities, understanding of the course and course content, and administrative 
affordances and limitation; but it also includes the student’s own experience and 
articulation of his or her needs, preferences, and experience. In such a way, the student 
can introduce his or her own specific, lived experience of having a disability in the 
accommodation process and, in so doing, guard against both medicalized and simplified 
social approaches to disability. However, there could be a lurking danger that students 
may be cut out of the process of complex accommodation. 
  In some institutions, instructors may attempt to work only at programmatic levels 
in their inquiry; in other words, they may work only with policies, procedures, and 
theories while leaving actual people out of the process. Such an approach could, in 
theory, yield some interesting and valuable results, but it also borders on paternalism and, 
more importantly, it elides the lived realities of having a disability. While working 
closely with individual students is the most direct way to avoid this problem, there may 
also be programmatic avenues that could work towards keeping the complexity in 
disability. For example, a writing program could easily structure midterm and end-of-
term course evaluations along axes of ability, disability, and success. In other words, in 
addition to questions posed to students in these course evaluations, students might also 
answer questions such as: 
• How did the instructor work to meet your learning needs? 
• What does “success” mean to you in this class? 
• Did anything about the class seem to put some students at more of an advantage 
or disadvantage than others? 
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• What changes in the class, curriculum, and/or policies would better help you 
succeed? 
The above questions are not perfect. One might want to ask more specific/direct 
questions about ability and disability, but such questions could identify students, and 
midterm/end-of-term course evaluations tend to be anonymous so that students will be 
encouraged to respond honestly and openly. Such openness might also be cultivated by 
more directly foregrounding disability in the composition classroom. 
 One final way to keep the complexity of disability intact is to center disability in 
the classroom. As “A Policy Statement on Disability in CCCC” affirms: 
Just as it is imperative to bring the subject matter and authors of formerly 
excluded groups into the classroom and canon, disability as a subject of study 
needs to be part of the curriculum. Teacher training can address ways of creating 
inclusive classrooms and curricula that are sensitive to both students and teachers 
with disabilities. 
As instructors select readings, craft assignments, and facilitate discussions, they can (and 
should) include disability issues. As Lennard Davis has said, and others have echoed, 
“What is universal in life, if there are universals, is the experience of the limitations of 
the body. Yet the fantasy of culture, democracy, capitalism, sexism, and racism, to name 
only a few ideologies, is the perfection of the body and its activities” (“The End of 
Identity” 314). While some instructors may shy away from foregrounding disability in 
composition curricula for various reasons, that decision need not relegate disability to a 
disembodied social condition. Certain simple procedures and policies—open 
accommodative dialog, altered accessibility statements, structured course evaluations—
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can help position disability as individual and normal within a particular course, a 
positioning which both sustains complex embodiment and encourages students to help 
instructors best accommodate individual learning needs and preferences. But, one might 
wonder, can dispreference slide into disability, and if so, what does this mean for 
complex accommodation? 
 After working through this project, one might be concerned that “disability” could 
become too expansive and that it might come to include so many bodily, mental, and 
social configurations as to become incoherent as a term or category. In one sense, many 
activists might argue that this is sort of the point: if social and ideological conditions are 
equitably reconfigured, then disability might disappear as each person’s needs and lived 
experiences substitute the continuance of, and desire for, a hegemonic norm. In another 
sense, though, in terms of this project specifically, one could be concerned that 
“discomfort” and “disability” might become conflated within the composition classroom, 
with first-year composition potentially devolving into a series of mollycoddling 
transactions wherein students are never challenged and, as a result, never grow as writers. 
While I think this objection is hyperbolic in its formulation, is does indicate an important 
underspecification of “discomfort” that could reasonably crop up in discussions on 
complex accommodation; as such, it’s worth exploring in some detail. 
 Certainly, discomfort seems to be endemic to many areas of education, and 
especially to composition. However, “discomfort” is a slippery term not only because it 
implies subjective judgments, but also because it implies multiple species. In the present 
case, student discomfort could be made more precise by bifurcating it to include 
intellectual discomfort and procedural discomfort. By “procedural discomfort,” I refer to 
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pedagogical, administrative, and environmental practices that stress students. Similarly, 
by “intellectual discomfort,” I refer to ideas, arguments, or enframings that stress 
students.68 In one sense, I’ve addressed procedural discomfort throughout the course of 
this project: if a student feels stressed by particular pedagogical, administrative, or 
environmental features, then an instructor faces a kairic moment wherein s/he can 
interrogate and potentially optimally reconfigure such features. Of course, there is a 
continuum of discomfort, but any attempt to a priori quantify and classify such a 
continuum in terms of classroom features seems as if it would be arbitrary. Additionally, 
complex accommodation makes such quantification and classification moot: if a student 
feels uncomfortable, this discomfort creates the possibility for interrogation and possibly 
critique, with the result that the necessity and utility of the practice can be probed and 
either transformed to alleviate the discomfort (if the discomfort is found to be 
unnecessary), or it can be better understood and resituated within the instructor’s frame of 
reference (if it is found to be necessary and nonaccommodatable). In short, I believe that 
as far as complex accommodation is concerned, there is no functional instructional 
difference between procedural discomfort and disability: each provides a kairic moment 
to reverse the direction of fit, critique one’s own procedures, and determine if and how 
reconfiguration might better student success. Intellectual discomfort, on the other hand, 
seems both more necessary and less disabling than procedural discomfort.  
 Many teachers feel that intellectual discomfort is not only salutary, but is actually 
natural and necessary in the course of intellectual growth and development; in fact, some 
                                                
68 I’m employing “stress” here in a capacious sense to include various forms of tension, 
pressure, and strain that disrupt physical and/or psychological homeostasis or may lead to 
such disruption. 
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teachers may see a fundamental aspect of their work as tied to productively inducing 
discomfort. As Donald Murray has said (in the context of the writing conference), “I'm 
uncomfortable when my students are uncomfortable, but more uncomfortable when they 
are comfortable” (15). This valuation of discomfort may be linked to the idea that 
students must abandon simplified yet identifying worldviews and/or skill sets in order to 
more fully participate in a culture, a discipline, or some other specific in-group. In 
composition, students learn to move from writing for themselves or for some imagined 
monolithic reader and towards real(ish) readers. In this process, most students find they 
must change their frames of reference for what it means to communicate with other 
people. They may move from a sort of naïve semantic realism or linguistic positivism and 
towards more agnostic discursive horizons; in other words, what it means to “mean” may 
first be called into question for these students in the seemingly innocuous confines of a 
first-year composition course. The question for the present project then becomes: Does or 
can such paradigm-shifting discomfort equal disablement—perhaps even violent 
disablement—if it systemically disadvantages some students and not others? Is the 
devout literalist Christian disabled by the composition instructor who denies that the 
Bible is an authoritative source? I think I can and should answer this broader question of 
whether intellectual discomfort should be treated as disablement in a manner that some 
might find objectionable but which I find reasoned: I’m going to dodge it.  
 Ultimately, I think that the question of whether certain movements in education 
are disabling is incredibly complex, contentious, and shot through with political, 
ideological, and disciplinary commitments (as most interesting issues are). Undoubtedly, 
certain intellectual pursuits and courses of study can be incredibly stressful for students, 
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as anyone who has taught courses concerning identity formation can attest to. Can such 
stress disable some students? Can exposure to certain ideas or theories impede the 
education and vitality of people with particular physical and/or psycho-social 
configurations? The short answer is: I haven’t the slightest idea, but this is certainly an 
interesting line of inquiry. The longer and better answer is: within the context of complex 
accommodation in general and complex accommodation in composition specifically, 
functional agnosticism may be the order of the day. In other words, if a student 
approaches an instructor and indicates that particular ideas, theories, or courses of study 
are causing stress to him or her, then what is the harm and what is the benefit in working 
through complex accommodation as if the discomfort were functionally disabling?  
 Intellectual discomfort creates yet another kairic moment in the composition 
classroom. If an instructor subjects a discomforting idea, set of ideas, theories, etc. to the 
complex accommodation heuristics, s/he can uncover and perhaps understand the 
situation of those ideas within the writing program, field, or instructor’s own curriculum. 
In addition, s/he can add the discomfort to the calculus in the sense of considering 
whether and how discomfort is actually necessary, if and how these elements might be 
framed or couched so as to alleviate discomfort, and so forth. In short, the encounter of 
intellectual discomfort, like procedural discomfort, like disability is a moment of 
opportunity and affordance: it is a moment to assess what we do, how we do it, and how 
we can best do it with our individual students and their individual needs and capacities. 
 In the final summation, I don’t think the discomfort objection is really an 
objection. It is an interesting area of inquiry, and I acknowledge that I give it short(ish) 
shrift here. However, I contend that working through complex accommodation in cases of 
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discomfort potentially conveys similar advantages to working through complex 
accommodation in clearer cases of disability. The relationship between discomfort and 
disability, particularly in composition classes, should definitely be studied further in the 
future, but I believe that complex accommodation will allow instructors to remain 
productively agnostic as to the precise relationship. Of course, this entails that instructors 
will be able to engage in complex accommodation at all, and it might not be clear how 
possible such engagement might be across different institutions and in different writing 
programs. 
 
Objection 3: Complex Accommodation May not Be Feasible Across Institutions 
A simple, yet potent objection to complex accommodation is that it might not work in 
different institutions with different faculty. One could argue that the heuristics may be 
useful and practicable for Composition PhDs, but the vast majority of composition 
courses are not taught by Composition PhDs; instructors of diverse academic 
backgrounds teach them, and graduate students and contingent faculty mostly teach such 
classes. In my own writing program, for example, graduate student composition 
instructors have Literary Studies, Media Studies, Creative Writing, and/or Rhetoric and 
Composition backgrounds, as do the contingent instructors. One might argue that the 
abstract theoretical and programmatic work of complex accommodation might come 
more easily to some of these instructors than to others.69 Moreover, differences between 
                                                
69 This is not to say that any of these students or scholars in these backgrounds do not 
engage in abstract theoretical and programmatic work, as they certainly do; rather, I am 
indicating that these different foci and the different years of study these instructors and 
contingent faculty may have will result in differences in tendencies to engage in the kind 
of inquiry suggested by complex accommodation. 
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writing program structures, administration, workloads, and institutional positioning might 
complicate complex accommodation by limiting not just action but inquiry as well. 
Ultimately, these objections are answerable by recalling that the heuristics supplied in 
this project, and the broader mechanism of complex accommodation, are heuristics for 
inquiry and potential metamorphosis, not algorithmic procedures for transformation. 
 Complex accommodation and the sorts of heuristics that represent it are flexible 
enough to lead to systemic thinking and potential reconfiguration in any writing program, 
staffed by instructors of diverse backgrounds. Even in the “Programmatic Heuristic,” 
where one set of procedures may lead to field-level inquiry, that sort of inquiry is 
intentionally underdetermined. “Field level inquiry” could refer to extensive scholarly 
inquiry, perhaps including a literature review and construction of a state of the art. 
Alternatively, “field level inquiry” could signify picking up a collection of essays on the 
particular issue/subject/concern. “Field level inquiry” could even be as simple as trading 
lore with instructors from other institutions over a meal. The point of the “field level 
inquiry” portion of the heuristic is to expand inquiry beyond one’s immediate writing 
program context. How that hashes out will vary between instructors. I’ll have more to say 
about field-level inquiry a bit later, but there is yet one more cross-institutional feasibility 
issue that must be addressed, a veritable elephant in the living room (or shared 
department office). 
 One final cross-institutional objection centers on labor: in a field where 
instructors are already asked to do so much, is complex accommodation the proverbial 
straw that breaks the adjunct’s back? When kept within rhetorics of requirement and 
framed as an imperative, complex accommodation might be taken as an additional 
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burden, especially for overtaxed instructors. However, when approached within a rhetoric 
of affordance, complex accommodation may lose this burdensome aspect. As I show in 
Chapter 4, complex accommodation can be multidirectional: instructors are not merely 
accommodating student’s learning styles and needs, but they are accommodating their 
own teaching styles and capacities. There is no reason why labor expenditure cannot or 
should not be a component of such inquiry and deliberation. Additionally, as I continue to 
underscore, complex accommodation is utterly flexible and a function of possibility 
within context, so it does not necessarily imply specific courses of action. Where 
complex accommodation does imply certain courses of action, it creates possibility for 
various sorts of proceduralizations that may clarify and—in some senses—simplify 
ambiguous, stressful, and inefficient processes (like ad hoc accommodation). Ultimately, 
these responses are vague, and the vagueness is a function of trying to address the 
possibilities across contexts. 
 How complex accommodation really works—its affordances, its limitations—will 
be a function of local context, of individual schools, writing programs, classrooms, 
teachers, and students. How it affects standards, how it constructs ability and disability, 
and even its practical feasibility will all depend on particular instructors in particular 
writing programs in particular institutions working with particular students. As such, 
there is much research to be done on complex accommodation, research that will 
continue the inquiry begun here. 
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Further Research and Directions for Inquiry  
In general terms, complex accommodation needs ethnographic research from multiple 
sites before its overall utility might be discussed with any degree of specificity. Thick 
analyses of complex accommodation will help us to see how it might impact standards, 
but more importantly, it will help show whether and how it might be implemented at 
different types of institutions with different structures. 
 One of the limitations of the current project—as I’ve indicated previously—is that 
I am immersed in both Composition Studies and Disability Studies. In addition, I 
currently work within a large progressive writing program, staffed by highly-experienced 
instructors who undergo continual professional development and who participate in and 
help constitute a vibrant writing program culture. Complex accommodation would 
doubtlessly look very different at different institutions, with different instructors, and 
with different student bodies. Accordingly, a future direction into complex 
accommodation might compare its implementation at different schools (R1, small private 
institutions, community colleges, etc.), by different levels of instructor (MA-level 
education, PhD-level, contingent faculty, tenured faculty, etc.), in different programmatic  
structures (writing studies programs, English departments, humanities departments, etc.). 
This type of research can help shed light on how complex accommodation might be more 
or less specified, whether it is practicable in some writing programs but not others, and a 
host of other informing results. Of course, an integral component of such research would 
be tracking attitudinal shifts that might occur as a result of complex accommodation. 
 Complex accommodation embraces social approaches to disability that also 
account for the ways in which embodiment (including impairment) relates to, interacts 
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with, and constructs disability. However, instructors, students, and even broader 
programs wherein complex accommodation might occur may subscribe to more 
medicalized conceptions of disability. As complex accommodation is structured to 
reverse the direction of fit by inquiring into (and potentially changing) structurally- and 
systemically-disabling practices, environments, and ideologies, research should be 
conducted into whether and how complex accommodation may shift attitudes on 
disability. How does complex accommodation shift instructor’s attitudes from medical to 
social models of disability, or does it leave attitudes unaffected? How does the 
administrative framing of disability suggested by complex accommodation—the syllabus 
alterations, the ad hoc negotiations, the course evaluations—affect students’ perceptions 
of disability? Do instructors even implement complex accommodation when they are not 
required to do so? 
 One concern I have with complex accommodation, especially in terms of further 
research, is whether it ought to be required of instructors. In one sense, complex 
accommodation ties up a number of compositional best practices is a neat package: it 
invites reflection, metacognition, exploration of other ways of teaching and doing 
composition. I wonder, though, what happens to the “rhetoric of affordance” if complex 
accommodation becomes a programmatic requirement. Could complex accommodation 
become as reified and proceduralized as ad hoc accommodation is in some contexts? Part 
of me thinks that complex accommodation is structured in such a way that such 
ossification is impossible in the ways in which it depends so heavily on inquiry rather 
than algorithmic procedure. But this raises the following question: if complex 
accommodation is voluntary, why would instructors choose to participate in it? This is far 
  179 
from a simple question. Exploring why or why not instructors would utilize complex 
accommodation can reveal where priorities, values, and exigencies lie at different 
institutions and among different instructors. Such data could be helpful for “selling” 
complex accommodation to instructors in different ways, but it could also be invaluable 
for institutions and the field in general insofar as it can create snapshots of instructor 
priorities and senses of the means and ends of composition.  
 The reception, critique, and effects of complex accommodation at the field level 
may reveal much about both complex accommodation and the field as a whole. As 
instructors and scholars critique complex accommodation, what do these critiques focus 
on? For example, focused critique on practical implementation might reveal anxieties 
about, or preferences for, more rigid proceduralizaiton. Alternatively, I can imagine 
critical focus falling on complex accommodation’s alignment with social and complex 
models of disability. A field-level response along this vector may be revealing about 
dissonances (or consonances) between different scholars and the CCCC organization as a 
whole (at least in terms of model alignment). Which programs implement it, how they 
implement it, and why may also provide valuable insight into the field’s (and different 
institutions’) willingness and ability to approach disability more systemically. In the 
broadest strokes, I wonder if and how complex accommodation might change scholars’, 
practitioners’, and programs’ senses of the purposes and ends of composition. 
 Throughout this project, I’ve discussed how complex accommodation changes the 
directions and kinds of fit that accommodation creates. But it does more than this. It 
begins with the encounter of disability as a moment of kairos, a moment where certain 
sorts of inquiries and questions become opportunely possible when they may have 
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previously been impossible or inaccessible. Moving through the heuristics of complex 
accommodation and exploring how systems rather than individual student configurations 
create a lack of fit can then lead to further kairic moments (remembering, of course, that 
these are not necessary implications but only possibilities). When this inquiry happens at 
the local levels of the classroom and program, it becomes theorization: making sense of 
the articulations and imbrications of the practices, policies, and ideologies that frame and 
construct one’s composition class necessitates the construction of explanatory 
systematization. Put another way, the narratives that instructors track and create to make 
sense of the provenance and continuance of their practices, pedagogies, and policies 
create local explanatory theories of composition. Of course, these theories are utterly 
provisional and continually subject to change; in the process of complex accommodation, 
these theories are continually “passing,” to borrow the language of Donald Davidson and 
the Post-Process theorists. This is a metaphorical comparison, but it may be an important 
one.  
 Post-Process theorists who borrow from Davidson’s work use “prior” and 
“passing” theories to describe how we communicate with one another by drawing from 
background beliefs/knowledge (prior theories) to construct in-the-moment interpretive 
schemes to make sense of other people’s communicative attempts (“passing theories”). 
As Kent describes it: 
...people cannot communicate from nowhere; in order to communicate, you must 
be somewhere, and being somewhere—being positioned in relation to other 
language users—means that you always come with baggage, with beliefs, desires, 
hopes, and fears about the world. What matters is how we employ those beliefs, 
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desires, hopes, and fears to formulate passing theories in an attempt to interpret 
one another’s utterances and to make sense of the world. And, first, as the term 
“passing” suggests, a passing theory goes by us; it never ‘stops’ so that we can 
capture some sort of unitary, complete, or determinate meaning. Second, a 
passing theory “passes” away; it never endures, never works twice in quite the 
same way. Most important, generating passing theories—using our prior theories, 
our situatedness, to create utterances—can never be reduced to a predictable 
process. (4) 
In the above terms, as instructors tentatively move through complex accommodation, 
they are continually drawing from their prior theories—their knowledge about ability, 
pedagogy, program, policy, institution, composition itself—to create passing theories 
about how and why things are the way they are within the contexts instructors find 
themselves in. I have tried to underscore how complex accommodation, like the prior-
passing theory relationship, is underdetermined. Unlike post-process approaches to 
communication which may imply radical indeterminacy70, I do think that complex 
accommodation can be scaffolded even if it is underdetermined, hence the metaphorical 
rather than literal comparison between the two theoretical perspectives. That said, what 
happens at the level of field-level inquiry, the blank spot in complex accommodation’s 
                                                
70 One could run with the prior-passing theoretical dialectic all the way to asserting that 
communication is impossible or merely guesswork, but genre, efficiency (in the sense of 
communicative work actually happening), and linguistic stabilities seem to militate 
against such extremism, at least in practical terms. As Kent says, “All a prior theory 
amounts to is the background knowledge with which we begin in order to create passing 
theories. Our prior theories do not need to match the prior theories of other people; that 
is, we do not need to come from the same communities, nor do we need to believe the 
same things about the world or even speak the same language in order to communicate. 
However, there is no doubt that coming from the same community will help us 
communicate more efficiently and effectively” (4).  
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heuristics? Is it possible to scaffold complex inquiry at that level, or would such 
scaffolding defeat its purpose? 
 Throughout the last few chapters, I have kept the field-level inquiry portion of 
complex accommodation intentionally vague, and I have held off addressing it until the 
very end of this project. This is because I don’t want to suggest a specifiable way to 
engage in inquiry at the field level. Such a suggestion would itself be theory laden and 
risk determining the process. Complex accommodation is already shot through with 
theoretical commitments, and the theories that underwrite how I think about the field and 
how I might conduct research and inquiry at the field level might be insupportable in 
different contexts and by different people. This is not an attempt at intellectual slight-of-
hand or legerdemain. As I worked through the heuristics presented in this project, I 
initially began constructing a field-level heuristic but quickly realized that the 
“possibilities” that I created and tracked were so inflected by my own background—by 
my prior theories about composition—that they were subtly leading to disciplined ways 
of proceeding through field-level inquiry. The power and potential of complex 
accommodation lies in beginning from one’s own context, with one’s own students and 
their perspectives, and one’s own commitments and then to move through individual, 
programmatic, and institutional inquiries. Complex accommodation can suggest the sorts 
of questions to ask at these levels to stimulate inquiry, but even these questions are 
framed and shaped by local contexts. I hesitate to offer field-level suggestions and instead 
elect to wait and see what questions local instantiations of complex accommodation 
produce. In short, seeing how people conduct field-level inquiry, and how it comes to 
bear on complex accommodation and thinking about complex accommodation, should 
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itself be an object of research rather than a clean procedure. At that point, my own field-
level questions may more profitably join the conversation. Of course, I have not remained 
completely silent on my own field-level inquiry, as Chapter 4 evidences. However, given 
my anxieties about over-proceduralizing complex accommodation, I think it prudent to 
merely provide an example of field-level inquiry rather than anything that might be 
mistaken as a prescription. 
 
A Deliberate Conclusion 
At the end of this project, I recall the “deliberative procedure” elaborated and critiqued in 
Chapter 1. In that context, “deliberative procedure” was framed as a harmful and 
hegemonically-legitimizing mechanism, one that could continue to perpetrate 
marginalizing and disabling practices and ideologies in the composition classroom. Now, 
I invite the reader to reconsider the idea of a deliberative procedure in light of complex 
accommodation. In the encounter of a disabling practice or policy, it is my hope that 
compositionists and writing programs will continue to ask “How can we justify this?” In 
reversing the direction of accommodation, however, I believe this becomes a very 
different question, and what this question refers to, what it implies, what possibilities it 
creates might lead to fundamental changes in composition for all students and for all 
teachers of composition. 
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